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Abstract 
Summary 
 
Illegal drug trafficking and retail drug sales constitute the most common activity of organised 
crime groups in the UK and draw the largest share of resources from the police and prison 
services, whilst also generating considerable social costs.  There are few contemporary studies 
in the UK on the supply of drugs, its organisation, culture and risk management practices, and 
even fewer on active dealers themselves. There remains limited ethnographic research into the 
drug trade, missing important insights that can be gained from observing distributors in a 
natural setting. A key absence in criminological literature is the voice of offenders who commit 
serious crimes and how they perceive and mitigate problems related to their activities. This 
research aims to fill gaps in the knowledge base by investigating the nature of the drug market, 
the crime risk management practices of drug dealers, and possible reasons for their involvement 
and patterns of activity. The study examines the criminal careers of offenders who operate in 
one of Britain’s largest cities, termed here anonymously as Red City. The participants in this 
study distribute and manufacture a range of illicit substances, both offline and online. They 
distribute drugs on local, national and international levels (retail, wholesale, import and 
export). To complement the fieldwork, interviews were conducted with official actors from the 
criminal justice system, the private sector and the third sector. The thesis seeks to provide a 
more nuanced and grounded picture of illicit drug dealing and ‘organised crime’, that provides 
an account that corrects popular stereotypes. The chapters proceed as follows: 
 
Outline of the thesis 
 
Chapter one provides the introduction to the thesis. It identifies the research problem, sets the 
contexts of the study and explains how the thesis contributes to the field. Chapter two outlines 
the theoretical framework for the thesis; it combines life course criminology with perspectives 
taken from research on organised crime. It examines organised crime in terms of markets, 
networks, and organisations. Chapter three describes the methodological approach employed 
in this study and considers the ethical and practical challenges of researching illegal activity. 
Chapter four addresses the ‘start’ of the criminal career when actors first become drug dealers. 
It follows the lives of the ‘lads’, who make up a core of the participants in the study. Chapter 
five examines how drug dealing is conducted in the city streets. It draws upon ethnographic 
data from two parallel drug markets that sit at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of their 
harms and ‘legitimacy’. Chapter six provides a sociohistorical analysis of organised crime in 
the nightclub scene to the present day. It draws upon insights from bouncers and drug dealers 
working in the field. Chapter seven addresses the effects of emergent technology in the drug 
trade. It examines how offenders employ digital technologies, both offline and online. Chapter 
eight addresses the desistance phase in the life-course. It discusses the factors that facilitate 
and inhibit desistance for individuals and groups of offenders. Chapter nine outlines and 
evaluates the key findings in the thesis. It makes policy recommendations to mitigate problems 
related to drugs and organised crime in the future. Throughout all chapters of the analysis, 
comparisons are made between offenders working in different drug markets and settings, to 
assess the relationship between their activities and the characteristics of the marketplace in 
question. The study finds that drug markets that are closest to ‘legitimacy’, in terms of their 
legal status and the public perception of the drugs, can have less risks for distributors. In light 
of this, they may be sold more openly and accrue lower levels of exploitation in the trade. 
Overall, this thesis demonstrates how serious offenders operate in rapidly evolving criminal 
markets, providing a significant contribution to the knowledge base. 
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1) Introduction 
 
The ‘War on Drugs’ on the Door 
  
Since my ten years working as a bouncer, I've seen Red City's drug market change remarkably 
in some ways but in other ways stay exactly the same. I started out my foray into the industry 
in a club called Inertia; a venue that was in a white working-class area and a fair few miles 
from the city centre. Inertia catered mainly to the local hooligans whose idea of a good night 
was a few lines of cocaine and a punch up. The brawls were inevitable once the punters became 
fully intoxicated and somewhat frustrated due to their lack of success with the women. If social 
status could not be found through sex, it was found through violence. I myself had a pint glass 
rammed into my face a few years earlier after getting dragged into a dispute because of some 
girls we had ‘pulled’ and a rival ‘gang’ who felt they were in the wrong company. The dress 
code was sharp, and bloodied shirts were a regular feature of the door staff at the end of the 
night. The bouncers were a combination of bodybuilders jacked on steroids and professional 
fighters. At 6 feet 5 inches tall and 18 stone of muscle mass, I fitted the part quite well. I moved 
on from Inertia quickly as I needed more hours to pay my bills, and in truth, I did not like the 
violence. I settled at a popular club called Space in the city centre, where I became close friends 
with some Iranian 'gangsters’ who ran the door. This was early 2009 and the music scene was 
in the process of change. Space held a variety of events from live music to underground drum 
and bass raves that were popular with the burgeoning student crowd. Drum and bass raves 
had become more hospitable and less violent than they were in my youth but still had a cohort 
of the inner-city urban poor; a mix of second-generation English Jamaicans and local white 
English. These were the city’s ‘outcasts’ left behind during its rapid economic development. 
The structural inequalities that led to their harsh socio-economic backgrounds pushed them to 
drug dealing and often robbery. If you were a student in the rave scene, seeking drugs from 
these guys was always a risk.  
  
The policy on the door of Space was loose, searches were irregular, and many punters got in 
with dubious IDs or none at all; not to mention the drugs they were carrying. Depending on 
the night, the drug of choice was cocaine or MDMA. A few people risked smoking cannabis 
inside but were easy to find due to the drug’s pungent odour. Drug dealing was not permitted, 
and toilet searches were common. A couple of regular dealers were given a pass as long they 
were discreet and did not cause any trouble. Although anti-drugs, the Iranians felt it was better 
to control who was allowed to sell inside rather than go after everyone. The dealers also acted 
as informants, reporting on people causing trouble. It was an arrangement that worked until 
the dealers became too brazen. In the same year, a ‘legal high’ called M-Cat (mephedrone) hit 
the market and was hugely popular. With gurning effects similar to MDMA, and a strong smell 
of ‘cats piss’, the users were readily identifiable. M-Cat was a potent drug, cheap at £20 per 
gram and easily available from head shops, the internet or local drug dealers. Many of the 
dealers were middle-class students who got pulled into the trade eager to cash in on this white 
powdered ‘gold rush’. Ketamine also spiked in popularity, although was more of a niche drug. 
Again, its usage was highly visible due to its paralyzing effects when consumed in large doses. 
It was not uncommon to see people pass out on the dance floor as it suddenly kicked in. I saved 
who I could, but others were not so lucky and pummelled into the floor face first and defecated 
themselves. More experimental users would combine a number of drugs together (M-
Cat/MDMA, ketamine, cocaine and alcohol); this was the fabled ‘monkey mix’, named so due 
to its combination of gurning, paralysis and stimulatory effects on the user; it was not a good 
look. M-Cat has now all but disappeared from the city since it was classified as a Class B drug 
following negative press stories. Nitrous oxide has also seen a continual rise of popularity; 
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however, its availability has decreased somewhat since the Psychoactive Substance Act 2016. 
The larger ‘official’ enterprises with their websites and delivery services have withdrawn, 
leaving violent street vendors who get into regular territorial disputes outside the clubs. Again, 
the media did a thorough job of stigmatising the drug, however, its popularity has not waned 
dramatically. 
 
I write this vignette in the early evening whilst working on the door of a small bar called Jax. 
It is a popular bar on the outskirts of Drayton; an inner-city area in the later stages of 
gentrification. There are few altercations at Jax, and the nights can be quite mundane; the days 
of resolving constant fights at places like Intertia are, fortunately, long behind me. The 
management gave up asking me to put my phone away years ago and are content to put up 
with this due to my competence at other aspects of the job. It is difficult to get hold of competent 
door staff, since the industry has become flooded with unskilled, inexperienced bouncers from 
a variety of backgrounds. These are people who are unable to manage the door or deal with 
disputes effectively. I am good at my job and get paid far too little for what I do. Even if 
altercations are infrequent, I still receive regular death threats. The wages have increased little 
since I started in the industry and some companies scarcely cover the minimum wage as, in a 
time of austerity, people are desperate for work. As I stand here writing this, the atmosphere 
out on the street is lively and jovial. The punters pass by in buoyant conversation, and early 
evening positivity, that is often expressed in anticipation of the ‘good’ night ahead. A couple 
across the street are not doing so well and a heated dispute ensues around some personal issue 
I can’t quite make out. A number of beggars capitalise upon the rapid flow of people and skitter 
around feverishly, amassing what small change they can to fund their drug addictions. The 
heroin, crack and spice markets cater to this user group to which drug deals take place away 
from the club scene in sheltered streets, back alleys or people’s homes. These dealing patterns 
are common to all types of drugs, and many users come into the club pre-prepared for the 
evening ahead. Others will try and source drugs on the night itself and may spend their 
evenings trying to get hold of them. 
  
Since 2008 I have worked in around 30 different venues and was head of security in a number 
of them. My longest stay was in Space and the club has changed significantly in terms of its 
clientele, its music and also its drug policy. Searches are now a regular feature of the club and 
people found with drugs are stopped and arrested. The police have a close relationship with 
the venue, as part of their intensified multiple agency approach. There are a few clubs in the 
city that follow this regime, but most do not and will simply confiscate drugs, destroy them, 
keep them for personal use or, in some cases, sell them on. Whatever the case, drugs are a 
pivotal feature of the club scene and are here to stay. It is now approaching 11 pm and a queue 
is beginning to form on the door around me. It is time for me to put my phone away and get on 
with the job. I am just but one of many people in the night-time economy, whose work is 
channelled in ways to extract as much money from these punters as possible. The distribution 
of psychoactive substances, whether legal or not, is an essential part of this process, as clubs 
would not be popular without them. 
 
 
  
 5 
Organised Crime in Red City 
 
‘Organised crime’ is an umbrella term used to describe a variety of criminal acts now defined 
by the government as ‘serious’ in nature. These include drugs trafficking, cybercrime, modern 
slavery, theft, fraud, corruption, money laundering, and counterfeiting. Generally, organised 
crime involves the supply of illicit goods and services and is carried out by a number of 
collaborating conspirators. There remains no agreed upon-definition and its vagueness is a 
matter of contention (Von Lampe 2019). Nonetheless, it is a problem that is costly to society 
and generates considerable harms. It is estimated that organised crime costs the UK £37 billion 
annually (HM Government 2018a). In 2018 the National Crime Agency published the Serious 
and Organised Crime Strategy, which set organised crime as a national priority above terrorism 
(ibid). Nonetheless, there remains a shortage of rigorous empirical studies documenting and 
analysing the problem in the UK. Official conceptions of organised crime are plagued with 
stereotypes that depict the problem as being undertaken by violent mono-ethnic 'alien’ groups. 
In regard to drugs, the common image of the dealer is that of inner-city street gangs dominating 
the retail level, whereas international trafficking is said to be carried out by foreign crime 
groups of exotic and ‘dangerous’ origins. These stereotypes have been further reimagined in 
the so-called phenomenon of ‘county lines’ where vicious drug gangs spread to rural areas in 
search of market opportunities, exploiting vulnerable adults and children to distribute their 
products: a concept which has been uncritically accepted by some academics (see: Coomber 
and Moyle 2017; Spicer 2018; Robinson et al. 2019).  
 
Whilst there may be an element of truth to the representations of the problem, there is a 
tendency for the media and police to distort and amplify crime issues into grotesque caricatures 
that then feed back into the policy discourse (Pearson 1983; Cohen 2002). The simplicity of 
notions of organised crime fails to account for the intricacies of criminal networks and crudely 
depicts the actors who constitute them. This study aims to redress several gaps in knowledge 
in the field of 'organised crime', and enhance our understanding of criminal networks, markets 
and of organised criminals themselves. It draws upon accounts with criminal actors across a 
range of social demographics, ethnic backgrounds and genders. It examines the criminal 
careers of offenders who distribute a variety of different drugs in a number of different settings; 
with a particular focus at the retail level. To complement the fieldwork, interviews were 
conducted with official actors from the criminal justice system, the private sector and the third 
sector. The majority of the offenders in the study are white English citizens of UK origin, 
reflecting the fact that most organised crime in the UK is conducted by UK citizens (Hobbs 
1998, 2013). The research involved fieldwork with a variety of criminal actors, such as those 
who did not distribute drugs but who engaged in extra-legal governance, exacting extreme 
forms of instrumental violence (Campana and Varese 2018). Whilst organised crime is 
primarily about money, it is also significantly about respect and social status. For many, it is 
an outlet for their physical talents that have limited use in the legitimate economy, since 
deindustrialisation has ravaged traditional jobs of the working class.  For others, it is part of a 
lifestyle choice that reflects the hedonism of the party in the 24-hour city. According to the 
convention of the UNODC (2004), organised crime is defined as:  
 
“a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences 
established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (UNODC 2004, p. 5).  
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This definition is so broad, however, that it accounts for all of the participants in this study 
regardless of how they operate. The UK takes a slightly different tack by adding the term 
‘serious’ to the mix to denote crimes that are more harmful in nature:  
 
“we define serious and organised crime as individuals planning, coordinating and 
committing serious offences, whether individually, in groups and/or as part of 
transnational networks” (HM Government 2018a, p. 14).  
 
This second definition is equally problematic as not only does it refer to groups but also 
individuals. In this respect, organised crime has become any criminal act that is ‘serious’ but 
what counts as serious is another matter entirely. This all-encompassing ambiguity provides 
little use when it comes to actually analysing criminal acts. According to Levi (2012), the 
concept of organised crime is ‘‘a floating signifier’ of social danger, allowing interpreters to 
read what they like into it’ (Levi 2012, p. 595). The label is socially constructed by official 
actors who place it upon certain criminal acts and types of offenders (Becker 1963; Von Lampe 
1999). It is a highly subjective process and open to interpretation. 
  
The conceptual problems with the term have not stopped UK police forces operationalising it 
in order to identify and map out criminal groups across the country. The Organised Crime 
Group Mapping System generates numerical scores which are assigned to criminal groups in 
local areas. These groups are placed into bands based on the severity of their acts, their level 
of capability and also their sophistication (HMIC 2015, p. 36). This method, however, presents 
a simplified and static representation of criminal activity that fails to recognise its dynamic and 
often chaotic nature: 
  
“interpreting data, the result of the actions of the police, as if they represent real 
criminal activity or criminal trends can give the impression of a stable, ‘mappable’ 
community, rather than a volatile, market-based series of fluid and mutating 
collaborations. Beyond the computer-generated network charts that are designed 
by the police to freeze frame and simplify complex interactions, there is a chaotic, 
emotional world of loyalty, distrust, wealth, debt, cold business calculation,  fierce 
hedonism and impulsive risk-taking.” (Hobbs 2014, p. 16). 
 
There is a tendency to conceive organised crime as a singular definable and 
measurable thing whereas in reality, organised crime is a process which is both situated and 
changeable (Edwards and Levi 2008). Criminal actors adapt to fluctuating opportunities and 
constraints that are available to them, throughout the course of their criminal and non-criminal 
careers. Instead of accepting official definitions, this thesis applies a more nuanced approach 
by examining how illicit drug dealing is organised through criminal collaborations and the 
relationship this has with the life-course of offending. It attempts to examine what affects the 
organisational, and operational, features of drug dealing both within the criminal act and also 
within the criminal career. Moreover, it looks toward conceptualising the issue on a case by 
case basis through grounded ethnography that uncovers both the process and meaning of the 
activity for the very actors that carry it out. Criminology does and always has had an 
unreasonable distance from the people who make the discipline possible, the criminals 
themselves. Yet, it is through spending time with offenders and being out in their natural 
environment that a detailed picture of their life-worlds can be drawn. 
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Drugs in the UK and the Framing of the Problem 
 
The UK has a long history of social problems relating to the use and distribution of 
psychoactive substances, although they were not always illegal. The 1920 Dangerous Drugs 
Act in Britain was the first act to criminalise drugs, responding to concerns around the use of 
opium and cocaine. The act marks the birth of the current prohibition system (Seddon 2009), 
which has been significantly reformed until present day. Illicit drugs are now governed legally 
by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016. The framing of 
the drug problem in terms of organised crime, however, emerged in the mid 1980s, influenced 
by international developments on the political stage, alongside a sense that young people in the 
UK were ‘at risk’. The apparent threat of organised crime moved to the forefront of political 
discussion, triggering a number of policy reforms, legislation and international treaties. The 
growth in the trafficking of narcotics at this time was a major concern as suppliers responded 
to the increased demand for their products in the developed world. In 1987, for example, 
Reagan’s Presidential Commission amassed a 500-page interim report on drugs, compared to 
a 2-paragraph statement in a previous report 20 years earlier (Albanese 1988). In his words, 
“illegal drugs were every bit as much a threat to the United States as enemy planes and 
missiles… we're going to dry up the drug market and kick the dope peddlers right out of this 
country” (Reagan 1986). Margaret Thatcher, then UK prime minister, expressed similar 
sentiments, “it is perhaps the most lucrative form of crime and the most terrible that the world 
has ever known. One of the most terrible in its fundamental effects and how rapidly it can 
spread if you do not stop it” (Thatcher 1986). In an effort to address this ‘new menace’, the UK 
introduced the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, the first act to tackle the financial proceeds 
of drugs in the UK. In a similar vein came the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Again, the issue was framed in terms 
of organised crime. Overall, the 1980s marks a time where drugs were seen as a significant 
threat to the UK, with the primary contributors being organised criminals of foreign origin. The 
rhetoric remains much the same to this day, however modest the impact on the availability of 
drugs. 
 
In the UK (2017-2018) it is estimated that around 9% of adults aged between 16 and 59 have 
taken illicit drugs in the last year (around 3 million people). Class-A drug use among people 
aged between 16 and 24 has also increased since 2011. Cannabis remains the most common 
drug of choice with 7.2% of adults aged between 16 and 59 having used it in the last year, 
followed by powdered cocaine at 2.6%. MDMA is also popular at 1.7% of the same age group. 
Drugs such as heroin and crack are also consumed regularly, as are a number of other drugs 
including a plethora of new psychoactive substances that mimic the effects of existing 
substances. According to the EMCDDA (2018), deaths from drug overdose are now at record 
levels. In 2018 the UK had a total of 3070 deaths from drug overdoses; the highest rate in the 
EU (ibid). Since the financial crisis of 2008, the UK has consistently cut funding to the 
treatment and rehabilitation of addicts. Indeed, around 60% of local authorities have had their 
budgets cut for drug and alcohol services in the last year (Independent 2019). Criminal groups 
step in to supply drugs that are in popular demand, and governments appear powerless to stop 
them. 
 
In terms of distribution, county lines currently dominates the policy and media discourse on 
drugs around concerns of violence and exploitation in the trade. Criminal groups are depicted 
as being predatory, highly organised, hierarchically structured and geographically far reaching 
(in line with popular conceptions of organised crime more generally). The thesis finds, 
however, that most drug markets are relatively civilised and do not operate in this way 
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(although, there are some that do). These popular representations can disrupt proper thinking 
about the drug trade and what is actually threatening or harmful. Previous UK research on 
organised crime has found that criminal groups tend to be local, loosely organised, limited in 
size and scope, and often ephemeral (Hobbs 1998; Matrix Knowledge Group 2007; Hobbs 
2013; Salinas 2018). A central argument of this thesis is that drug markets are far from 
homogenous and have particular features that alter the modus operandi of the very actors that 
engage in them. The structure and methods of criminal groups differ depending on the type of 
drugs sold, their place within the supply chain and the setting in which they operate (online 
and offline). This also relates to both entry to and exit from drug markets throughout the 
criminal career. The study finds that drug markets that are closest to ‘legitimacy’ (Smith 1980) 
in terms of their legal status and the public perception of the drugs, can have less risks for 
distributors. In light of this, they may be sold more openly and accrue lower levels of 
exploitation in the trade. This study argues, therefore, that drug dealers operate across an 
ecology of risk that presents opportunities and contingencies in relation to the activities of state 
and non-state actors within the settings they operate. Relationships around trust are essential to 
reducing these risks, but this relates to the type of drug market and also the level of the supply 
chain. 
 
A further salient topic of concern, which is central to county lines offending and drug dealing 
in general, is technology and crime; however, there are few ethnographic studies that examine 
this aspect of offending. Technology allows old crimes to be committed in new ways and 
enables entirely new types of crime altogether; some of which are fully dependant on it 
(McQuade 2006; Levi et al. 2015). The central argument of this thesis is that technology 
reduces risks for distributors and increases the availability of drugs, which has the effect of 
increasing purity levels and reducing costs. It alters the methods criminal actors use as well as 
their geographical movements. It can replace human actors as tasks are delegated to it (Latour 
1994), as well as providing new environments in which to offend. There exists a continuum 
between the analogue and the digital in which traditional forms of organised crime are 
enhanced by emergent technologies but also reconfigured through their application. The study 
finds that rather than replacing the physical territories of the terrestrial city, ICT extends them 
into online environments with the effect of re-orientating the movements of criminal groups as 
they interact with and within them. Whilst ICT can enhance crime, it also poses additional risks 
due to the significant amounts of data that it generates. Indeed, we live in an era of ubiquitous 
digital surveillance in which technologies provide new tools for state control. Within these 
conditions, offenders and crime controllers adapt and alter their practices whilst gearing up on 
new hardware to outmanoeuvre and derail their opponents. It is this mutability that drives the 
technological uptake within enforcement agencies and the criminal networks they seek to 
control (Dorn 2003; Ekblom 2017). The study examines the impact of digital technology 
within the illicit drug trade, drawing upon the experiences of offenders who distribute drugs 
both offline and online. It examines how offenders operate within different settings under 
conditions of heavy digital surveillance. The remaining chapters proceed as follows:  
 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2) Literature Review: Theoretical Framework. This chapter provides the theoretical 
framework for the thesis. It combines life-course criminology with perspectives taken from 
research on organised crime. It examines organised crime in terms of markets, networks, and 
organisations. Developmental and life-course criminology (DLC) and research on organised 
crime have, until fairly recently, remained independent criminological subfields utilising 
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distinct theoretical frameworks that are suitable to their lines of enquiry. Although the 
separation between these two disciplines has begun to fade, there still remains more that can 
be done to harness the theoretical and methodological contributions of each (especially in cases 
where researchers aim to study the criminal careers of serious offenders).  Drawing upon the 
work of Sampson and Laub (1995), the research demonstrates how criminal careers develop 
through particular trajectories and turning points that relate to significant changes in their lives 
and the environments in which they are in. This is combined with the work of Kleemans (2013), 
who argues that involvement in organised crime can be determined by social opportunity 
structures that present themselves at different times throughout the criminal career. The 
research thus employs an age-graded theory of opportunity structures that examines the 
trajectories and turning points of serious offenders whilst considering the effects that close 
social bonds have upon them. 
 
The first half of the theoretical framework is dedicated to providing explanations of the 
criminal career but does not account for the actual doing of crime in which offenders coordinate 
themselves to conduct their activities. The thesis thus proposes three ideal types of social 
coordination that relate to their respective theoretical positions used in the study of organised 
crime. 1) Markets: organised crime is a market-based activity that involves the supply of illicit 
goods and services. In this regard, crimes may be governed, to some extent, by economic laws 
of supply and demand. 2) Networks: organised crime cannot exist without networks of people. 
Networks provide the skills, resources and opportunities to conduct crime. It is the relationship 
to the network and the place within it that determines the behaviour and activities of offenders. 
3) Organisations: organised crime involves collaboration between both networks and groups 
of individuals. Organisations work towards shared goals and provide different levels of 
resources to commit crime. Networks and organisations are distinct analytical categories (Von 
Lampe 2016).  
 
Chapter 3) Methodology: Ethnographic Research in Criminal Settings. This chapter describes 
the methodological approach employed in this study and considers the ethical and practical 
challenges of researching illegal activity. The research involved me observing criminals who 
were active in the community committing serious crimes, some of whom are unknown to the 
police. Researching crime in action can be risky, and there may be obligations to disclose 
information to the police. Furthermore, covert research of any kind is often rejected by ethics 
committees due to issues around consent and personal safety in the field (whilst the dealers 
knew who I was, their customers did not). This chapter explains how I went about resolving 
these issues whilst getting my informants to trust me with highly sensitive information. The 
participants revealed information on crimes that could put them in prison for many years. As 
an insider to the group, I have privileged access to this information, but my relationship to the 
participants created further dilemmas that outsiders may not have experienced.    
 
Chapter 4) Entry: A Journey into Drugs. The first analysis chapter addresses the ‘start’ of the 
criminal career when actors first become drug dealers. It follows the lives of the ‘lads’, who 
make up a core of the participants in the study. It examines the factors and mechanisms that 
lead people towards crime in specific settings throughout their lives. Understanding why 
people begin offending is of particular importance in reducing crime: if interventions can be 
put in place to stop offenders from embarking on these journeys, significant social and 
economic benefits can be gained. Previous research in this field demonstrates that social 
networks provide opportunities to distribute drugs and determine the roles that people assume 
when they first become dealers (Murphy et al. 1990; Matrix Knowledge Group 2007; Werse 
and Müller 2016). These studies, however, do not consider the relationship between age and 
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settings in generating these networks to begin with. Overall, this chapter finds that personal 
circumstances, life experiences, and opportunities to sell drugs, largely dictate whether people 
will go on to sell them. 
 
Chapter 5) Street Dealing: Illicit Enterprise in Parallel Markets. The second analysis chapter 
examines how drug dealing is conducted in the city streets. It draws upon ethnographic data 
from two parallel drug markets that sit at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of their harms 
and ‘legitimacy’ (Smith 1980). Drug markets are diverse heterogeneous systems that have 
particular features that determine their structure. Drug markets differ in terms of their social 
acceptability and legal status, which can increase risks for distributors. There are few studies 
that actively compare the structure of the drug market, depending on the product sold. This 
chapter compares the heroin and crack trade against a semi-legitimate drug, nitrous oxide. It 
demonstrates how drug policy differentially constrains drug markets, observing more harm in 
those that are closest to illegality.  
 
Chapter 6) Organised Crime in the Night-Time Economy: Drugs, Vice & Violence. The third 
analysis chapter provides a sociohistorical analysis of organised crime in the club scene to the 
present day. It draws upon insights from bouncers and drug dealers working in the field. Night 
clubs are renowned for drug use, making them ideal places for drug dealers to occupy. The 
private sector controls the monopoly of violence in the industry employing private security 
staff to control access to the venues and keep them safe. The study found that bouncers involved 
in organised crime dispense a form of quasi-legal governance in which their role as licenced 
door supervisors allows them to control the drug markets within their premises. To minimise 
the hold that organised crime groups have on the sector, the government introduced Security 
Industry Authority (SIA) licences in 2001 to bar criminals from taking on these roles. 
Nonetheless, there remains little academic research that assesses the level of organised crime 
in this field today. 
 
Chapter 7) Dealing in the ‘Virtual’: Emergent Technologies, Drugs and the Internet. The fourth 
analysis chapter addresses the effects of emergent technology in the drug trade, with a 
particular focus on ICT. The UK has seen a dramatic shift between open, semi-open and closed 
drug markets (May and Hough 2004). These changes can be explained mostly by advances in 
technology and the need for protection and concealment from the law. Technological advances 
have benefited both criminals and the police resulting in what has been described as a digital 
arms race between these two groups (Ekblom 2017). Questions remain as to how criminal 
actors communicate and conduct their activities within these circumstances, and how they 
perceive and use emergent technology to meet their ends. Studies of online drug markets are 
growing but tend to ignore the offline lifeworld of those who engage in them. This thesis 
examines how criminal actors employ emergent technology in both physical and ‘virtual’ 
environments. 
 
Chapter 8) Exit: Kill My Name; The Road to Desistance. The final analysis chapter addresses 
the desistance phase in the life-course. It outlines the cycles and shifts between crime and 
legitimate work. Although research in this field is growing, it suffers from an actor orientated 
approach in that it does not consider the life-course of criminal organisations themselves. This 
chapter discusses the factors that facilitate and inhibit desistance for both individuals and 
groups of offenders. It demonstrates how they strategically select market opportunities, 
position themselves within their networks, or desist from crime entirely, to reduce the risk of 
prosecution. The study examines the relationship between settings, social networks and group 
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dynamics, providing an important contribution to the knowledge base. Overall, the analysis 
chapters can be roughly differentiated along the lines of becoming, doing and withdrawing. 
 
Chapter 9) Conclusion. The final concluding chapter outlines and evaluates the key findings in 
the thesis and makes suggestions toward further research in this field. It makes policy 
recommendations towards the legalisation of drugs to help mitigate the economic and social 
costs of organised crime in the future.  
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2) Literature Review: Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework for the thesis drawing upon insights from 
developmental and life-course criminology (DLC) combined with concepts on organised 
crime. Research into these fields has developed significantly, yet they remain relatively distinct 
from one another, leaving a conceptual gap in the knowledge base. Academics researching 
organised crime can benefit from the concepts and findings of DLC based research, especially 
when examining criminal careers. Similarly, research on DLC could benefit from a synthesis 
of organised crime literature when investigating the careers of organised criminals. The fields 
themselves are far from homogeneous, however, as is evident in the split between 
developmental and life-course criminology. Research into organised crime is much the same 
with researchers applying sometimes contrasting methods and theoretical frameworks to the 
object of study. This chapter aims to draw upon the most relevant contributions of each to 
devise a theoretical framework that is best suited towards the aims of this study and 
investigating the problem more generally. It will critically evaluate these works to highlight 
their benefits whilst recognising the limits of each. 
 
It must be kept in mind that the theoretical positions identified in this review are social 
constructs and as such, are open to scrutiny. They represent ideal types of social life that 
systematize features of empirical reality by focusing on some elements and excluding others 
to isolate patterns in behaviour (Psathas 2005). The resulting output, however, may be 
somewhat abstract from the phenomenon itself. It is unlikely that criminal actors perceive their 
life-worlds in this way, and this is important because the way they see the world has 
implications for how they act within it. By imposing a priori categories, the social scientist may 
miss social activity that goes against commonly held positions and force social life into boxes 
that it does not belong. Here we can take insights from cultural criminology which: 
 
 “actively seeks to dissolve conventional understandings and accepted boundaries, 
whether they confine specific criminological theories or the institutionalized 
discipline of criminology itself” (Ferrell et al. 2008, p. 5).  
 
It is not, therefore, only the framing of structures which can be challenged but the relationships 
that structures are said to have on the actors within them. To grasp the process in which crime 
is organised, we need to understand how actors perceive their world as this may lead them to 
action. This is where a cultural analysis which locates structural dynamics within lived 
experience can help (Ferrell 1998; Young 2011). Organised crime is a process emerging from 
constant negotiations between actors of varying beliefs and cultures that are situated within the 
structures we identify.  
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Criminal Careers 
 
Developmental and life-course criminology is a wide-ranging multidisciplinary perspective 
that draws upon biology, psychology, and sociology. Its foundations lie in earlier theories of 
the criminal career that became popular in the 1980s.  Developmental criminology focuses on 
background causal risk factors that are said to increase the likelihood of offending and the 
development of the criminal career. Life-course criminology similarly attends to these factors 
but also considers the consequences of life events and transitions (Farrington 2003). Both 
approaches use mainly statistical methods, although some life course-studies have combined 
them with qualitative narrative interviews (Sampson and Laub 1995, 2005), whether with 
‘offenders’ and families or with control agencies such as police data and commentaries. The 
positivist risk factor paradigm is dominant in criminology and provides foundations for the 
‘what works’ approach to evidence-based policy and crime control (Farrington et al. 2003). 
Static risk factors that occur early in life are said to be the most important element in predicting 
future criminality. This model has been criticised for its determinism with offenders seemingly 
‘locked in’ to their trajectories with little consideration of human agency (Sampson and Laub 
2005). The consensus within DLC is that people desist with age regardless of the differences 
between them (Benson 2012), although it may be that at least some have become better at 
avoiding arrest so do not show up in statistics (Ouellet and Bouchard 2017; Gundur 2019). Age 
is associated with maturation and competence in criminal activity (Hirschi and Gottfredson 
1983).  
 
The majority of DLC studies are explicitly or implicitly founded upon variations of social 
control theory and differential association. Differential association is a social learning theory 
of crime. The central point of the theory is that crime is learned through association with others, 
particularly through close social ties. Learning includes motives (criminality) as well as 
techniques for deviant activities (crime itself). Differential levels of association with criminals 
and non-criminals will result in different levels of criminality (Sutherland et al. 1995). The 
main tenets of social control theory are that people turn to crime when their bond with society 
is weakened. Latent deviant tendencies are restrained by internal and external forms of social 
control, which are enforced by control agents. Conformity is attainted through informal 
mechanisms of socialisation from family or peers or formal mechanisms relating to institutions 
such as the police. When the bonds to these agents are weakened, people deviate from the norm 
and engage in criminal activity (Hirschi 2002).  
 
The application of social control theory and differential association to the study of organised 
crime may be limited. Not everyone who engages in organised crime will originate from a 
disaffected background where their bonds to society are weakened or will spend time with 
deviant peers (Kleemans and de Poot 2008). This is partly a methodological issue: DLC 
concentrates on the usual suspects whilst ignoring the crimes of the powerful (Drake et al. 
2014). Criminal groups do, however, use mechanisms of social control to reduce risks and 
enforce order in the underworld (Reuter 1984; Jacques and Wright 2011) so the theory may 
gain some traction here. A further issue is that these are general theories of crime, which 
approach the object of study with broad brush strokes. By following this line of reasoning, 
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DLC studies unwittingly align themselves with the nomothetic impulse of criminological 
positivism that attempts to establish general laws of human behaviour (Young 2011). There 
are, however, manifold differences between types of organised crime, and between the effects 
of contextually contingent factors that impact upon them (Von Lampe 2016). An idiographic 
approach that is orientated towards the study of localised phenomena can provide a deeper 
understanding of the process in which organised crimes occurs (Edwards and Hughes 2005). 
This thesis utilises ethnographic fieldwork grounded in the experiences and cultures of 
indigenous criminal actors to provide a more nuanced understanding of the careers of organised 
criminals that avoids gross generalisations. Extensive research strategies that employ risk 
factors and or general theories of crime may not be enough. 
 
DLC studies are typically longitudinal and map the criminal career over the course of many 
decades. This method is well suited to the analysis of statistical datasets and also interviews 
with offenders (if they can be accessed for follow up interviews later in their lives). 
Ethnography, however, involves the researcher being present in the life-worlds of the 
informants on an often, daily basis, which is resource-intensive and difficult to achieve. One 
of the only ethnographic studies on drugs and crime that has achieved anything near the DLC 
standard is MacLeod’s (2008) ‘Ain’t no makin’ it’, in which he followed the lives of two groups 
of teenage boys in a deprived housing estate in a northern city of America. MacLeod first got 
to know the boys by spending time with them in the community before approaching them for 
his study. After documenting their activities, he then returned eight years later once they had 
reached adulthood: The ‘Hallway Hangers’ were mainly white, were pessimistic about their 
life chances and rejected the education system. The ‘Brothers’ were mainly black, were 
optimistic about their futures and valued education as a means to achieve their goals. Upon 
returning, MacLeod found that neither groups fared well; the Hallway Hangers had 
experienced poverty, addiction and unemployment, whereas the brothers had experienced 
racism, discrimination and were unable to find well-paid, meaningful work (despite their 
aspirations). Although longitudinal research of this kind can be difficult to achieve 
ethnographically, life histories can be accessed through the reflective accounts of the 
informants. A number of ethnographic studies on drugs and crime have employed this method 
successfully (e.g. Bourgois 2003; Sandberg and Pedersen 2011; Goffman 2014; Briggs and 
Monge Gamero 2017). Perhaps the most concerted ethnographic study to trace the careers of 
offenders through interviews is Heal’s (2015) ‘Journeys into Drugs and Crime’, where she 
employed life-history, narrative interviews with UK based Jamaican drug dealers. Overall, 
these studies demonstrate the harsh reality of poverty and social exclusion that often leads 
people to crime. Distributing drugs only compounds their issues resulting in chaotic lives 
marred by violence, addiction and incarceration. The concentration of these studies on minority 
groups experiencing economic deprivation, however, is a limitation (Salinas 2018). These 
studies also focus on particular types of drugs, and or aspects of the market, at the expense of 
others (these methodological points will be returned to in the following chapter). 
 
 
Turning points and trajectories 
 
A significant contribution to studies on the life-course is provided by Sampson and Laub. They 
employ large quantitative data sets but combine these with life history narratives to provide a 
deeper analysis. They are critical of the determinism of developmental criminology which 
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purports that criminal careers can be predicted from early risk factors. They stress the 
importance of time specific contextual events and emphasise the importance of human agency 
(Sampson and Laub 2005). Criminal careers are not fixed; they are shifting dynamic 
movements that form organically into pathways of stability and change: 
 
“background variables are surprisingly modest prognostic devices in the 
prospective explanation of trajectories of crime over the life course. Within-
individual changes in criminality are not called forth from the distant past but are 
mediated by proximate and time-varying social processes grounded in life 
transitions, situational interactions, routine activities, and turning points.” 
(Sampson 2000, p. 712). 
 
Transitions are changes in the life-course that are marked by events such as getting married or 
starting a new job. Transitions lead into trajectories which are distinguished by more long term 
stability in a particular field: “transitions are always embedded in trajectories and give them 
distinct form and meaning” (Elder Jr 1985, p. 31). Turning points, on the other hand, entail 
sudden transformations in life, events that can “knife off the past from the present” (Sampson 
and Laub 2005, p. 7). Turning points into crime can knife off legitimate opportunities, as well 
as connections with law-abiding peers, especially if one finds oneself incarcerated. Desistance 
from crime may require that non-criminal ties are gained whilst criminal ties are cut. Turning 
points can result not only in a change of activity but also a change of identity (Elder Jr et al. 
2003). Sampson and Laub emphasise the notion of situated choice within turning points, 
arguing that life events are the consequence of continuous social production rather than a 
process of unfolding inevitability (Sampson and Laub 2005, p. 14). Turning points do, 
however, relate to wider social structures that are encountered during age-specific times such 
as starting school, work and later marriage. It is here they present an age-graded theory of 
social control that provides the foundations to their approach. 
 
 
Age graded opportunity structures 
 
An alternative approach to researching organised crime is to dispense with motives and look 
specifically at opportunities that enable crime itself. The argument here is that crime cannot 
take place without opportunities to do so, therefore, background factors are not relevant. This 
theory, however, is undermined by the fact that not everyone who has an opportunity will take 
it. The most widely cited theory of criminal opportunities is routine activities theory (RAT). 
According to Clarke (1980), crime occurs when a motivated criminal finds a suitable target 
that is not in the presence of a capable guardian. These opportunities arise in the routine 
activities of the offender’s everyday life. RAT is a social control theory of crime but differs by 
the fact that it is situational rather than normative. In the criminal career, routine activities are 
age-graded, meaning that people are likely to engage in different types of activities depending 
on their age, for example, school, work and marriage. The consensus within DLC studies is 
that engagement in education or work provides less time for unstructured and unsupervised 
activities where crime can take place, and that commitment to legitimate activities raises the 
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social and economic costs of engaging in crime. Research has shown that unstructured 
socialising outside of school relates to greater levels of violence and cannabis use in young 
people (Anderson and Hughes 2009) and employment in high quality jobs reduces the 
likelihood of offending.  Good jobs and meaningful work, however, are more important factors 
than the presence of work alone (Uggen 1999; Tripodi et al. 2010). Marriage is also a key factor 
in desistance, leaving offenders with less time for their criminal peers (Warr 1998; Sampson et 
al. 2006).  
 
Commitment to legitimate fields is generally viewed as a positive factor in the life-course, 
however, organised crime has distinct logistical requirements meaning that engagement in 
legitimate fields may be a precursor to it. Legitimate work can provide the actor with skills and 
resources for crime (van Koppen et al. 2009), and it can hide illicit activities such as the use of 
cash businesses to launder funds (Gilmour 2015). Furthermore, events such as marriage may 
encourage the offender to move into less risky and lower profile crimes, something that official 
data might not capture. According to Kleemans and de Poot (2008), organised criminals do not 
necessarily exhibit the typical characteristics of general offenders and may start their criminal 
careers in adulthood with no previous history of offending. They argue that social opportunity 
structures provide the greatest explanations for engagement in organised crime at any stage in 
the career. If criminal opportunities arise later in life, this can lead to late onset in offending. 
As with RAT, the issue with opportunity models is that they do not explain why some people 
take opportunities when others who are in the same position do not. Differential association 
may, in fact, provide a better explanation of criminal motives in this instance. Furthermore, 
opportunity models leave human agency by the wayside as criminal opportunities are simply 
responded to as they arise. This is not the case; offenders create their own opportunities as 
much as they respond to them (Steffensmeier and Ulmer 2005). Perhaps then, a more fruitful 
approach to the study of the careers of organised criminals is to employ an age-graded theory 
of opportunity structures that draws upon differential association and social control theory but 
is aware of the limits of each, whilst paying due credit to human agency.  
 
 
Markets, Networks & Organisations 
 
The review so far has mainly attended to the literature on criminal careers and its applicability 
to the study of organised crime but has given less consideration to the literature concerning 
organised crime itself. Questions remain as to how criminals coordinate themselves to carry 
out their activities whilst responding to market opportunities and threats. To account for this, 
the following section outlines three ideal types of social coordination which relate to their 
respective theoretical positions used in the study of organised crime: markets, networks and 
organisations. The integration of these approaches with DLC provides further conceptual 
grounding and sets the theoretical bases of the study.  
 
For the purpose of this study, a network is referred to as all actors who are connected by one 
or more social ties that engage in a related activity. Within the network, there are people who 
work independently or those who work as a team (an organization). What the actors within 
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these structures have in common is the activity they engage in; the distribution of illicit goods 
and services. They engage in a market-based activity that will be governed (to some extent) by 
the laws of supply and demand. These perspectives, however, represent ideal types of social 
coordination so cannot be taken as a given. The reality of social life is much more complex 
than can be perfectly delineated here. 
 
 
Markets 
 
The first approach that I will be referring to is the neoclassical model of market economics that 
is dominant in criminological research on organised crime. The fundamental argument is that 
organised crime is a market-based activity, so is best explained with theories and models from 
mainstream economics. A market can be defined as any structure that allows buyers and sellers 
to exchange goods, services, and information. The exchange of goods or services for money is 
called a transaction (Lefebvre 2013, p. 116). Markets usually have a name which often refers 
to the type of product being traded, but what is sold is does not necessarily determine how 
markets are structured. Markets are characterised by choice, evaluation and competition 
(Aspers 2011). Studies using this approach address supply side characteristics such as product 
pricing, profits, distribution systems, production and retail, and demand side characteristics 
such as consumption habits, costs of purchases and price elasticity (Ritter 2006).  
 
For products to sell, they need to be pitched at a reasonable price for both the distributor and 
the customer. This is what is called fair market value, a price that can be mutually agreed upon 
(Naylor 2003, p. 85). If drugs are priced too high and they can be sourced alternatively at a 
lower price, then customers may go elsewhere. Price also relates to purity, so users may be 
prepared to pay more for an unadulterated product (Caulkins and Padman 1993). The costs of 
illicit drugs are relatively high due to the risks. The structural effects of drug policy and law 
enforcement drive up the price, which has the side effect of making it more lucrative and 
appealing for distributors (Barnett 2012). At street level, however, dealers tend to make very 
little for their actions (Levitt and Dubner 2009). Structural forces differentially constrain illicit 
drug markets, meaning that the prices of some products may be more inflated than others. 
Government intervention prevents illicit markets from reaching a natural equilibrium and 
distorts them in ways that increase harm and reduces their efficiency. Chemists producing new 
psychoactive substances, for example, were more concerned with tweaking their drugs to 
bypass laws rather than reducing harm to the end user (Wainwright 2016). Although, even 
legitimate pharmaceutical companies may be more concerned with profit than their customers’ 
wellbeing (Goldacre 2014). The structure of society also determines how easy it is for funds to 
flow between actors and legitimate spheres. Anti-money laundering policies can make it harder 
to use or invest accumulated market capital (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016; Albanese 
2018). 
 
Drug dealers can improve their service by increasing product quality, reducing price, giving 
credit, making timely deliveries, and maintaining discretion (Caulkins and Padman 1993; Hales 
and Hobbs 2010; Moeller and Sandberg 2015). To differentiate themselves from other 
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suppliers, they can create brands allowing customers to identify with them and their products. 
By branding a product, customers can expect goods to be of a certain standard based on 
previous experiences or through a recommendation from others (Forsyth 1995). Legal issues 
mean that distributors must operate in concealment and cannot openly advertise their services 
unless they find loopholes in the law. A possible negative consequence of branding is that it 
may allow enforcement agencies to tie drugs to a particular source. Moreover, other distributors 
may clone the brands of their competitors in order to benefit from their reputation, so there 
may be more sources than anticipated (Duterte et al. 2009). 
 
From the market perspective, people sell drugs specifically to make money. Offenders are 
presented as utility maximisers who organize themselves to exploit market opportunities and 
diversify into new areas as they see fit. As rational actors, they will only engage in crime if the 
returns are greater than what they would make in the legal economy relative to the additional 
risks incurred (Caulkins and MacCoun 2003; Dwyer and Moore 2010). Caulkins and MacCoun 
(2003), however, comment on the limits of rationality and question the ability of offenders to 
‘perceive and estimate the relevant probabilities and consequences’ of their actions accurately 
enough to make ‘choices based on expected payoffs’. They conclude that decisions to sell drugs 
are not based on ‘careful calculations’ but are often in fact ‘not well thought out’ (Caulkins and 
MacCoun 2003, p. 456). With limited information, offenders at best operate with a bounded 
rationality (Cornish and Clarke 2008). Moreover, the rational choice model unwittingly 
demonises drug dealers by aligning to media stereotypes, which describes them as calculating 
‘pushers’ who have little care for the harmful effects of their products (Langer 1977). This may 
be more true of legitimate pharmaceutical companies, as is the case with the recent opioid 
epidemic (Haffajee and Mello 2017). 
 
The neo classical model is criticised as a taken for granted explanation that is not well suited 
for accounting for distortions in the market that are the consequence of cultural values or the 
(il)legality of actions (Dwyer and Moore 2010). In the drug market, commodities are not 
always sold along commercial lines and may be traded on norms of reciprocity and gift giving. 
Indeed, illicit drug markets have been demonstrated to exist along a continuum between 
commercially and non-commercially ordered in which motives for selling drugs are either 
financial or non-financial (van de Ven and Mulrooney 2016). Drug dealing can be a 
community-based exercise in which exchange is centred on a culture of helping or providing 
an experience, rather than purely making a profit (Langer 1977; Sandberg 2012; van de Ven 
and Mulrooney 2016). This type of altruism is a common characteristic of those who engage 
in the social supply of drugs. Social supply is the most common type of dealing, although, 
some have said it should not qualify as dealing at all (Coomber and Moyle 2014).  In Briggs 
and Gamero’s (2017) ethnography in Madrid, they found that addicts would often share drugs 
with their peers in the expectation that the favour would be returned later down the line. This 
informal economy enabled users to have a steady supply of drugs when they did not have the 
funds to pay for them.  
 
Cultural characteristics may be unique to the market in question (partial market culture) or span 
across markets (general market culture). They can determine who is allowed to contact each 
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other, who is allowed to make offers (Aspers 2011), how disputes are settled and if they will 
end in violence (Taylor 2007; Sandberg 2012). Violence is not solely related to illegal market 
disputes, but can also be affected by the psycho-pharmacological effects of the drugs in 
question (Goldstein 1985). In some markets, cultural knowledge may be essential for entry 
(Langer 1977; van de Ven and Mulrooney 2016). Culture both orders a market and delineates 
it from others (Aspers 2011). 
 
Criminal markets are significantly different from legal markets because transactions are not 
protected by law, and the state itself poses a risk to them. To overcome legal risks, criminal 
groups incorporate transactions into pre-existing trusted relationships based on kinship, 
friendship, locality or ethnicity, whilst limiting the number of customers and employees (Paoli 
et al. 2009, p. 204). Indeed, trust is a defining feature of criminal markets. Buyers and sellers 
need to be confident that their contacts will honour the exchange (ensure that the correct funds 
are given for the correct product) and maintain discretion and secrecy where required. 
According to Gambetta: 
 
“trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability 
with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a 
particular action… When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, 
we implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is 
beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider 
engaging in some form of cooperation with him”  (Gambetta 1990a, p. 217). 
 
Uncertainty in regard to other peoples’ actions is essential to the nature of trust. Agents always 
have partial knowledge of other agents’ motives and how they are likely to act within certain 
situations. Trust is a way of coping with this uncertainty (ibid). The issue with illicit drug 
markets is they exist in chaotic environments whereby information sharing is suppressed by 
the activities of law enforcement (Moeller and Sandberg 2015), this leads distributors to prefer 
operating with people they have established long term relationships with ‘where there is mutual 
trust tested over time’ (Gambetta 1993, p. 232). Spending time in prison is also an important 
factor which ‘establishes credibility and generates trust’ (Matrix Knowledge Group 2007, p. 
25). Indeed, trust may be found in various forms.  
 
Von Lampe and Johansen (2004b, pp. 169-171) identify four forms of trust within criminal 
markets that underly the basis of criminal activity. 1) ‘Individualised trust’ refers to trust placed 
in individuals. It is based on direct observations of an individual’s previous behaviour. If no 
direct access to this information exists, it may be provided by intermediaries; the trust is 
mediated. 2) ‘Trust based on reputations’ relates to publicly held information on certain actors, 
which may be acquired through the ‘grapevine system’. 3) ‘Trust based on generalisations’ 
refers to commonly held perspectives on particular social groups rather than individuals. 
Finally, 4) ‘abstract trust’ refers to the trust placed in broader institutional structures and 
systems, which set particular conditions within the environment.  
 
In the drug market, products are often provided on credit: this resolves issues when drugs are 
in demand, but customers do not have the funds to pay for them (Moeller and Sandberg 2015). 
Individualised trust, whether mediated or not, presents a certain probability that loans will be 
repaid. Creditors can also use coercive mechanisms to bolster trust through the threat of 
sanctions. In the drug market this is often achieved through the threat of violence; however, 
other informal mechanisms can be employed. According to Jacques and Wright, non-violent 
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forms of social control include actions such as ‘retaliatory theft and fraud, negotiation, 
avoidance, and toleration’ (Jacques and Wright 2008, p. 240). Indeed, violence may negatively 
affect the reputations of distributors and dissuade others from working with them (Dickinson 
2019). Moreover, excessive coercion in any form can foster distrust from those on the receiving 
end of it (Gambetta 1990a). Dealers may instead pursue leniency by allowing those in debt 
greater time to make repayments. Maintaining positive relations can result in greater profits in 
the long term (Dickinson 2019). The police can also be employed as a form of social control 
by informing to them on others; however, police involvement may be a risky tactic and can cut 
off ties with customers if they are jailed. Such methods are mainly reserved for the competition 
(Skolnick 2011; Goffman 2014; Bacon 2017). Overall, successful exchanges based on credit 
can strengthen trust (Desroches 2007), which may be over and above those where no credit is 
given. 
 
In regard to distribution, there are at least three stages in the supply chain: local, national or 
international levels. Drugs may be sold retail or wholesale and distributed from the bottom up 
or top down depending on where they are manufactured. In the UK, the drug market has been 
defined by 1) open street-based markets, 2) semi-open club and pub-based markets, and 3) 
closed private markets. In the first two marketplaces, sellers will often do business without 
prior introductions (May and Hough 2004). Open markets are the most visible and accessible 
of the three and had declined until headshops began selling new psychoactive substances. 
However, after the Psychoactive Substance Act 2016 was introduced, this trend began to 
reverse (Reuter and Pardo 2017). Illicit drugs are also available from the internet, which may 
be both open and closed depending on the product sold. On the ‘dark-web’, sellers are protected 
through anonymity reducing risks, allowing them to supply a range of illicit substances. Drugs 
that are on the lower end of the classification system, or have medical purposes - such as 
anabolic steroids - are of lower risk to the distributor and are readily available on the internet 
without having to resort to crypto-markets (Paoli and Donati 2014; van de Ven 2016). Drugs 
which cause more harm to the community, and are less socially acceptable, are likely to pose 
a greater risk to the supplier, as the community are a key source of information for the police 
(Fielding 1995; Gill 2000), second to insider informants (Bacon 2017). There is, therefore, a 
relationship between the level of risk associated with the classification of the drug, the harm it 
causes and the visibility of the distributor. I define this relationship as an ecology of risk. A 
similar argument has been put forward by Smith, who suggests that illicit enterprises operate 
across a spectrum of legitimacy. Those closest to the side of legality are said to encounter fewer 
legal risks and operational constraints (Smith 1980; Smith 1994). How criminals perceive risks, 
however, may not be so clear cut.  
 
Indeed, the variability of drug markets between open and closed relates to the level of risk 
involved (perceived or otherwise) and the ability of distributors to put mechanisms in place 
that reduce it. To gain intelligence on suppliers, the police attempt to infiltrate drug markets 
through the use of informants, surveillance tactics and undercover officers who act as drug 
users and make test purchases (Dunnighan and Norris 1996; Loftus and Goold 2012; Walker 
and Hyland 2014; Bacon 2017). Closed markets present the greatest challenge to the police as 
they are not easily accessible from the outside. According to Bacon, ‘it is very difficult if not 
impossible for police to infiltrate closed markets where access is limited to known and trusted 
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participants or social network markets that are primarily based around friendship and existing 
acquaintances’ (Bacon 2017, p. 206). Furthermore, as drug use ‘is a victimless crime; the drug 
purchaser is unlikely to complain about his supplier’ (Bean and Billingsley 2001, p. 25). This 
is in line with the work of Bittner (1970) who describes this as a challenge in policing more 
generally: 
 
“no conceivable human interest could be opposed to fighting illness; in fact, it is 
meaningless to suppose that one could have scruples in opposing disease. But the 
evils the police are expected to fight are of a radically different nature. Contrary to 
the physician, the policeman is always opposed to some articulated or articulatable 
human interest” (Bittner 1970, p. 8). 
 
Due to the mutual interests between buyers and sellers of illicit drugs, a more proactive 
‘intelligence-led’ approach is required to gain information on them (now commissioned within 
the UK National Intelligence Model). This is in contrast to more typical reactive policing 
whereby crimes are reported and responded to (Ratcliffe 2008). In reality, however, the 
policing of drug markets is a mixture of the two (Maguire 2008; Bacon 2017). 
 
To conclude, drug dealing is a market-based activity that is both commercially and culturally 
ordered. In the most part, dealing is about making a profit, but on the other hand, some 
exchanges are better explained through culture. The risk of distributing drugs affects their price 
and availability, whilst trust is important for ongoing interpersonal transactions. Distributors 
operate within the confines of illegality unless they can find loopholes in the law. Lastly, the 
UK has seen a dramatic shift between open, semi-open and closed drug markets. These 
changes, however, can be explained mostly by advances in technology (Natarajan et al. 1995; 
May and Hough 2004). Technology has altered the manner in which transactions take place 
and has brought new drugs into the market.  The following section discusses both the role and 
impact of new technologies on the drug market and considers how they might be used in the 
future.  
 
 
Market Technology 
 
Whilst there is a range of technologies that are of relevance here, the discussion will 
concentrate on three types that are of particular significance – manufacture technology, 
distribution technology and information communication technology (ICT). The central 
argument is that technology reduces risks and increases the availability of drugs, which has the 
effect of increasing purity levels and reducing costs. It must be noted that the technologies 
described in this section have been designed to meet certain ends and be used in specific ways. 
Technology, however, is not rigorously bound by the prescriptions of its designers and may 
often serve the user in unanticipated ways that can be innovatively applied to local problems 
(De Laet and Mol 2000). To fully understand how technology mediates the modus operandi of 
the criminal actor requires a local level analysis of technology in action.  
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Manufacture 
 
The benefit of manufacturing drugs is that it reduces costs and enables producers to acquire 
large amounts of substances without having to rely on other distributors in the supply chain 
(although precursors may need to be acquired). The price of drugs at the manufacturing stage 
is the lowest, as actors avoid the mark-ups that occur as they are passed down the supply chain. 
Drugs at the manufacturing stage also have the highest levels of purity (Arkes et al. 2008). 
Technological advances have increased the potency of drugs bringing a more potent yield at a 
lower price. The potency of cannabis has risen markedly since the 1990s due to genetic 
modification of the plants and advances in hydroponics (Mehmedic et al. 2010; Chandra et al. 
2019).  As technology reduces in price and becomes easier to access, producing drugs becomes 
a more viable option. In the UK, cannabis was traditionally imported from Morocco in its 
weaker resin form, but now the majority of cannabis is grown locally and is of the significantly 
stronger ‘skunk’ variety that has a higher ratio of THC (Potter 2008; Kirby and Peal 2015; 
Giommoni and Gundur 2018). Drugs such as cocaine and heroin are imported into the UK, as 
their main precursors (poppy and coca) do not have the right conditions to be grown locally at 
scale. Scientists, however, have found ways to synthesise real opium and cocaine from yeast, 
although in very small quantities (Galanie et al. 2015). When this technique is refined, it may 
mean that these drugs will also be produced locally, reducing the need for international supply.  
 
Advances in chemistry have resulted in a plethora of synthetic variants emerging on the market 
to bypass drug laws, although this has not had a significant effect on the demand for traditional 
drugs such as cannabis, cocaine, heroin and MDMA (as demonstrated by usage statistics) 
(Lader 2015; HM Government 2018b). It is likely that as technology develops, the skills needed 
to produce drugs will decrease. 3D printers have been developed that can produce 
pharmaceutical drugs automatically (Sanderson 2012). If these technologies become available 
cheaply en masse, it is possible that they will be taken up by local actors, leading to increased 
domestic production for a variety of drugs; this has been described elsewhere as the 
‘democratisation of technology’ (Manyika et al. 2013). A side effect of manufacturing drugs is 
that it increases risks. Producers face tougher penalties if they are caught by the police and may 
make them more attractive targets for other predators in the field. Manufacturers are also less 
mobile, as they are tied to the production site and may have difficulty relocating it elsewhere. 
This may mean they are less responsive to threats. Manufacturers can avoid this issue by setting 
up ‘factories’ in other peoples’ addresses and have other people run them. 
 
 
Distribution 
 
Distribution technologies, on the other hand, are used specifically to deliver products. 
Advances in this form of technology have enabled suppliers to reach a broader geographical 
range of destinations. There are three interrelated factors in their ability to fulfil their roles. 
Firstly, how much they can carry; secondly how fast they can travel; and thirdly how well they 
can conceal themselves and their payload (Von Lampe 2011). International imports may be 
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shipped through air, land or water. Inland, drugs are typically moved by automobiles or when 
in small amounts on foot. A more recent phenomenon is the use of drones to smuggle drugs 
across borders and into prison (Sanchez 2015). Drones benefit from being unmanned so are 
less risky, but can only carry a limited payload. Unmanned vehicles can replace drug couriers, 
which reduces risks by stymying the flow of information. Driverless cars could be particularly 
beneficial to criminal actors in this regard: however, there will always be a person who will 
have to pick up the drugs at some point in the supply chain where they can be targeted by the 
police. The handing over of drugs is often the most risky aspect of the operation, especially if 
done in a public space (Jacobs 1996). If supply chains can become fully automated, this may 
pose a significant problem for the police if they cannot trace who is operating these machines. 
The end result of this could be greater purity levels at destination zones and lower prices, 
depending on technological expenses. 
 
 
Communication (ICT) 
 
The primary benefit of ICT for criminal activity is that it allows actors to communicate with 
each other without being physically present. This has changed the drug market in a number of 
ways. In the UK, open markets were common at the street level as they enabled suppliers to 
work from a fixed location where customers knew where to find them. The issue with this is 
that it created additional risks: their high visibility made them easy targets for the police and 
led to higher levels of violence, due to territorial disputes. The advent of the mobile phone 
changed this, as customers could contact suppliers directly without having to be physically 
present, allowing them to be more mobile (May and Hough 2004). This resulted in a shift to a 
less violent closed retail market where distributors only worked with people who had their 
contact details and had been vouched for. This enabled police to directly monitor calls and 
messages once they had established that a dealer was active. ICT creates records of 
conversations in a way that face to face communication does not. One method that dealers use 
to resolve this was by talking in code; another involves changing numbers on a regular basis 
and not registering phones in their names (Natarajan et al. 1995; Salinas 2013). The newer 
smartphones allow stakeholders to communicate via encrypted messaging services and can be 
encrypted themselves, making access to these conversations much more difficult; the phones 
do, however, collect more data. Even if the police cannot access these messages, they can still 
locate peoples’ whereabouts using cell site data or GPS tracking on the mobile device, which 
may be enough (Mellars 2004).  
 
The internet has significantly changed the drug market, by not only enabling anonymous 
communication but also providing virtual platforms where markets can grow. At present drugs 
can be purchased on either the clear net or the dark net; the latter of which requires specific 
software to access. The dark net is the safer of the two as it anonymises stakeholder activity by 
bouncing internet traffic through various relays around the world. Within these crypto-markets, 
users can purchase goods anonymously, using digital currencies. Drugs sold on the internet are 
usually distributed via post creating risks for the customer if they receive them in their name. 
Whilst monetary transactions occur online, the drugs as well as the people are grounded locally 
 24 
(Hillebrand et al. 2010; Aldridge and Askew 2017). Buyers can rate the service provided by 
the distributors, much like in legitimate online marketplaces, increasing quality standards, and 
providing a safer environment than found on the street (Buxton and Bingham 2015). Online 
markets reduce local systemic violence in the drug trade due to the anonymity they provide. 
Without the threat of violence, illicit markets become more like legal ones, as distributors 
employ softer strategies (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu 2014). The security of the Dark Net is not 
as impervious as initially assumed, however: there are cases of vendors being blackmailed after 
hackers have gained access to their personal information from their accounts (Zajácz 2017). 
The police also managed to gain control of an entire crypto-market before they shut it down, 
resulting in seizures of millions of dollars in assets (Afilipoaie and Shortis 2018) Social media 
platforms also provide an effective means to purchase and supply illicit drugs. The police rarely 
have the capacity to access these communications, making them more appealing to local 
dealers (Fraser et al. 2018). 
 
Current criminological research of the distribution of drugs online is growing but in its early 
stages. The focus of these studies has been on the illicit marketplaces themselves but tends to 
ignore the offline life-worlds of the actors who engage in them. This is partly the result of their 
methods: access to these distributors has been gained online, where researchers have visited 
websites sites and approached suppliers via email or other messaging services. There are few 
studies which have accessed online vendors of drugs offline face to face. Furthermore, previous 
studies do not discuss the process of transfer that unfolds when illicit enterprises move their 
businesses online. Some online vendors might not have a background in offline distribution, 
but for those who do, their criminal pasts may have implications for how they conduct 
themselves. This study aims to bridge this gap by using data gained from face to face interviews 
and real-world observations with distributors and manufacturers of drugs who operate both 
online and offline. It will outline how these actors adapt to these virtual environments and 
manage the risks they face in their course.  
 
 
Networks 
 
The second type of social coordination that I will be addressing in this framework are social 
networks. The network model is a relatively recent approach to the study of organised crime. 
It examines social relations in criminal networks in terms of webs of direct and indirect ties 
(Von Lampe 2016). The central argument is that offenders’ behaviour cannot be accounted for 
without considering their relationship to the network and their place within it. Scholars have 
used this approach to provide both static and dynamic representations of criminal groups and 
their activities, making it well suited for an analysis of the criminal career. One of the key 
issues of analysing social networks is that they have no clear boundaries, so can be difficult to 
measure (Felson 2003, p. 155). It is ultimately up to the researchers to define network 
boundaries to suit their agenda. For the purpose of this thesis, networks are defined as all actors 
who are connected by one or more social ties that engage in a related activity. The activity, 
therefore, sets the boundaries of the network. This means that everyone in the supply chain is 
part of a network even though they may not know each other or interact directly. They can, 
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however, still have effects on these distant others through their activities (adulterating drugs, 
for example). 
 
A social network consists of various types of social ties; a dyadic tie is the most common unit 
of analyses and represents the relationship between two people. A triadic tie represents the 
relationship between three people and so on. Certain actors may be more central to the network, 
and this determines the degree to which it is structured around them (Aspers 2011). Network 
density (the number of ties between actors) has been associated with increased delinquency. 
Those who with many ties to criminal peers are more likely to become criminal themselves 
(Haynie et al. 2006), thus lending support to Sutherland’s theory of differential association 
(Sutherland et al. 1995). The types of social connections an actor has largely determine the 
opportunities that are available to them. Strong social ties such as between family members or 
close friends are associated with greater knowledge sharing (Hansen 1999): however, having 
many weak ties is argued to provide greater access to opportunities (Granovetter 1983). 
Information about opportunities does not circulate freely through networks, so having a greater 
number of ties can increase the likelihood of gaining access to it. Burt contends that successful 
market competition is a matter of relationships rather than personal attributes because 
relationships generate entrepreneurial opportunities (Burt 1993). This is supported by research 
in the UK showing few barriers to entry at all levels of the illicit drug market. Contacts rather 
than skills or proficiency determine entry (Matrix Knowledge Group 2007). Where an actor is 
positioned in the network can also determine the amount of benefits they can extract from 
others. An individual who bridges structural holes (gaps between networks) has significant 
leverage as they can dictate access to resources and information between groups. Brokerage 
has been associated with increased earnings for offenders (Morselli and Tremblay 2004; 
Morselli 2009).  
 
In terms of the career, people accumulate contacts as they become embedded in crime; a side 
effect is that they become detached from actors within legitimate fields. This can reduce access 
to legitimate opportunities, making it more difficult to desist (Sampson and Laub 1997; 
Morselli and Tremblay 2004). Progression in the career, however, leads to greater autonomy 
as offenders become less dependent on others and position themselves in ways that make others 
more dependent on them (Kleemans and Van De Bunt 1999; Kleemans and de Poot 2008; 
Gundur 2019). Greater human agency not only increases the capacity to make choices but also 
enables people to capitalise on the limited agency of others. Criminal actors typically develop 
personal preferences and social networks that align with the identity of their ‘working-selves’. 
The prospect of what that relationship may bring, in terms of long-term costs and benefits, can 
be enough for the actor to instigate a significant shift in the sense of self in an attempt to modify 
their career. Desistance is the result of criminals wilfully changing their identity by working 
towards a positive future self and re-orientating themselves in the networks around them 
(Paternoster and Bushway 2009).  
 
According to Morselli et al. (2007), criminal networks are structured in ways that attempt to 
maximise efficiency whilst minimising risks; however, there is a trade-off between the two. 
Increased security may reduce efficiency and vice versa. Trust and secrecy are central to 
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security and become manifest when criminal networks are mobilised into action. Because 
offenders rely on ties with trusted others, this can reduce their ability to operate quickly or 
capitalise on new opportunities. The time to task within criminal networks is increased because 
of policing pressures, which increases mistrust between actors (Ibid). Nonetheless, distrust can 
be a selling point for criminal actors if their presence in the market can resolve it (Gambetta 
1990b). One means by which distributors can increase security is through the usage of 
‘information networks’. Dealers can attempt to find out new developments within the drug 
market by seeking out information from their known associates: 
 
“information networks are used to seek out new suppliers, better-quality product at 
better prices, and help dealers locate reliable distributors to expand operations. 
Networks can help to gain introductions and verify the identity, reputation, and 
trustworthiness of all actors” (Desroches 2005, p. 130). 
 
In the UK, criminal networks have been found to be highly flexible and adaptable. They are 
more responsive to changes in their environment given that their boundaries are more malleable 
and less defined than a hierarchical organization (Vy Le 2012). If law enforcement concentrates 
its efforts on taking down so called ‘kingpins’, it will usually have limited effects on the market, 
as network fluidity means it can reconfigure itself quickly as actors displace into new areas. 
Displacement has a number of forms: Offenders can change the time at which they commit 
crime (temporal). They can switch from targets in one location to targets in another (spatial). 
They can change from one type of target to another (target). They can alter the methods used 
to carry out crime (tactical). They can switch from one form of crime to another (offence) 
(Guerette 2009, p. 3). Lastly, they can diversify across targets so that if one is removed, others 
are still available (diversification) (Rubin et al. 2013). Their ability to displace effectively, 
however, may be determined by the social contacts to which they have access. 
 
A fundamental critique of the network approach is its preoccupation with network structure. 
This has the effect of discounting the personal attributes and agentic capabilities of the actors 
within it. The social network approach thus: “fails to show exactly how it is that intentional, 
creative human action serves in part to constitute those very social networks that so powerfully 
constrain actors in turn (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, p. 1413). Agents and structures are not 
separate entities but are mutually constitutive elements. Action shapes structure as much as 
structure shapes actions (Giddens 1984). Furthermore, the network approach is aligned to 
rational choice theory where network formation is seen as the result of a strategic optimization 
process (Easton and Karaivanov 2009). Ties, however, are not formed purely around achieving 
strategic outcomes and maybe more to do with cultural affinities or the types of places people 
visit in the routine activities of their lives. Lastly, the social network approach suffers from 
social determinism in which all action is the consequence of social relations. The ecological 
effects of the physical environment are generally ignored. Settings, however, facilitate crime 
by providing suitable places in which these networks can form: 
 
“We arrive at a view of the underworld that does not deny or minimize the role of 
social networks and groupings, yet depends on recurrent settings where criminal 
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cooperation can grow… Even if specific participants change, the criminogenic 
setting can persist” (Felson 2006, p. 10). 
 
In the life-course, convergence settings are age-graded; young people may frequent informal 
meeting places such as parks or other hangouts, whereas adults might socialise in pubs or clubs. 
Each setting provides different criminal opportunities meaning that patterns in the life-course 
are likely to relate to patterns in the settings people visit. 
 
 
Organisations  
 
The third and final type of social coordination that I will be addressing in this framework are 
criminal organisations. The origins of this approach can be traced back to Cressey’s (Cressey 
1969) functionalist model of organised crime, but its features are common in the illicit 
enterprise model forwarded by Smith (1975), and Reuter (1983). For the purpose of this thesis, 
I define an organisation as three or more actors who work together towards a shared goal. 
Organisations are differentiated from networks to avoid the conceptual confusion that occurs 
when criminologists use the terms interchangeably. Organisations evolve out of networks but 
are distinct analytic categories characterising different dimensions of relational structures. 
They are, however, not empirically discrete (Von Lampe 2009, 2016). Organisations provide 
different levels of resources for crime than working alone. 
 
A key feature that differentiates organisations from networks is their organisational culture. 
They have a system of norms and codes of practice that members must adhere to regardless of 
their individual interests (Von Lampe 2016). Organisations have a division of labour, a degree 
of specialisation and stratification of roles. They may vary in how these roles are coordinated 
as well as how rules and codes of conduct are devised and enforced. Moreover, they may vary 
in the purposiveness in which they pursue and achieve their goals (Best and Luckenbill 1980). 
According to Smith (1980), there are two primary factors which determine an organisation’s 
structure: 1) the type of service it provides and 2) the task environment (setting) it operates in. 
A dealer of illicit goods has specific task related requirements that are somewhat different to a 
loan shark and hence will be organised so. It is worth remembering, however, that some 
criminal activities may encompass a range of activities within them. Drug dealers can act as 
loan sharks by giving drugs on credit, they may rob other drug dealers and sell their drugs on, 
they may fence stolen goods taken in exchange for drugs, they may corrupt official actors, and 
if they accumulate enough capital, they may launder their funds. What we can take from this 
is that the structure of an organization may have to change to carry out these sub tasks; this 
may mean altering the modus operandi and bringing new actors into the fold.  
 
Organisations have a life-cycle much like the actors within them. They go through stages with 
turning points and trajectories of their own.  Organisational and individual life-cycles are likely 
to have interrelated effects. For example, as actors are recruited into criminal originations, their 
career is accelerated as skills and knowledge are transmitted down to them (Kleemans and de 
Poot 2008). The loss of a key enabler, however, may signal the death of an organisation (Tafoya 
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2014). This relationship has been largely missed by DLC due to the actor-centric 
methodological individualism that underpins their approach. A combination of theory from 
individual and organisational life-cycles may provide additional insights into the trajectories 
of both.  
 
According to Lester et al (2003), there are five stages in the life-cycle of an organisation. 1) 
Existence: this is where an organisation comes into being. Here its members focus on the 
viability of the organisation to meet its goals. 2) Survival: organisations pursue growth in this 
stage whilst developing some formalisation of structure and consolidating strategies of action. 
3) Success: organisations have now matured to the extent that formalisation and bureaucratic 
control become normalised. Roles, policies and procedures are fully established. 4) Renewal: 
to foster creativity, the organisation seeks to return to an earlier stage where its structure was 
less formalised. Decision making returns to a more decentralised state as the organisation takes 
on a matrix like structure. 5) Decline: this is the end of the organisation and can be entered at 
any stage. Organisational breakdown in this stage is the consequence of politics and power. 
People become more interested in pursuing their own goals rather than the goals of the 
organisation (an organisation is still an entity as long as its members are collectively pursuing 
the same goal). Criminal organisations tend to stay decentralised and meet the decline stage 
rather quickly to avoid the risk associated with formalism. Career criminals temporarily 
organise themselves on an ad hoc basis to complete specific criminal activities before 
dispersing and reforming into new groups elsewhere (Levi 2012). Whether these actors are 
able to diversify and reform into new markets or crime types is questionable. 
 
The structural effects of the task environment constrain organisations in a number of ways. 
Firstly it limits the size in which they can grow; criminal organisations often keep a small 
membership base to avoid detection even though they may benefit in the short run from a larger 
size (Morselli et al. 2007). Greater size is associated with increased revenue but also increased 
complexity of operations (Von Lampe 2015). Criminal groups must look out for signs and 
signals to ensure that new recruits are trustworthy (Gambetta 2009; Densley 2012). Learning 
how to read these signs and strategically presenting oneself (Goffman 1956) is a skill in itself 
that may need to be nurtured. Social structure differentially constrains criminal organisations 
meaning that some will be able to grow larger than others. Large criminal organisations have 
difficulty forming in strong states where mechanisms for enforcing laws are greater (Patrick 
2006). It is perfectly logical for them to take on a looser structure to avoid interdiction (Reuter 
1983). Organisations with a larger membership are more integrated into the legitimate 
economy as they become reliant on outsiders for logistical support (Von Lampe 2015). If 
legitimate actors are aware that they are facilitating illegal means, then they may need to be 
paid off. Recruiting staff may be difficult as organisations cannot openly advertise, and people 
may not wish to take on the risks of their roles. Risk is not evenly distributed between members 
of the group: those within higher positions may assign the riskiest tasks to peripheral members 
who are easy to replace. These actors are given limited information about the operational core 
to reduce their utility to the police (Dorn et al. 1998). In this respect, increasing membership 
can reduce risks, depending on the roles and information these actors receive.  
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Threats to criminal organisations come from both the inside and the outside. Internal threats 
occur when actors jockey for power or and cannot work together to achieve their goals (Lester 
et al. 2003). Disputes can occur over operational strategies as members cannot agree on how 
things should be done or how the benefits of their actions should be distributed (Slade 2013; 
Tafoya 2014). External threats come primarily from law enforcement and market predators. 
The police aim to disrupt and dismantle criminal organisations by arresting their members, 
placing sanctions and confiscating proceeds. Market predators also compete for resources and 
may attack the organisation with violence or robbery. To protect against such threats, 
organisations can maintain a low profile, employ deterrence mechanisms and use surveillance 
tactics to monitor others. Violence is the primary form of deterrence but generally cannot often 
be employed against the police. Criminal groups in the UK do not have the critical mass 
necessary to deter police through violence so rely on corruption where possible (Woods 2016). 
 
Organisations are said to form because the costs outweigh the benefits of doing so; however, 
this may not be the case. Like the market and network approaches, this model is rooted in 
rational choice theory and can be criticised along the same lines. Furthermore, conceiving 
organised crime in terms of a group aligns with the more stereotypical views that criminal 
groups are highly structured and hierarchical. It promotes the idea that criminal organisations 
are sophisticated entities employing well thought out strategies run by charismatic mafia bosses 
who are the architects of the criminal underworld. It is questionable how far ahead into the 
future organisations look to plan their actions, and even if they do, how realistic they are. The 
same can be said of the leaders of these organisations and the power they hold over others. In 
the UK, criminal organisations tend to be more informal and loosely structured (Spapens 2010; 
Hobbs 2013).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The review has set out some of the major contributions to the study of criminal careers and 
organised crime to provide the conceptual bases for the thesis. The first section of this chapter 
began by outlining the main characteristics of developmental and life-course criminology, 
whilst considering their suitability for an analysis of the careers of organised criminals. It 
argued that the theoretical roots of DLC lie in differential association and social control theory 
which, although useful, do not account for non-typical developments in the life-course that 
may be better explained by opportunity structures across age grades. The second half of the 
chapter was orientated towards the activity itself. It outlined three ideal types of social 
coordination relating to their respective theoretical positions in organised crime: markets, 
networks and organisations. The market is the platform for the activity whilst the criminal 
networks and their organisations are the means for delivering it. Overall, this chapter can be 
roughly split into perspectives on the life of crime and perspectives on the doing of crime, and 
this sets the bases for the structure of the thesis. 
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3) Methodology: 
Ethnographic Research in Criminal Settings 
 
The Researcher’s Journey 
 
My interests in studying crime and deviancy stem from my life experiences and immersion in 
deviant groups from adolescence to adulthood. I was raised in a disaffected, single-parent 
family home and lived in relative poverty throughout youth. By the age of 14, I had lived at 12 
addresses, attended numerous schools and had dropped out of education entirely. My longest 
stay in secondary school was at Summer Park School, where I befriended the lads who make 
up a core of the sample in this study. I began studying at college at 15 but did not get into 
university until 21, as I struggled to make up for my lack of education. My difficulties in college 
were compounded by my friendship with the lads who had developed an anti-school, anti-work, 
culture in response to the structural inequalities and limited opportunities that were available 
to them (Willis 1977). They looked towards drugs and music production as a way out of poverty 
and a means by which they could gain social status and respect (Bourgois 2003; Urbanik and 
Haggerty 2018). My undergraduate degree was away from home: a Bachelor of Arts in 
Sociology at the University of the West of England. I felt an instant affinity with the subject as 
it enabled me to understand the broader structural and social processes that underscored the 
many difficulties that my family and friends experienced in life. In 2008 I was required to write 
a dissertation as part of the degree, and it was here that I had my first experience conducting 
ethnographic research with the lads. The lads were in their early 20s and had broadened their 
social networks, bringing more friends into the group: some of whom were from middle-class 
backgrounds. A number of members were DJs, rappers and music producers who performed 
to Drum and Bass, UK Garage and UK Hip Hop. As hip hop was originally an American 
artform, I became interested in how it had been appropriated and ‘glocalised’ by local artists 
along social class lines (Bauman 1998). I found striking differences in the choice of lyrics, with 
artists from poorer backgrounds expressing more violence in their vocabulary whilst also 
buying into the principles of conspicuous consumption: gold, cars and designer clothing. 
Violence is an integral part of street culture (Sandberg 2008). Embodying these values 
produces social status whilst minimising future victimisation on the street (Urbanik and 
Haggerty 2018). Many of the artists sold drugs to make money as a well-paid career in the 
music industry was not realistically attainable, although they did not recognise this. Talent and 
hard work will not guarantee success in a capitalist society, especially if you are poor. 
 
After graduating, I began looking for work and became close friends with a bouncer called 
Ollie, who was my training partner at a local gym. I had taken up bodybuilding alongside some 
of the lads in the group, and was of significant stature due to my height and build. Ollie believed 
I would be well suited as a bouncer, so I enrolled in the Security Industry Authority (SIA) 
training program and applied for my licence. Whilst working as a bouncer, I became fully 
engrossed within the local music scene and extended my social networks. I started producing 
dance music at a professional level and was signed by a record label, but made little from sales. 
After four years with limited career opportunities, I decided to return to study and enrolled in 
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a part-time MSc in Criminology at Cardiff University. As before, I was required to write a 
dissertation as part of the degree. At this time, the lads had been selling drugs for a number of 
years and were well established in the drug market. I became interested in the reasons why they 
got into dealing, what affected their level of embeddedness in the trade, and how this changed 
throughout the life-course. To answer these questions, I interviewed 7 of the lads but decided 
against conducting fieldwork due to the limited scope of the study. After completing the MSc, 
I took the research to PhD level and was awarded a prestigious scholarship from the Dawes 
Trust. The PhD effectively builds upon my master’s thesis, adding the ethnographic component 
and drawing upon a broader range of criminal actors: the majority of whom I met whilst 
working as a bouncer. I have also interviewed a number of actors from the criminal justice 
system (police), the third sector (drug and alcohol services) and the private sector (bouncers). 
I have now been working as a bouncer for over ten years.  
 
It is difficult to estimate the exact number of hours I have spent working as a bouncer, as my 
time on the job has fluctuated. The club scene also has peak times throughout the year, where 
work becomes more frequent. At a minimum, I have worked 2 shifts per week at around 14 
hours total (weekends). I have also worked up to 7 days per week at around 40 hours total 
(shifts are shorter during weekdays). Over a 10-year period, this amounts to something between 
7,280-20,800 hours of work as a bouncer. I have also worked in around 30 different venues 
and was head of security in a number of them. During this time, I have built up a substantial 
knowledge of the drug market, added to my daily experiences of being around users and dealers 
from childhood onwards. My life immersion in the field has helped me to develop contacts 
with a broad network of offenders whose accounts form the basis of this thesis. 
 
 
Red City 
 
The research takes place in Red City, a multicultural post-industrial city with one of the largest 
populations in Britain. It is a popular destination for tourists throughout Europe and home to 
many citizens of varying descent. Red City’s modern economy is centred upon media, 
electronics and other creative industries but it has not always been this way. In the 18th century, 
it was associated with traditional manufacturing industries before they went into decline. In the 
19th century, traditional industries were replaced alongside increasing commerce, import and 
exchange. As commerce increased, so too did its population leading to the creation of the 
suburbs that remain populated by the wealthy to this day. In the 20th century, Red City was 
heavily bombarded during the second world war. It was rebuilt in the 60s, drawing upon a large 
immigrant labour force of mainly Afro-Caribbeans. The immigrants were housed in an inner-
city area named here as Drayton. The residents of Drayton had previously been wealthy but 
fled to the outskirts of the city as the area was bombed heavily.  It was neglected by the council 
during the city’s rebuild, leading the area into a rapid decline. What was once a prosperous 
place had become an impoverished ghetto; a place with some of the highest crime rates in the 
country. Drayton has been home to some of the most notorious gangs in Britain; these gangs 
once waged war on the streets in deadly battles as they strived to control the local drug markets. 
At present Drayton is in the process of gentrification, but crime rates in and around the area 
remain high, and it has a significant drug problem. The gentrification process has led to a 
number of small cafes, restaurants and bars that cater to the new middle class ‘hipsters’ 
 32 
(Schiermer 2014) and student population. The white middle classes working in the city’s 
service sector capitalised on the cheap housing ideally located close to their workplaces, a 
common trend throughout the UK (Hamnett 2003; Watt 2008). The council estates on the outer 
edges of the city that sprang up after the second world war, however, remain disaffected.  
 
The night economy in Red City is particularly booming, with pubs and clubs throughout the 
city centre that are regarded as some of the best in Europe. The clubs host big-name 
international DJs, bringing in clubbers from afar who can be seen pouring out of the central 
train station on a Friday and Saturday night. With several universities, it also has a huge student 
population who make up a large proportion of the punters in the club scene. The city also holds 
a number of festivals throughout the summer which sell out fast despite their pricing. Even 
after the last venues shut their doors, there will always be a house party somewhere in the city 
for those willing to keep the party going. On busy periods the taps of the bars flow freely whilst 
drug dealers busy themselves selling various ‘party drugs’ to meet the demand. The bouncers 
in the city pride themselves on their physical prowess and may take the odd course of steroids, 
which they believe helps them perform in their role (Goldstein 1990; Tutenges et al. 2015).  
Red City’s recreational drug scene, however, is counterpoised by much darker markets of 
powerful addictive substances such as crack cocaine, heroin and more recently, the highly toxic 
synthetic cannabis ‘spice’ (Rose et al. 2015). The benefits of the city’s burgeoning economy 
have not been received equally across the social strata, with the government’s austerity 
measures leaving many in poverty. Indeed, the number of homeless in Red City has increased 
significantly in recent years, and with illicit drugs in such high demand, it is inevitable that 
people will step in to provide them. If you want it and know where to look, the drugs can be 
found.  
 
 
Research Design 
 
Aims 
 
There is a variety of aspects of this research, whose dynamics will be better expressed through 
a discussion of the unfolding properties of the illicit drug trade in Red City. However, among 
the questions examined are the following: 
 
1. What influences the decision to establish oneself as a dealer, progress in terms of roles 
and amounts sold, and/or desist from it? 
2. How are relationships between suppliers and customers created and maintained within 
the drug market? 
3. How do drug dealers manage the risks of detection and reprimand from the state and 
other criminal actors in the drug market? 
4. What role does emergent technology have in facilitating drug sales? 
 
To answer these questions, the following methods and analytical procedures were employed: 
 
• Ethnographic fieldwork of drug dealing in various locations throughout the city. 
• Narrative interviews with drug dealers and other criminal stakeholders. 
• Semi-structured interviews with official actors. 
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• Thematic analysis of two illicit vending websites belonging to two participants in the 
study. 
• Descriptive analysis of nitrous oxide sales data. 
 
 
Participants 
 
The original core of participants is a group of friends described here as ‘the lads’ whom I have 
known since childhood. The majority of the lads attended Summer Park school; others joined 
the group later on. Additional dealers, I met whilst working in nightclubs or were introduced 
to me through gatekeepers. Official actors were also solicited through the social contacts I have 
gathered in the field. Some of the dealers had worked in nightclubs as bouncers and provided 
information about their role. All of the bouncers in this study were criminally involved in the 
drug trade to some extent. Due to the limited space of the thesis, not all of the actors are featured 
in the study, but their accounts went towards conceptualising the many processes and structures 
of the drug trade. The dealers distributed and manufactured a range of substances during their 
lives; the typologies presented are loose approximations of their role in the drug market. The 
total number of participants was 37 (informants marked with an ‘*’ did not wish to be digitally 
tape-recorded but agreed to hand-written transcription instead).  
 
The lads 
 
• Bubbles – retail cannabis dealer. 
• Sam Stone – retail cannabis dealer, anabolic steroid manufacturer (personal use). 
• Andy Stone – retail cannabis dealer (Sam’s brother and partner in the trade). 
• Derrick Wright – wholesale cocaine dealer. 
• Simon Wright - retail cocaine dealer (Darren’s brother and his drug runner). 
• Patrick – cannabis cultivator, wholesale supplier. 
• Ryan – poly dealer, retail level. 
• Darren – nitrous oxide dealer retail level. 
• Ben – retail cocaine dealer. 
 
 
Additional dealers/manufacturers 
 
• John – M-Cat dealer retail level. 
• Buster – drugs courier/trafficker (ex-bouncer). 
• Claire – MDMA dealer retail level. 
• Sarah – hallucinogen dealer, wholesale level. 
• Lucy – cannabis and cocaine dealer, retail level. 
• Mat – wholesale MDMA and spice dealer (ex-bouncer). 
• *Charley – anabolic steroid manufacture, international supplier. 
• Rocco – heroin dealer, wholesale level. 
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• Blake – poly dealer, retail level. 
• Calvin – retail MDMA dealer. 
• Wolf – wholesale cocaine dealer. 
• *Teeth – retail heroin and crack cocaine dealer. 
• *Hector – retail heroin and crack dealer (Teeth’s drug runner). 
• *Brian – retail heroin and crack dealer (Teeth’s drug runner). 
• *Maximus – retail nitrous oxide business owner. 
 
 
Enforcers – the Iranian ‘Mafia’. 
 
• Ade Bizhan – protection services (bouncer). 
• Kamin Bizhan – protection services (brother of Ade, bouncer). 
 
 
Official actors 
 
Third sector – (drug and alcohol services) 
 
• Laura 
• Sharon 
• Jacob 
• Johanna 
 
 
Criminal Justice 
 
• Peter - senior police officer. 
• Tom – financial investigator. 
• May – police officer. 
• Neil – prison officer. 
 
 
Private sector (bouncers) 
 
• Adam 
• Lenny 
• Liam 
 
 
The data were collected through a number of phases over a five-year period. The first phase 
involved interviewing offenders and took place during my master’s degree. In the second 
phase, additional criminal actors were enrolled, ethnographic fieldwork with offenders was 
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also initiated at this stage (first year of the PhD program). The third phase took place over six 
months during the second year of the PhD, which involved interviewing official actors. 
Ethnographic fieldwork with offenders was interrupted at this time. The fourth stage involved 
resuming fieldwork with offenders and conducting follow up interviews. This took place 
during the final two and a half years of the program. Fieldwork with offenders was interrupted 
whilst gathering data from the police, as it was deemed too great a risk to collect data from 
criminal sources concurrently. 
 
Participation in the study was completely voluntary, and no material incentives were offered, 
in order to minimise the risk of subject coercion. Fully informed consent was gained from all 
participants who were interviewed. Observational fieldwork was semi-covert as only the 
distributors of drugs were aware of the research agenda. The dealer’s customers and other 
individuals they associated with were not informed of the project and could not give their 
consent. Revealing my role as a researcher to the buyers of drugs would have put both myself 
and my participants at risk, whilst disrupting the opportunity to gain data in the field. I did not 
provide informed consent forms to the criminal actors as this would increase the risks of their 
identity being discovered: consent was sought and obtained verbally. Informed consent forms 
were provided to all official actors except those who engaged in crime themselves (bouncers).  
 
Interviews were conducted at a secluded space of the participants’ choosing. Public spaces 
were avoided due to the sensitivity of the information but were used when no alternatives were 
available. The interviews were recorded with a designated digital device or written by hand, 
depending on the participants’ preference. Only five of the offenders in this study did not wish 
to be digitally recorded. All interviews were transferred to a securely encrypted hard drive, 
including handwritten notes which were digitised. Fieldwork was conducted in various places 
throughout the city, such as in the participants’ homes, in their cars, out on the street or in pubs, 
bars and nightclubs. Field notes were written up at the end of the day to avoid suspicion whilst 
out in the field. At times I used my mobile phone to write down key words to facilitate recall. 
Where possible, this would be done in a secluded space such as in a toilet cubicle. I also drew 
upon experiences I had witnessed throughout my life, drawing upon my time spent with those 
participants whom I knew since childhood (the lads). Due to the fallibility of memory, I 
discussed these events with the lads to ensure my recall and interpretation of them was accurate. 
All data that was not encrypted was destroyed. Anonymity was sought at all times, pseudonyms 
for participants and places were used throughout the research process. 
 
 
The Ethnographic Approach 
 
Ethnography is an approach which involves the researcher immersing themselves in the life-
worlds of the people they wish to study (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). The etymology of 
the word originates from Greek, with ethnos meaning ‘the people’ whereas grapho means ‘to 
write’. Ethnography is both ‘something to know and a way of knowing’; it is a ‘method, theory 
and style of writing’ (McGranahan 2018, p. 4). Typically, ethnography involves observational 
methods that capture the behaviour of actors in a more natural setting. These are often 
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combined with interviews to allow the researcher to probe deeper into the area of study. 
Ethnographic research on offenders is invaluable as it allows the researcher to comprehend the 
social worlds of criminals in ways that other methods cannot (Sandberg and Copes 2012) The 
intersubjectivity that is achieved through immersion in the same social space, can allow the 
researcher to interpret the meaning of accounts and actions that could be misunderstood by 
outsiders (Blichfeldt and Heldbjerg 2011). The method requires time, however, which most 
research programs cannot afford (Copes et al. 2011). Moreover, the canon of natural science 
based positivism continues to dominate criminology (Young 2011), especially in the United 
States, with the majority of published articles employing quantitative methods (Jacques 2014). 
This may lead researchers to favour these research strategies to secure publications and later 
employment. 
 
 
Ethnography with offenders 
 
Many articles and textbooks on conducting ethnographic research with criminal populations 
present themselves as ‘how to guides’ for the novice researcher. The field is envisaged as an 
exotic place of inherent danger that one has to get into, get to know and get out again (Edwards 
2002). The researcher emerges from the field like a hunter on safari, with a bag full of trophies, 
tales to tell, and a pat on the back from the academic community. Such ‘blitzkrieg’ ethnography 
(and journalism) continues to rear its head but can be illuminating. Whilst it is not without 
merit to immerse oneself within marginalised populations so that the voice of the underdog 
may be heard (Becker 1967), there is a danger of reproducing stereotypes that all crime is 
committed by the poor or other marginalised groups:  
 
“the drug offending populations and participants examined in most relevant 
academic literature are the same ones who feature (disproportionately) within 
criminal justice figures, the media, and political discourse” (Salinas 2018). 
 
Salinas (2017) provides a detailed overview of this empirical issue using examples of drug 
dealers who do not follow the typical pattern of holding criminal records and being 
unemployed. The participants in his study are all working class males, however, making his 
‘unusual suspects’ more usual than he claims. In a society where drug use is becoming 
increasingly normalised across social groups, it is questionable whether ethnographic research 
on drug populations has represented the full reality of the problem. Indeed, a report from the 
Social Metrics Commission (2018) found that youths from middle class backgrounds are more 
likely to have tried illicit drugs in the last year than those from poorer ones. Substance use, 
misuse and distribution, whilst potentially linked to poverty, is not necessarily a problem of 
the poor. Ethnographic research on drugs also tends to focus on specific types of drugs or 
aspects of the market at the expense of others. Whilst recognising that ethnographic research 
does not aim to be representative or generalisable in ways aligned with quantitative work, it is 
worth noting that my research includes male and female informants from a variety of social 
class backgrounds, who distribute a variety of different drugs, in a number of different settings 
(a point I will return to later). This meant being strategic in terms of who I chose to include in 
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the study and in my use of gatekeepers. Indeed, there were a number of dealers in my network 
of potential participants that I chose not to approach. The point made here is not simply 
methodological, but rather indicates something of the complexity and variance in and across 
drug dealing networks and scenes that are not reducible to standard measurement criteria.  
 
 
Access 
 
Criminologists looking to access offenders will often go through official channels. Secrecy is 
essential to the success of most criminal organisations, making them difficult to penetrate from 
the outside. Although this route is easier and less time consuming it may result in a biased 
sample which can reflect the organisational structure of the criminal justice system and its 
many prejudices. Hobbs (2013) makes this point: 
 
“Law-enforcement-based research seldom reveals the organizational decisions, 
assumptions, and prior knowledge that impact upon their selection and sampling, 
and as a consequence research derived from these sources should always carry a 
disclaimer that ‘the content of this file are the fruits of police activity’” (Hobbs 
2013, p. 7). 
 
Serious offenders who are proficient at their craft may go completely unknown to the police 
and cannot be accessed through official means. Other low-level offenders may go unnoticed 
from the authorities because of their gender, ethnicity, or social class. Furthermore, criminals 
that are already known to the police are often failed offenders who are easy targets for arrest 
(Hobbs 2003).  Knowing these facts, I attempted to enrol participants across a range of social 
demographics. I succeeded in interviewing offenders of different genders, ethnicities and social 
class backgrounds. Many of the participants had no criminal records and were unknown to the 
police. The participants ranged from retail to wholesale drug dealers, operating on local, 
national and international levels. I also interviewed two participants who did not distribute 
drugs but enforced order and provided protection in the criminal underworld through acts of 
serious instrumental violence. Ade and Kamin are brothers and are well respected in many 
circles. 
 
There were some aspects of the field that were fairly new to me. Although I had witnessed the 
selling of ‘hard’ drugs such as heroin and crack and ‘soft’ drugs such as nitrous oxide in the 
past. It was not until I was out in the field with dealers of these substances that I began to get 
a detailed picture of how these markets operate. The lads are the participants that I spent most 
of the time with over the years, and their products of choice are cannabis, powdered cocaine 
and MDMA, they also operated mainly on the street level. The field is not a uniform social 
zone and comprises of many different illicit economies that have their own internal structures 
and codes of conduct (Aspers 2011; Sandberg 2012; van de Ven and Mulrooney 2016). 
Navigating access to other parts of the drug market required work and learning. Fortunately, I 
knew enough dealers across the city to make this happen, but where I could not, I used a 
snowballing technique and was introduced to dealers through friends. There were only two 
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participants in the study who agreed to take part without having met me before: Sarah and 
Lucy, both of whom were willing to let me interview them alone in their homes.  
 
It was important that I approached prospective participants in the right way. My primary tactic 
was to tell them about my own life history (if they did not already know it) or explain what I 
had been doing since I saw them last. By telling my own personal story, I had hoped that this 
would convince them that I was not working for the police, whilst building rapport as we 
exchanged shared experiences. In regard to the project, I would tell them that I was opposed to 
drug policy as it stands and the way that drug dealers are often demonised and presented as 
‘bad people’. I explained that it was important to get their perspective, so I could tell their side 
of the story. Getting the participants to feel that I was on their side and wanted to help was key 
in the recruitment phase. 
 
 
Trust, status and the self 
 
The management of self-presentation was key in getting participants to trust me, whilst 
blending into the field. The types of clothes I wore, the way I held myself, the types of language 
I used, and the topics I talked about, all had a part to play in this. Knowing the majority of the 
participants personally significantly helped in this matter:  
 
“You should get the ‘feel’ of their world by extensive and attentive listening - get 
some sense of what pleases them and what bugs them, some sense of their frame 
of reference, and some sense of their sense of language… Until the criminal's frame 
of reference and language have been learned, the investigator is in danger of 
coming on either too square or too hip” (Polsky 1967, pp. 128-129).  
 
To gain trust in the underworld, I had to embody the style of the underworld but was aware 
that this was different throughout the field. Having grown up with the lads and been part of the 
same subculture, this was not something I had to adopt artificially, but something I had to 
maintain and revert to. I became increasingly aware that my language had become more 
sophisticated, and my local accent began to fade as I spent more time in academic circles. 
Continuing my work as a bouncer and spending time in the field kept me grounded, however.  
 
The status of being a bouncer was well received among participants who respected me as 
someone who was ‘tough’ and engaged in violence when necessary (at least from their point 
of view) (Winlow 2001; Hobbs et al. 2003). From a professional perspective, violence in a club 
occurs when you have lost control of the venue or are not able to manage it effectively. Having 
to actually fight with punters, rather than split up fights, is a rarity and not something I enjoy. 
Nonetheless, these incidents provided me with a legitimate narrative and a point of 
conversation that participants could relate to. Like the drug market, being subject to serious 
violence on the job is uncommon, but these events when they do happen, allow actors to build 
their reputations and culminate their identity as someone not to be ‘messed with’. Being close 
friends with people like Ade and Kamin, who held a significant reputation, went especially in 
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my favour. Having serious offenders as friends allowed me to convince people that I was not 
an officer, and the project was safe. Some of the participants were not known to me before the 
study, giving me a limited time frame to build trust. 
 
As an insider to the field, I had a pre-existing level of closeness to some of the informants that 
would be difficult to achieve from an initial outsider position. The tight bonds I have with my 
participants has given me an intimate knowledge of their lifeworld’s and involvement in crime. 
Immersion is viewed as an essential characteristic of ‘good’ ethnography, however, the need 
to create distance is something that is often overlooked (Ybema and Kamsteeg 2009). The 
downside of being an insider is that the researcher may overlook familiar details that do not 
seem important (Edwards 2002). In this respect, there is a need to ‘make the familiar strange’ 
(Gordon et al. 2001, p. 188) by creating analytical distance from the field. When I initially 
began writing I had to create this distance so that I was generating a sociological account of 
what was happening, drawing from my position, rather than simply writing from the 
perspective of ‘one of the lads’. The same was true when I was out in the field. Rather than 
living in the field as a native, I had to begin to analyse the events in situ, in a way that I had 
not done until the research began. Indeed, the problems I encountered did not result from ‘going 
native’ but instead from ‘being native’ (Kanuha 2000), as a non-criminal insider (not everyone 
who associates with drug dealers will use drugs or sell drugs themselves, nor will they be 
expected to do so). I had to manage multiple states of mind but also personas as I moved from 
the field to the desk, to working as a bouncer. Engaging with criminological literature helped 
me to develop a more reflexive and analytical perspective overall. The greatest issue with my 
criminological mindset was being able to turn it off. Being in a constant state of heightened 
awareness was emotionally demanding. Ethical and emotional characteristics of fieldwork are 
intensified in the process of data collection (Briggs 2009) in often unremarked ways (Baird 
2018). 
 
Perhaps the most difficult element of self-presentation was when it came to witnessing 
troubling and emotionally disturbing events (a concern flagged by the ethics committee). 
Whilst the vast majority are not, some drug dealers are in fact, calculating predators and will 
regularly engage in violence and intimidation: particularly in markets that are comprised of 
vulnerable drug addicts. Teeth, for example, entrapped his drug runners and customers through 
debt bonding and physiological manipulation, leaving them largely under his control. Meeting 
with desperate customers who had their teeth pulled, going to the houses of street prostitutes 
with missing limbs, or watching Teeth’s runner cry as he belittled him in front of me, was not 
easy to witness (see chapter 5). Hector had been doing well apparently, and only had to be hit 
around the head with a Maglite on one occasion since working for Teeth. I did not wish to 
challenge Teeth on his behaviour as I was concerned for my own safety and knew that if I was 
not impartial in his presence, the opportunity to spend time with him would be lost. I distanced 
myself from Teeth after he sent me a video of one of his runners injecting himself. Teeth had 
created the video with the research in mind as he said he wanted to give me some more insights 
into the trade:  
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The needle went deep into Barry’s arm as he got ready for the dose. He steadied his hand and 
aspirated quickly before slowly injecting the brown fluid into his bloodstream. I could hear 
Teeth talking in the background as he filmed the video, avidly enjoying the show: “that’s it you 
know what to do”. A few moments later, Barry pulled out the needle leaving a thick trail of 
blood oozing down his left arm. He licked it off and smiled drearily at the camera with a 
bloodied grin and rolling eyes. “Barry is as good as gold” Teeth remarked, “but if you cross 
him, he will come at you with an infected needle”.  
 
I was not sure if the comment was an implicit threat to me regarding the information I held on 
Teeth or something else entirely. Nonetheless, I realised that I had become part of Teeth’s 
psychological power play, and people were being exploited. It was time for me to move on.  
 
 
Access in the night economy 
 
Whilst the majority of the fieldwork was conducted outside of the club scene, I used my time 
there to generate contacts from both offenders and official actors. A number of dealers 
frequented clubs where I worked and were friends with the managers and owners of the 
establishments. I became friends with them and gained their trust, some of whom where 
bouncers themselves. Many of these actors I knew before the research began, whereas others 
came to my attention during the project. As I got to know them better, I would tell them about 
my research and study their response. Many participants were quite forthcoming and offered 
to take part without me asking. They enjoyed telling their stories as it allowed them to perform 
their identity, which had gained them significant respect on the street (Sandberg and Pedersen 
2011). Others needed to be asked directly, and whilst some agreed when asked in person, they 
did not return my messages and could not be traced. In these cases, I would wait until I saw 
them again and allow them to bring up the matter in conversation. I knew that pressing further 
could ruin my chances. Buster was one of these people. I initially saw Buster in a nightclub 
when I was out drinking with Kamin. I already knew Buster from working on the ‘door’ 
(bouncing) so I decided to approach him to ask if he would participate in the study. He agreed 
but seemed awkward at the prospect due to the seriousness of his offence. I waited a couple of 
days to contact him, but he ignored my messages. A few months later, I was informed that he 
had been attending a martial arts class in the city, so I went along to train. As a martial artist 
myself, this was not something out of the ordinary. After subsequent visits to the class, he 
began to trust me and succumb to the pressure of the ‘elephant in the room’. It was then that 
he approached the subject and said he would be willing to participate. 
 
 
Interviews 
 
I loosely employed a Schutze (1978) methodology of open narrative-based interviews 
combined with semi-structured questioning that probed deeper into specific areas (as referred 
to by Bauer (1996)). The interviews were respondent-driven rather than being dictated by the 
interview schedule. The ‘question response schema’ of structured and semi-structured 
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interviews can impose concepts onto the data that emerge from the interview schedule rather 
than the topic under investigation (Bauer 1996, p. 2). A level of reflexivity can assist in this 
process, however. As I was interested in the life histories of the participants, I began the 
interview simply by asking them to tell me their life story from childhood. This stage of the 
interview was designed to allow the interviewee to talk openly in a natural manner, eliciting 
stories that are constructed in a ‘self-generating schema’ (Bauer 1996, p. 3). According to 
Sampson and Laub (2005), qualitative life history narratives can provide a deeper exploration 
of the life course where quantitative methods may fail. 
 
The first stage of the process was to conduct a number of pilot interviews alongside writing a 
brief literature review on the topic as I analysed the accounts. This allowed me to formulate an 
interview guide of significant ‘exmanent’ issues that I hoped to cover (Bauer 1996, p. 5). As 
more interviews were completed, I added additional topics to the guide that had come to my 
notice through the interview process. The guide was theoretically driven by both the literature 
review and the participants’ accounts in an adaptive manner (Layder 1998). The literature 
review was revisited and altered throughout the research project as new information came to 
light. At certain times if the participant had directed the conversation towards a salient topic 
but had not covered all aspects of it, I would probe deeper and ask further questions on the 
matter. To avoid disrupting the flow of the conversation, topics in the guide were written into 
a question format. Throughout the interview, I ticked off topics that had been covered and those 
that had not were introduced at the end of the interview. Some structuring of the interview was 
necessary to ensure all aspects of the guide had been fleshed out.  
 
I employed a more structured approach when interviewing official actors. I created a list of 
semi-structured questions on specific areas of their working role, combined with questions that 
reflected their opinion on certain aspects of the drug trade and their official response to it. The 
reason for the more structured approach was that I was not looking to assess the life-story of 
these actors, which required a more open format. I wished instead to further corroborate aspects 
of the drug trade whilst broadening my perspective of it. ‘Partiality is a perennial characteristic 
of criminological theory’ (Young 1987, p. 338), by interviewing official actors I hoped to 
increase the scope of the study by bringing in a wider range of perspectives from the field.  
 
Qualitative interviews have long been employed in developmental and life-course studies of 
crime and deviancy (e.g. Glueck and Glueck 1952; Robins 1966; Sampson and Laub 1992); 
however, they align to a realist position in which reality is said to exists independently of the 
mind and can be objectively studied through sense data (Williams 1988). Life narratives are 
thus deemed to be accurate and stable representations of events to which causal claims around 
life changes can be made. This epistemological stance has been heavily criticised by narrative 
theorists due to the variability in which events are interpreted and constructed: 
 
“Language is viewed as a transparent medium, unambiguously reflecting stable, 
singular meanings... Critics of the realist assumptions of positivism challenge these 
views of language and knowing… Informants’ stories do not mirror a world “out 
 42 
there." They are constructed, creatively authored, rhetorical, replete with 
assumptions, and interpretive.” (Riessman 2005, pp. 4-5). 
 
Stories are often framed depending on what the teller believes the listener expects to hear, 
which will vary between one audience and the next. Such ‘vocabularies of motives’ (Mills 
1940) are context dependent and contain justifications for behaviour that attempt to influence 
others on reasons for conduct (Gerth and Mills 1953, p. 117). Indeed, narratives do not 
represent ‘windows’ into ‘private experience’; they are ‘dependent on discursive and cultural 
conventions for their form and content’ (Atkinson 2009, pp. 2-6). According to Presser (2009), 
narratives do not need to be viewed as accurate to be applicable to realism due to the effects 
they have on the future. Narratives can ‘circumvent’ realist occupations with truth by 
‘recognising their role’ (Presser 2009, p. 190). Indeed, narrative construction has important 
implications for involvement in and desistance from crime (Paternoster and Bushway 2009; 
Stevens 2012; King 2013). However, this does not resolve problems around inferring causal 
relations around past behaviour from socially constructed accounts, only that these accounts 
may be causal in themselves. Moreover, the recognition of the self-fulling prophecy of 
discourse emerges from interactionist approaches to social life that stand in direct opposition 
to realism (Wiley 2003). ‘If men define, situations as real, they are real in their consequence’ 
(Thomas and Thomas 1928, p. 572). In rejection of the realist approach, this thesis aligns itself 
with a social constructivist ontology (Berger and Luckmann 1991), as a means to examine how 
drugs and organised crime is constructed through social practices, including narrative and 
discourse. It also treats the testimonies of the participants as existing again as constructions 
that represent their experiences of crime and the meanings they attach to it (more on narratives 
later).  
 
 
Analysis 
 
Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to an hour and a half in total. The initial interviews were 
shorter but increased in length as the interview guide was developed. My ability to interview 
effectively improved over time, which, when combined with the expanded interview guide led 
to richer data overall. The interviews were transcribed in NVivo and coded as nodes. Fieldnotes 
and website data were also coded in this way. Webpages from the distributor’s sites were saved 
as documents and imported into NVivo. Max had a website advertising his nitrous oxide 
delivery service (Nos Man), whereas Charley’s site was dedicated to distributing image and 
performance enhancing drugs (Pharma-Labs). Charley did not run the site himself but worked 
within a team of actors who had different roles within the organisation. 
 
I employed thematic analysis (TA) to create a coding frame using concepts generated from the 
literature review and themes that emerged from the data. Reducing and simplifying information 
in this way allows the researcher to ‘expand, transform, and reconceptualise data’ to generate 
analytical structures (Coffey and Atkinson 1996, p. 29). According to Braun and Clarke (2014), 
thematic analysis is a tool for: 
 
“systematically identifying, organizing, and offering insight into patterns of 
meaning (themes) across a data set… This method, then, is a way of identifying 
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what is common to the way a topic is talked or written about and of making sense 
of those commonalities.” (Braun and Clarke 2014, p. 57). 
 
Braun and Clarke offer a six-step framework that allows researchers to develop codes and 
themes that relate to the research questions of the study. Although I did not follow their 
prescription religiously, the method proposed helped me to find themes across my data sets, 
whether it be fieldnotes, interview material or website data. I was aware that my personal 
background could influence the construction of the coding frame and analysis. Academic 
research does not generate knowledge in an unbiased manner, it may reflect certain interests or 
target certain audiences (Gouldner 1968). In light of these facts, I adopted a reflexive and 
critical gaze upon all aspects of the research (see below). The process of creating codes and 
themes was not straight forward, the topic of organised crime is wide, and at times I would try 
and include too much and be pulled off in different directions. This was also due to the amount 
of data I had amassed, which was easy to get lost in. At a certain point, I had to stop planning, 
stop ‘thinking’ and get down and write, it was then that the analysis began to flourish. The final 
output can be seen as a translation of a diverse range of elements, perspectives and processes 
(Law 2004).    
 
During the research process, I was also able to secure sales data of nitrous oxide from Max 
(N=1212). Two months of sales data were obtained but due to the late stage in the research, it 
was decided that descriptive statistics would be suitable to incorporate the data. Ethnography 
is a process of discovery (Whitehead 2005), meaning that the researcher may come across data 
that they had not initially planned for. Data of this kind is rare: drug dealers do not usually log 
their sales as it could be used as evidence against them. The logs had details of amounts sold 
in pounds sterling, the date and time in which sales were made, and the postcodes of where the 
products where delivered. The data were coded into SPSS, which was used to provide 
descriptive statistics for the study. 
 
 
Validating the ‘Truth’ 
 
An issue with interviews is that respondents may be motivated to lie about their actions or bend 
the truth. Offenders may wish to hide their activities for fear of being prosecuted. In other 
cases, they may embellish in order to gain social status for actions they have not committed 
(Presser 2009; Sandberg 2014). People may also believe they are telling the truth when their 
actions appear otherwise to others. Take the dealer who asserts he is getting out of the game 
but needs to make a few more sales first. Testimonies will always be distorted in some way: 
 
“We also often rely on individuals to tell us how they feel, what opinion or belief 
they hold, or what they did during a certain time. This is affected, however, by 
many things, such as their understanding of the worlds that make up the question, 
their memories, their mood, and their motivation to provide valid answers.” 
(Hoffmann 2017, p. 12). 
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From a social constructionist standpoint, the participants’ accounts need not be treated as either 
‘true’ or ‘false’ representations of reality but as ‘displays of perspectives and moral forms’ 
(Silverman 2011, p. 199). Consideration then should be given to how narratives have been 
constructed and for what purposes (Sandberg 2014). Nonetheless, if the researcher is able to 
cross-reference a respondent’s account, they may be able to elicit more information as to why 
it has been given in a certain way, rather than taking it at face value. This mitigates the potential 
issue of the ‘naïve ethnographer’ simply describing the world as it presented to them by 
informants. My time in the field and intimate knowledge of the participants was especially 
useful here. In some cases, I was able to confirm when the participants had completely changed 
a set of events to suit their preferences. I was also able to probe with questions related to actual 
experiences I had shared with them in the past. If I knew that a participant had significantly 
altered the story (something of a rarity), I would not interrogate them on the matter as I did not 
want them to feel like they were being cross-examined. There is always an issue that the 
researcher may interpret testimonies incorrectly, however, in which case member checks can 
be employed.  
 
 
Member checks 
 
Member checking is a process which involves the researcher sharing data and or its subsequent 
analysis with the participants to assess whether they and the subject matter have been properly 
represented. Member checking is said to increase the validity of the data (Koelsch 2013). As 
an insider, I had not initially intended to employ this method due to my depth of knowledge of 
the field; however, as the project progressed it became necessary for a variety of reasons. One 
of the lads, for example, questioned me on the purpose of the research and asked whether I had 
become an undercover officer “it’s funny you’ve been doing this research, but I’ve never seen 
any of it… I was just thinking wouldn’t it be cool if one of my mates was CID…”. With that, 
I produced my literature review, which I had downloaded to my phone. Ben seemed quite 
dissatisfied after reading it as he said it was like a ‘policy document’ and not like ‘real life’. 
After this event, I decided to share my chapters with my participants where possible to get their 
feedback. I also shared academic books on organised crime with my participants in this manner. 
Ade, for example, had become quite interested in the subject and had personal dealings with 
some of the criminal actors in Varese’s ‘Mafia Life’ (2017). I decided to share the book with 
him, but like Ben, he was unhappy with Varese’s portrayal of these actors. He believed the 
book was a sensationalised and conflated representation of organised crime, likening it to his 
own treatment by the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). Whilst it may not be possible 
to produce a truly objective account of reality, we must be aware that accounts can be good or 
poor depending on what is taken into consideration (Liebling 2001). Member checking not 
only allowed me to check the data and analysis for inconsistencies but also served as a tool to 
convince participants I was not working for the police. Furthermore, as I knew that some of 
the offenders would be reading the thesis, I decided to describe them as ‘participants’ rather 
than ‘informants’, as the latter term is often associated with the ‘grass’ who informs to the 
police, which I was certainly not doing. 
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External validity 
 
Without elaborating further due to constraints of anonymity, Red City is a modern urban 
environment that has particular features that are common in other major cities throughout the 
UK (although local contexts will vary); thus, some of the findings in this study may be directly 
generalisable to other areas. Furthermore, illicit drug markets involve systems of exchange that 
are applicable in all cases; they involve the trading of goods where trust between parties is 
essential. Indeed, human practices may contain their own means of generalisation due to their 
commonly shared features. Nonetheless, the limits of external validity in ethnographic studies 
can be resolved by a commitment to a depth of analysis, achieved via immersion in the field. 
It is through a ‘thick description’ of events, which avoids surface explanations, where readers 
can begin to grasp social worlds as they resonate with their own personal experiences of them 
(Geertz 1973). It is then up to the reader to decide how transferable (rather than statistically 
generalisable) these findings are to their own context (Tracy 2010). ‘What generality it 
contrives to achieve grows out of the delicacy of its distinctions, not the sweep of its 
abstractions’ (Geertz 1973, p. 25). However, where findings confirm to ‘established concepts 
and theories’, they can be said to have achieved ‘analytical generalisability’. The same is true 
if theories that emerge from the research can be confirmed elsewhere (Smith 2017, p. 5). To 
conclude, forms of narcotic distribution may be recognisable as common regardless of location, 
although there are also significant differences (take, for example, the differences between 
criminal cartels in Mexico and UK drug dealers). This study does not, therefore, attempt to 
present findings which are universally valid; however, it may indicate some broader trends in 
narcotic distribution and criminal activity in the UK.   
 
 
Ethics 
 
Before I could begin collecting the data, the project needed to be approved by the department’s 
board of ethics. There are differences between institutions within and between countries, but 
in the contemporary era, requirements of institutional review boards (IRB) are stringent, 
making research into illegal activities difficult. Research that involves fieldwork in high-risk 
settings may be turned down, which in effect silences the voices of vulnerable and marginalised 
populations within them (Swauger 2009). IRBs have been criticised for representing the 
universities’ interests above all else (Wallace 2003; Hedgecoe 2016). Universities do this to 
protect themselves from criticism and negative exposure in the press that might lead to a 
withdrawal of funding. It may also reflect a lack of cultural affinity with ethnographic work in 
the ‘big science’ mindset that prevails in contemporary academia (Young 2011). The process 
of gaining approval is often seen as a static ‘box ticking’ exercise that does not reflect the fact 
that many ethical issues in the field are situated and cannot be anticipated in advance (Calvey 
2008). Fieldwork on illegal activity is a messy business (Ward 2008). Yet, if we do accept 
‘research ethics as negotiated’ this does not answer the question on how we ‘judge what is 
justifiable’, a perennial problem (Taylor and Smith 2014, p. 547). Covert research is especially 
difficult to get approved and is frowned for being deceptive (Calvey 2017). Participants are not 
able to give their consent and have no say in the research process and how they may be 
represented (Homan 1980). Nonetheless, covert research can benefit participants by 
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illuminating hidden injustices (Calvey 2008, 2017). If data is anonymised fully, detriment to 
personal interest can be avoided.  
 
My personal experience of gaining ethical approval was one where it became clear that the 
exercise was an assessment of me, rather than of my methodology. My moral character came 
under scrutiny from the committee in and through the discussion of a series of hypothetical 
scenarios. It was even proposed that an ordered list of crimes was written up in terms of their 
‘severity’ and if I were to observe any that breached a certain predefined threshold, I would 
have to report them immediately. I had to explain that although I intended to spend time with 
drug dealers, and already did so, by association, in my personal life, this did not make me a 
‘bad person’, ‘taint’ my moral compass or impact upon my ability to conduct an ethical study. 
I was (and am) fully able to make appropriate decisions in the field and respond to them, 
without a list to refer to and, in any case, would not wish to be bound by abstract pro-hoc moral 
criteria. The negative stereotypes of drug dealers had, in effect spilt over to me through 
association: an issue I had to grapple with throughout the research process. This also exposes 
the boards’ desire to rank and quantify social life into abstract risk matrices. Fortunately, this 
proposal was dropped. In regard to personal risk, the fact that I was already embedded in these 
networks and witnessed drug dealing on a regular basis went in my favour. These were ‘risks’ 
I chose to take as part of my everyday life, and not something that would be imposed upon me 
through the research process: I was already ‘in the field’, and witnessing crime was not an 
unusual occurrence for me. The fact that the data gained from observations could not be 
gathered in any other way was also taken into consideration.  
 
If it were not for my background and physical stature, it is questionable whether the project 
would have been approved, further silencing attempts to conduct research of this kind in the 
future. Nonetheless, this thesis does not advocate an ‘anything goes’ philosophy in which every 
social scientist should be given clearance to do this type of research (Calvey 2018, p. 13). I 
worked with dangerous people in sometimes dangerous settings, which could be especially 
risky had it not been for my prior knowledge of the field. As a bouncer I am well known and 
trusted with many criminal actors in the city. I am also familiar with the environment and how 
to act within it. Whilst it is true that many ethical dilemmas are situated, prior knowledge of 
the field can help to resolve these issues when, or before, they emerge. 
 
 
Observing Criminal Acts 
 
The research involved both witnessing and collecting information on criminal acts. Witnessing 
and recording crimes that are not known to the police is risky and could put the researcher in a 
position where they are legally obligated to give up the information. Run-ins with the police 
are not out of the norm in this type of research. Bourgois (2003) was stopped by the police a 
number of times who questioned him on his presence in a high crime neighbourhood. In an 
extreme example, Scarce (1994) was sent to prison for 159 days after refusing to disclose data 
to a federal grand jury. According to Elliott and Fleetwood (2017), researchers in the UK 
generally have no legal obligation to report a crime except in regard to terrorism. Researchers 
can still come under scrutiny, however, if they hold information on a specific case:  
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“Although no absolute legal protections of respondents’ confidentiality exist, the 
legal processes that would force a researcher to break confidentiality are quite 
specific. The court could only apply to access research data in a circumstance in 
which researchers were thought to have information relating to a specific criminal 
case, and where the public good outweighed the duty of confidentiality.” (Elliott 
and Fleetwood 2017, p. 8). 
 
Indeed, in 2016 Boston College was subpoenaed by the Police Service of Northern Ireland in 
a court case regarding recorded interviews with a former IRA prisoner (Guardian 2016). 
Anthony McIntire gave testimonies on loyalist paramilitaries, which the university had 
promised not to publish in his lifetime to protect him from harm. To avoid identifying the 
participants in the study, all data have been completely anonymised. I have promised the 
participants that under no circumstances would the data be made available to the authorities 
even if I was summoned to court. Like Scarce, I would go to jail to protect my data, my friends 
and also myself. There are worse things in this world than going to prison, such as being on 
the wrong side of violent criminals.  
 
Whilst I did not have any issues with the police when out with dealers in the field, an 
intelligence officer whom I approached put me under pressure to work for the police as an 
informant, in return for access to his department. I informed him that I could not provide the 
police with such information as I was legally bound by the board of ethics to provide 
confidentiality to everyone in my study. Nonetheless, he saw that my research could be 
valuable, so put me in contact with a senior officer who agreed to be interviewed. I had met 
the intelligence officer through a friend of the family who was himself a police informant. 
Gupta ran a local corner shop that was in an area of concentrated drug use and had a 
considerable hatred towards both users and dealers. In light of his views, I provided him with 
‘Good Cop Bad War’ by Neil Woods (2016). Woods was an intelligence officer who had 
written about his experiences tackling drugs in the UK and the benefits of legalisation. It was 
after reading this book his perspective began to change. According to Becker (1967), it is not 
possible, nor desirable, to avoid taking sides in the research process. What is more important 
‘rather is whose side we should be on’ (Becker 1967, p. 3). Indeed, it was my partiality (to 
some aspects of their work) that allowed me to gain the trust of many participants in this study. 
Positionality is a social problem, which can have serious consequences for the researcher 
within the field. Something that even Becker failed to recognise. 
 
 
Too close to crime 
 
It is not always possible to foresee the ethical dilemmas that occur in the field nor remove 
oneself completely from criminal activity. Ferrell calls for deep experiential immersion in 
criminal worlds to the extent that legal boundaries may be breached. For him, an abandonment 
of the objective, detached stance of positivism is necessary to gain insights that have remained 
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hidden from mainstream criminology (Ferrell 1998). Although I had no intention of breaking 
the law there were times when my presence as a researcher worked to facilitate crime: 
 
Mat, an ex-doorman, had come to the city for the day after being released from prison. He had 
told me that the experience had changed him, and he wanted to go straight but was struggling 
for money. He needed to save for a car of his own and afford a place to live. Mat had a cheap 
source of MDMA, so came to sell a few ounces to make a quick turn over. He told me he was 
meeting a customer who was taking the drugs on credit and wanted me to come along. We 
parked up on a side street in the city centre in a car that Mat had borrowed from his mum. 
When his contact arrived, Mat introduced me as a bouncer, someone who was “hard as fuck” 
and “connected”, reeling off many names of my associates. Mat was using my status to bolster 
his own to ensure he got the money back, which he did the following week.  
 
I spent the night with Mat and ended up in a drum and bass rave where I bumped into Charley, 
a producer of anabolic steroids. Charley had fallen out with Mat over some ounces of poor-
quality M-Cat he had given him some years back and had not seen him since. I was alone at 
the bar when Charley approached me “what the fuck are you doing with that dick head you 
know he ripped me off right”. Not wanting conflict, I explained that Mat had just got out of jail 
and was trying to turn his life around “he’s changed mate seriously”.  Charley took my word 
for it and decided to make amends. The two resolved their differences and before long were 
discussing how they could use Charley’s industrial pill press to produce ecstasy pills.  
 
Whilst I had unwittingly facilitated this exchange by acting as a mediator between the two 
parties, there was no way I could have foreseen this event. The reality, however, is that this 
was not an artefact of the research but a normal facet of social interaction that was facilitated 
through the environment we were in. Criminals make contacts through people they know or by 
being in the same environments that other offenders frequent (Felson 2006). This is the same 
process I used to gather my participants and reflects the fact that organised crime bears much 
of the same mechanisms as many legitimate social and economic pursuits (Smith 1975, 1980). 
Nonetheless, navigating disputes between friends who had become rivals was not 
straightforward: I had to ‘control my associations’ (Goffman 1989). The participant’s 
associates would spot me out with their enemies resulting in questioning phone calls the next 
day. When I explained it was for the research project and only temporary, this was usually 
enough. The participants wanted to maintain their friendships with me rather than break them.  
 
 
Doing it covert 
 
As the research was semi-covert, both myself and my participants intentionally kept the nature 
of the study secret from the majority of the people around us. In this respect, there was a 
strategic shift between levels of openness and deceit. I was either presented to the customers 
as a friend and a bouncer or not introduced at all. In the latter case, we would allow people to 
make their own assumptions. This was all the more interesting on the rare occasions I took 
written notes in public view. The first evening I spent with Teeth, for example, involved me 
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taking notes on a pad of A4 paper in a number of bars throughout the city. Teeth had made it 
explicit that he did not want to be tape recorded.  
 
We sat outside a bar in the city centre on a benched area that became increasingly more 
crowded as the interview wore on. As I scribbled away insistently during the conversation, 
Teeth reminded me to keep my voice down as he did not want people outside to hear. A couple 
of lovers sat a few meters away glanced over occasionally, trying to assess what was going on 
“keep it down, they think you are my social-worker” Teeth observed with a cunning smile.  
 
Teeth was enjoying the attention he was getting from both me and the onlookers, particularly 
in being able to deceive them. For him, it was a game. Similarly, when I was out with Max 
making his nitrous oxide deliveries, I took notes as I sat in the passenger side of his car. His 
customers did not seem bothered by this and may have assumed I was logging the sales. 
Although there was no way to know what they thought without directly asking them, I imagine 
they would have been concerned if they knew the real purpose behind my scribblings. In a 
similar example, Rosenhan (1973) secretly sent a number of sane researchers into a psychiatric 
ward to test if they would be diagnosed correctly. The researchers began by writing notes in 
private but soon realised that no one seemed concerned when they took them openly on the 
ward. When examining nursing records, it was revealed that the writing was interpreted by the 
staff as a characteristic of the patients ‘pathological behaviour’ (Rosenhan 1973, p. 388). 
People make assumptions on the motivations and purposes of other’s behaviour based on ideal 
types and symbolic identifiers that relate to the context they are in. 
 
 
Managing Relations with Friends 
 
Managing field relations with friends was difficult and put us in positions that were not normal. 
Interviewing friends and asking them questions about their lives is not something I would 
engage in if it were not for the project. Ryan, for example, remarked on how his experience of 
being interviewed by me was “weird”, he said it was as if I had become “a different person”. I 
had hoped that by using an interview schedule that allowed the participants to speak more 
freely would ameliorate some of these tensions, but regardless of how it was carried out, it was 
still an interview. Being an insider, however, allowed me to see how my presence as a 
researcher had changed the environment, which provided important insights in itself. This level 
of reflexivity could not have been attained from an outside perspective: 
 
“The point is that minimizing the influence of the researcher is not the only, or 
always even a prime, consideration. Assuming we understand how the presence of 
the researcher may have shaped the data, we can interpret the latter accordingly 
and it can provide important insights, allowing us to pursue the emerging analysis.”  
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, p. 102). 
 
Interviewing the people you know can be a benefit as a level of trust will have been 
preestablished. Trust is essential in conditions where participants are reporting criminal 
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activity. Knowing participants well can increase their motivation to provide accurate accounts 
as the researcher may know if they are embellishing or posturing (Sandberg 2014).  
 
 
Exiting the field 
 
The process of exiting the field is something that is seldom discussed in ethnography (Iversen 
2009). Many qualitative research textbooks completely ignore this process and concentrate on 
gaining access or managing field relations (Delamont 2016). Researchers can encounter 
methodological issues when leaving, but the process is often taken for granted. As some of the 
participants are close friends who I had known long before I began the research, exiting the 
field is not something that I would want, nor am I able to achieve. Many of these friends I no 
longer saw on a regular basis until the research began, but was still in contact with them. 
Friends become distant as a normal part of life, as other commitments make it difficult to spend 
time together. Although the lads were no longer hanging out on a daily basis, we stayed in 
touch and got together on important occasions. Social media allowed us to maintain relations 
where we could not see each other in person. When contacting participants for the research 
project or moving away to write it up, there was no ‘entering’ or ‘exiting’ the field, but rather 
a shift between distance and immersion. These oscillations were determined by the 
opportunities to gather data (participant dependant) and the research schedule itself.  
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4) Entry: A Journey into Drugs 
 
It all started when I moved up here to Red City, I’d never been anywhere near drugs until that 
point, not even seen them. I went down to this house in Westcroft where a few people were that 
I know. Baker who I got working for me had got himself into a bit of trouble. Lennox was a big 
player and was pissed at him over something and they were going to kill him, right there and 
then. When I walked in the house they had him tied to a chair, they were taunting him, kicking 
the legs out, beating him round the head, and you know what, I took pity on the cunt. I told 
them I wasn’t going to have that, no one was doing any killing on my watch. I said “he’s mine 
now, I own this man” and they didn’t like it but there was nothing they could do. Baker was 
my entry point, he had been selling dark and knew where to get it. So I saw it as a business 
opportunity... 
 
Introduction 
 
The entry point into the illicit drug market marks a stage in life that can progress into a life-
long commitment to criminal activity. For some, selling drugs is a conscious decision, a 
practical and economic investment in drugs that becomes a sustained routine activity. For 
others, it is but part of the lifestyle of being a drug user. Not everyone who distributes drugs 
will define themselves as a dealer, especially those involved in social supply. It is the path to 
which offenders take on the ‘dealer’ identity that is of most interest to this study. This chapter 
examines the start phase of the drug dealing career, where the participants in this study first 
establish themselves as distributors. Previous research in this field demonstrates that social 
networks provide opportunities to distribute drugs and determine the roles that people assume 
when they first become dealers (Murphy et al. 1990; Matrix Knowledge Group 2007; Werse 
and Müller 2016). These studies, however, do not consider the relationship between age and 
settings in generating these networks to begin with. This chapter demonstrates how 
opportunities to sell drugs are age-graded, reflecting entry and exposure to different 
criminogenic settings through the life-course. 
 
There are a number of possible (and mostly compatible) explanations for becoming a dealer: 
structural inequalities, the normalisation of drugs, the drive for capital and the ‘high life’ of 
conspicuous consumption (Adler and Adler 1983; Bourgois 2003; Coomber et al. 2016). But 
even these provide only shallow answers to the issue. Every drug dealer has a unique life story 
that may not be generalisable to the wider population. Furthermore,  a truly representative 
sample is unknowable as long as some drug dealers remain concealed. Following the 
ethnographic tradition, the study aims, perhaps more modestly, for depth in the analysis and 
provides a critical description of the participants’ accounts, to outline how, in some cases, 
people become drug dealers. It examines offender narratives around life trajectories and turning 
points (Sampson and Laub 2005), that they believe has led them to crime. As these accounts 
are socially constructed, the turning points they refer to cannot be deemed as objective causal 
mechanisms in the realist sense. They are reflective narratives that help make sense of 
particular life experiences that are contextually framed by the present (Riessman 2005; 
Atkinson 2009; Presser 2009). ‘A narrative is not a report on one’s entire life so far. Rather, a 
narrative always draws selectively upon lived experience’ (Presser 2009, p. 179) 
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The Lads 
 
I was first introduced to the lads in the playground of Summer Park School in 1999 on a dreary 
English mid-Autumn day. Summer Park was one of the worst performing state schools in the 
UK and still is today. Many pupils left with no qualifications; others counted themselves lucky 
to pull together a few low-ranking GCSEs. The school had a large cohort of students from 
Drayton, a low-income neighbourhood that was in a terrible social condition. Crime was rife 
in Summer Park: drug dealing, stabbings and robbery were not out of the norm. The old 
Victorian building resembled a high-security prison. Its parameters enclosed by tall barbed 
wire fences, whilst CCTV cameras loomed out from the crumbling brickwork, doing little to 
provide any sense of security. Groups of youths frequently loitered around the entrances 
robbing students for their lunch money as they walked in. Fortunately, I never had any cash as 
was clearly evident from my ‘school uniform’ (shabby clothes my mum had purchased from a 
local charity shop). I hated the school with a passion, but the lads provided me with a sense of 
belonging and the security that is found in numbers. The boys were a few years older than me, 
but we got on well, and they took me under their wing. As a younger member of the group, 
they shielded me from the various deviant and criminal activities that they engaged in, but I 
was there throughout to witness it. Some members of the group went on to become long-term 
career criminals, and their stories are present throughout the chapters of the thesis; others did 
not engage in crime apart from being users of illicit drugs.  
 
 
Social supply 
 
The lads first encountered drugs during school hours. The local cycle path was a secluded space 
in disrepair and provided an ideal spot for the boys to hang out at lunch. Home to an assortment 
of burned out scooters, shopping trolleys, disused needles and syringes, it cut through the city 
like a malignant vein. The pupils from the Drayton would often spend their time there so they 
could smoke weed in relative privacy and sell small amounts to the students to fund their habits. 
Bret was the first to come in contact with the drug. He came from a relatively wealthier family 
home and had a larger supply of pocket money, so was able to make purchases on a regular 
basis. He would sometimes share with Sam, Andy and Ryan who would chip in when they 
could. Andy and Sam Stone were brothers and lived in a poor single-parent home with their 
father. Not having a place of their own, the boys would smoke away from adults in places such 
as the streets, parks, graveyards and a camp they built in the woods using the gear they stole 
from a local primary school. The boys learned deviance through association at a young age 
(Sutherland et al. 1995) and enjoyed the thrills of edgework (Ferrell 1998). 
 
Social supply is regarded as the most common form of drug dealing. It is a part of the user 
culture in which drugs are consumed and shared among members of one’s immediate social 
group. The sharing of goods is a fundamental part of our social fabric. The sharing of food, for 
example, can be found in all societies across the world and is a bedrock of social bonding. 
Psychoactive drugs are no different (Taylor and Potter 2013; Chatwin and Potter 2014). There 
is no agreed-upon definition of social supply, but there is a general consensus among academics 
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that it is distinctively different from formal dealing (Coomber and Moyle 2014; Moyle 2014). 
This has spurred calls for a softening of our laws, but these suggestions have landed on deaf 
ears. As of now, the sharing of drugs between friends is still classed as dealing and carries a 
significantly greater sentence than possession alone. If you were to ask Bret if he thought he 
was a drug dealer for sharing a ‘spliff’, the answer would have inevitably been “no”. 
 
As time went by, the boys became tired of smoking out in the cold; at the age of 16, the older 
lads from the group had left school and were in search of somewhere more suitable. It was at 
this time that Bret was introduced to Gerald, a hash dealer who lived in a block of flats a short 
distance from his house. Gerald was an overweight middle-aged white guy with a messy beard 
and a hook on his right arm. The boys did not know it, but Gerald was a paedophile and had 
lost his arm in an incident involving an industrial metal grinder on account of molesting a local 
builder’s daughter. Bret began spending time in Gerald’s apartment as it was a convenient 
location to get thoroughly stoned. It is not easy smoking bongs on the street. Ryan and the 
brothers spent less time at the apartment as their father had agreed to let them smoke in the 
family home. From his perspective, they were safer smoking weed under his roof than they 
were out on the street. He was right. Bret continued spending time in Gerald’s company away 
from his friends as he became tired of sharing. He eventually fell victim to Gerald’s exploits 
and was sexually abused in his sleep. Gerald had been drugging Bret with Rohypnol during the 
nights he slept over. It was not until Bret spied him spiking his drink one night, he fully realised 
what had been going on. Bret tried to pretend it had never happened and frequented the 
apartment as usual. He was introduced to heroin from another lad who dossed there, and before 
he knew it, he was hooked. 
 
As the other members of the group could not afford to keep buying cannabis, they devised a 
cunning plan to grow it themselves. The weed they purchased from their dealer would 
sometimes contain seeds due to the grower not removing the male plants from the crop, a matter 
that stopped the female plants budding to their full potential. The lads decided they would try 
to cultivate the seeds and grow them in the cupboard of Andy’s bedroom, but they had an issue. 
They did not have any of the equipment necessary and could not afford it either. Not being 
perturbed by this shortcoming, they decided they would steal some light fittings from the block 
of flats where Gerald lived. Another friend from Summer Park School called Oscar, had just 
started an apprenticeship working for an alarm fitting company. He assured the boys he could 
safely take the light fittings out without tripping the main fuse board. He would have to cut the 
wires in a certain sequence in a similar manner to defusing a bomb, the boys mused. Late one 
night in the early hours of the morning the lads snuck into the building and successfully 
removed the fitting without being apprehended, but they blew the fuse board to the entire block 
and fled the scene in laughter. A few days later, they took a trip to a hydroponics store and 
bought a UV bulb using money that Ryan had acquired selling video games he stole from 
WHSmith. The boys did not realise it, but they had just embarked into the realms of ‘organised 
crime’, from the perspective of law enforcement at least. Breaking and entry, theft, and 
cultivating cannabis from a legal perspective are very serious crimes, but the lads did not see 
it this way. For them it was just a bit of excitement and a way to pass the time. They did not 
think they were causing any serious harm.  
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The first batch of weed the lads grew was fairly dismal as they did not know the correct 
procedures to follow, such as setting timers for light and dark sequences or using the 
appropriate plant food (Potter 2010). Criminal activities can require skills that do not come 
naturally to everyone; the boys had heard that they required a hydroponic setup through people 
in their social circles, but had limited information other than this. At the time of writing, 
information regarding the cultivation of cannabis is readily accessible on the internet, but it has 
not always been this way. It was not available to the boys at that time and with limited resources 
at their disposal, they bumbled through the process with little success. This begs the question 
as to how ‘organised’, organised crime needs to be before it can be defined as such: very little, 
it seems. 
 
After the first crop, the brothers’ father stepped in and told the boys he would have no more. 
Smoking weed in his house was one thing; growing it was a different matter entirely. During 
this time, Bret continued using heroin and spending time with Gerald. He used the drugs to kill 
his psychological pain, but with no other space to take them he ended up in a cycle of abuse 
and spiralled deeper into addiction. As part of my fieldwork, I spent time interviewing staff 
from Red City’s addiction treatment centre. Like Bret, the heaviest drug addicts were those 
who had experienced significant trauma in their lives. The following conversation is taken with 
a senior member of staff. Jacob has an extensive history of working in the field:  
 
Jacob: A lot of the people who currently use drugs here have become very well-established 
drug users, if you like, a harder end of drug use of the furthest end of addiction. Very 
high percentage of these people have led traumatic damaged lives as a result of their 
personal history, as children or later in life and which is then compelled by the 
institutions they live in, prisons, hostels and hospitals. There’s a very insensitive 
response to many of the problems… There’s a lot of other people who come into it 
because it’s fun and exciting. Most people start using drugs and alcohol as a result of 
fun, thrill seeking adolescent behaviour. They also use cigarettes and then move on to 
alcohol probably. Everybody says cannabis is a gateway drug, so is nicotine, so is 
alcohol… Most of us in the society moderated our alcohol use. I think there are different 
groups, there are people using for different reasons. What I think brings them together 
is the point where you start to manage your emotions, “I can’t cope with all this, I take 
this or that with alcohol or heroin or something else, so I don’t have to think about it”. 
That emotional coping strategy somehow becomes this universal, widely shared 
relationship with drugs and alcohol and that’s it if you like, that’s what people have in 
common. 
 
The emotional link between drugs and addiction is strong. Psychoactive substances alter 
chemical processes in the brain that can diminish or enhance moods and states of mind. Whilst 
it is true that addiction can be the result of trauma and be used as an emotional coping strategy, 
it is not necessarily the outcome of this in all cases. Anyone who uses an addictive substance 
on a regular basis has the potential to develop a habit as their body becomes dependant on the 
drug. America, for example, is experiencing an epidemic of addiction to opioids as a result of 
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doctors over-prescribing painkillers (Kolodny et al. 2015). When the addiction has become too 
strong, some have moved into the black market as they can find cheaper variants such as heroin 
or fentanyl more easily. These drugs can be even more addictive and significantly more deadly 
(Frank and Pollack 2017). To say that addiction is a universal emotional coping strategy is too 
much of a generalisation, even though the evidence linking addiction and trauma is robust 
(Hanson et al. 2017).  
 
Overall, the boy’s case clearly resonates with Jacob’s description. Bret became a heroin user 
after experiencing significant trauma from the time he spent with Gerald. The boys noticed the 
change in Bret’s behaviour but could not fully understand it. The once leader of the group was 
acting increasingly out of sorts, and they wanted him back the way he was before. They decided 
they would invite Bret over and enact their own type of radical ‘therapy’. They tied him up in 
a duvet cover and hit him repeatedly with rubber bats. The lads were hoping to ‘beat’ the 
addiction out of him but had little success. Society often blames users for their addictions and 
somehow feels that they need to be punished for their actions, but this could not be farther from 
the truth. The best methods for dealing with addiction are treatment and therapy (Leshner 1997; 
Van Wormer and Davis 2016) or, more importantly, wider structural change (Briggs and 
Monge Gamero 2017). The boys did not understand.  
 
One night when Bret was sleeping over at the apartment, Gerald had a heart attack. Upon 
hearing the commotion, Bret jumped up from where he was sleeping to find him gasping for 
air as he writhed in pain. Standing in shock, he watched as the life faded from Gerald’s eyes. 
By the time he called an ambulance he was already dead. 
 
 
‘Real dealers’ 
 
A couple of years passed, and the brothers had left school and started at a local college. At this 
point, they had stopped smoking weed but still spent a great deal of time with their friends. 
With a network of potential buyers in their immediate vicinity, they decided to capitalise on 
the opportunity and set out to become bona fide weed dealers: 
 
 
Mark: You mentioned that you sold cannabis for a while, can you explain the reason why, why 
you did that?  
 
Andy: It was just a business poking in there. All my friends smoked, I had friends who sold 
cannabis before, so I saw that it was something that I could do. When I saw my friends 
doing it and making money, I thought “well hey, you know, that’s something that I 
could do”. I didn’t smoke so I knew I didn’t have to worry about smoking my profit or 
whatever an um, I’m quite self-disciplined in most areas of my life. Apart from when I 
get drunk sometimes so. It looked easy, and it was easy, and I saved up some money 
from my giros and it was my brother’s idea I think, and we went and bought like an 
ounce of weed and we got a whole bunch of people that we knew who smoked all the 
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time, so we started just selling little bits to them. And it worked out. It just sort of built 
up from there and uh I guess ah… I guess I wasn’t scared of repercussions. I didn’t 
really care at that point in time because like I said I was kind of at a low end anyway, 
it wouldn't have made much difference in my life had I got caught. Maybe I would have 
got a slap on the wrist or something like that. So, I just thought “what the fuck it doesn’t 
really bother me getting in trouble over it”. 
 
 
Andy and his brother weighed up the legal risks of dealing cannabis and felt it was a relatively 
safe drug to distribute. The fact that they had given up smoking themselves meant that they 
would not consume their profits, a common issue for drug sellers. At the time, cannabis was a 
Class C drug carrying the lowest penalties for possession with intent to supply. Even now, after 
having been reclassified upward to the B category, it is still perceived by the participants as 
one of the least risky drugs to sell. This is supported by interviews I undertook with the police: 
 
Mark: So, are you targeting the more harmful types of drugs more so, like heroin and crack 
rather than cannabis dealers and people that are cultivating cannabis? 
 
Peter: Well when we assess, harm, threat and risk, the class of drug will come into it. It won’t 
be the be all and end all. But heroin and crack undoubtedly cause more harm to 
individuals and more violence in the criminal justice system than any other drug. So, 
yes, if you get to a situation where everything’s the same, it’s just the class of drug is 
different, then we are gonna go to those drugs that cause most harm. The trouble is that 
we have Class A, B, and C, that are supposed to reflect harm, but in reality don’t -- 
There’s a hell of a lot drugs in Class B and C that are more harmful than I would suggest 
powdered cocaine. 
 
Mark: MDMA? 
 
Peter: Well, I have reservations on that because I know there’s a lot of different opinion on 
MDMA, but MDMA is a very potent - very dangerous drug. There’s no coincidence 
that an awful lot of our deaths, after ketamine and crack are MDMA. So, I don’t think 
it’s quite like professors have said that it’s not as dangerous as horse riding or some 
stupid quotes like that, which are totally ridiculous. But actually, it’s quite a powerful 
drug. But what I mean is you’ve got things like ketamine, for instance, was a Class C, 
been moved to Class B - should be in Class A, in my opinion. There are reasons why it 
wasn’t put there, because it’s a legitimate, very useful anaesthetic drug. But far more 
powerful and far more dangerous than cocaine. 
 
Peter’s account demonstrates some of the longstanding issues with UK drug policy. The ABC 
classification system in the 1971 Psychoactive Substances Act was initially devised to 
represent the harm that drugs cause, but this is not the case in practice. Drugs tend to be 
classified in the aftermath of media scares and other political interests. Alcohol companies, for 
example, were a significant force in the fight against cannabis legalisation in the USA due to 
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concerns over losses in revenue (Fidler 2016). David Nutt is the professor that Peter refers to 
in the latter part of the discussion. He was a lead expert in the Advisory Council for the Misuse 
of Drugs. His job was to advise the UK government on drug policy to enable appropriate 
responses. Nutt and his colleagues set out to assess the harm of illicit substances using the 
strongest evidence that was available to them. Alcohol came up as the most harmful drug when 
considering both harms to the user and wider-society, whereas MDMA was deemed to be 
relatively safe. What makes MDMA harmful is the fact that users have to purchase the drug on 
the black market with little guarantees on its purity. If a user takes a high dose without knowing, 
this can have fatal consequences. The media are quick to blame the drug in these instances 
leading to moral panics that result in the drugs being ranked up the classification system (Nutt 
et al. 2010; Nutt 2012). Nonetheless, Nutt’s work has received substantial critiques from other 
drug policy analysts (e.g. Caulkins et al. 2011).  
 
The police operate with very modest resources at their disposal; this means that they have to 
exercise discretion when deciding which cases to pursue. The perceived relative harm of drugs 
affects investigation probabilities; however, there are a number of other factors at play. The 
type and source of intelligence they have on suspects can determine whether cases are followed 
up. Calls received from the local community, for example, are generally perceived as poor 
information sources; whereas information received from informants from within the drug 
market is highly valued (Gill 2000; Bacon 2017). Once a suspect becomes a target of an 
investigation, further information on their activities can be acquired. The various sources of 
information that are gathered in an investigation are collated, constructed and framed into legal 
products, which can be used as evidence in court (McConville et al. 1991; Smith 1997). These 
sanitised policing outputs seldom reveal the ethically ambiguous and procedurally dubious 
skulduggery that often underpins police operations. Drug detectives bend the rules to make 
cases in ways that undermine the current national intelligence model. Such methods can limit 
the effectiveness of the police force, although detectives believe they are a necessary evil to 
loosen the restrictive straitjacket of procedural policy (Bacon 2017):  
 
“In many respects the rules of criminal law and procedure are enabling for the 
creative accomplishment of desired outcomes. They allow police to gain 
compliance through tacit contracts with suspect populations, effect efficient crime 
control without much bother of due process and account for their actions in legally 
acceptable terms” (Ericson 2007, p. 394). 
 
If intelligence is received on a suspect that is already known to the authorities, this greatly 
increases the probability they will be pursued (McConville et al. 1991; Gill 2000). The fact that 
the brothers had no criminal record went especially in their favour. Their foray into the 
cannabis market marks the beginning of a prosperous career of dealing the drug. After nearly 
a decade of daily transactions, they experienced no direct issues with the police. 
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Status 
 
From an economist’s perspective, the motives for drug dealing are economic gain. Whether it 
is for a “free smoke” or cash, the dealer benefits economically from his actions. The brothers’ 
primary motivation for becoming cannabis dealers was indeed the money. After having left 
school with little academic success, they attended college but had little income of their own. 
Money is not the only reason people are attracted to dealing, however. Selling drugs can 
generate social status and respect on the street that people cannot find elsewhere (Sandberg and 
Pedersen 2011). Structural inequalities and limited opportunities can bar people from finding 
respectable roles in legitimate fields. In this instance, dealing drugs brings not only income but 
a sense of purpose in life (Bourgois 2003). In other cases, people buy into popular 
representations of the drug dealer high life, and this is what attracts them to the role (Adler and 
Adler 1983). For Max, however, it was a little different. 
 
Max 
 
Max: So, when I moved into foster care things were completely different, I had a totally normal 
family, I had slipped into a family that I had always wanted, they were just a nice 
average family they were perfect for me. Prior to being relabelled from a trouble maker 
I had done a lot of naughty shit, but I never got caught. I think it’s a driving force behind 
what I do, getting a kick out of not getting caught. But once I was moved into care I 
was introduced to a new social network, I was a clean slate no one knew me, no one 
knew anything about my past, I was an unknown quantity. I made friends quite easily 
I found a good position in the social network, it led to my first opportunity to start 
making money. It was a class mate he gave me a template for printing fake ID, it was 
on floppy disk this is how long ago it was. I remember him saying “whatever you do 
don’t sell it to anyone else”. So, you know what I did, I started making and selling them. 
I got away with it because no teachers knew about me, there were no adults around who 
could say “what are you doing?”. I made decent money from doing that, that was around 
the age of 16-17 I started doing it. Two things resonate with me from that time, A) I 
was making decent money and B) everyone who wanted one licked my ass. It’s about 
giving people things they can’t get anywhere else, it raises your status in the social 
ladder. 
 
Mark: Right. 
 
Max: After a while we didn’t need fake ID anymore, were all old enough to get into clubs and 
we started going out frequently and drinking. It got to a point where me and my mates 
where getting fucked around by drug dealers cos we were kids they would fuck us 
around. Keep us waiting on a street corner for an hour and not turn up or we would call 
them, and they couldn’t be bothered to come out and meet us they would turn us down. 
This was when I realised that I could do a better job and started selling weed. 
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I was first introduced to Max on a night out in the early stages of my fieldwork. He was a slim 
chatty white guy with a wicked wit that had me laughing for most of the evening. Max spoke 
rapidly, dropping ‘one-liners’ at will with the confidence of a seasoned comedian. His eyes 
glistened as he sat across the table and he sniffed in a way that most people do when the pollen 
count is high: it was the cocaine. Max was highly intelligent, but he loved the party a little too 
much. I noticed it then, but he was very popular, he seemed to know half the people in the bar, 
and he liked it. His charismatic personality and years of dealing drugs had made him a popular 
person in the party scene. Illicit drugs have an element of scarcity that makes drug dealers 
sought after people (Werse and Müller 2016), something Max identified early on. The dealer 
is as important to the customer as the customer is to the dealer. If you have a lot of customers, 
you can become an important person to many. There is a downside to being labelled as a dealer, 
however: it can block access to the legitimate sphere and create self-fulfilling prophecies of 
criminality (Becker 1963). If you are an “unknown quantity” you are less likely to be suspected 
of crime, making it easier to go about your business. The dealer image is something that must 
be managed, so it reaches the right social circles. 
 
 
Female Dealers 
 
The female drug dealers in Red City play more of a marginal role in the drug market. 
Nonetheless, it is important to consider their accounts as there are particular gender-related 
factors that impact upon the reasons why they became dealers as well as their positions within 
the trade. Drug markets tend to be dominated by male figures both in terms of the numbers of 
dealers and also in terms of the social hierarchy. This is not surprising considering the level of 
violence that is common in particular segments of the drug trade, especially at the retail, street 
level. Without the embodied physical capital that male dealers espouse, female drug dealers 
may be at greater risk of robbery or other threats to their livelihood (Grundetjern and Sandberg 
2012; Fleetwood 2014). Nonetheless, females do have involvement in the trade and will 
distribute drugs in particular circumstances. The following example is taken from an interview 
with Claire, who distributes ecstasy pills (MDMA):  
 
 
Claire 
 
Mark: Alright, can you tell me a little about your life growing up? 
 
Claire: Yes, I had a really nice life. Me, my mom, my sister and my dad were really quite 
comfortable. My dad left my mom when, I think, I was 12 at the time. He had been 
cheating on my mom, having an affair with someone for about a year. She didn’t have 
any idea about it, we didn’t have any idea about it. He literally just walked out on 
Christmas day, and that was it. Going from the perfect family; nice little house just 
outside of South London, it was in a nice area, and so that was fucking hard. My mom 
was completely devastated. She refused to ever speak badly about my dad in front of 
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me and my sister, but I think I was just at that age where I kind of saw the effect it had 
on her. So, I was much more resentful towards him then my sister.  
 
Mark: So, you just have the one sister? 
 
Claire: Yes just one. She’s four years younger than me. So from then, that was just when I was 
starting secondary school, and I went off the rails (laughs). I would say probably, I got 
arrested when I was 14 for breaking and entering into a house. I used to get drunk at 
school all the time, I was smoking weed, drinking a lot. I started really young, in terms 
of that kind of lifestyle. At the time I didn’t relate that to what happened with my mom 
and my dad but looking back now I think definitely it had something to do with it. For 
so many years I was in complete denial about that having an effect on me. I was like, 
“No, it doesn’t.” And I just shut him out and refused to acknowledge that, that situation 
having an effect on me. So secondary school I nearly got kicked out just because my 
attendance was so bad but they kept me there because I was quite academic. I got really 
good GCSEs considering I wasn’t really there at all. I got my first long term-ish 
boyfriend when I was 14-15. He was a bit older than me, his mom was a drug addict. 
There were lots of situations where we were really close, he ended up moving into my 
mom’s house. He lived up the road from us.  
 
Mark: How old was he then? 
 
Claire: He must have been three years older than me, which isn’t much now, but at that age it 
was quite a big difference. I think I was 14 when I started going out with him, and he 
was 17. So I used to spend a lot of time at his house and he had three little younger 
brothers and a sister, they were quite younger. His mom used to go out and ask to baby 
sit and she wouldn’t come back for three days. So we would just have to deal with that 
situation. I was kind of around that, and used to that kind of stuff young. I was going to 
raves when I was around 15 with him and his friends and doing pills, probably when I 
was 15.  
 
Mark: Really, from him? 
 
Claire: Yes through him, and our mutual friends. I had friends outside of school, who all lived 
in my area, we would hang out but they were a bit older so they didn’t go to school with 
me. Yes, probably doing a lot of pills by the time I was 16, 10 pills a night, we used to 
go raving every weekend. Then broke up with him, got into another relationship which 
was completely different, but we would still go out and do a lot of stuff, we used to 
smoke a lot of weed. We did quite a lot pills.  
 
Claire began using drugs in her early teens as a coping mechanism due to the traumatic effects 
of her parents’ divorce. The split marks a sudden turning point in life, which resulted in 
negative behavioural changes that impacted many areas of her life. In a similar manner to other 
drug users in this study, she began using drugs through her friends. To add to this, she started 
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a romantic relationship with a boy who also had traumatic experiences in life. Her partner had 
direct access to drugs and actively encouraged Claire to use them by supplying them to her.  
Research demonstrates that couples can facilitate use by providing drugs to their partners when 
they do not have the funds to buy them themselves (Briggs and Monge Gamero 2017). Drugs 
also have a social element as many users prefer to take them in the company of others (Coomber 
and Turnbull 2007). If you live with a partner who is also a drug user, this could lead to 
heightened consumption as there will be someone to share drugs with on a regular basis. 
Substance use can have a negative effect on relationships, however, depending on use patterns 
of the partners (Fleming et al. 2010). Claire’s drug use was also tied to the Rave scene; a place 
where people can escape from the troubles of daily life and enjoy the music through 
pharmacologically attenuated states of mind. MDMA is ‘love drug’ that creates feelings of 
happiness and euphoria that may have been missing from other aspects of her life. It was 
through her romantic relationships and embeddedness with the rave scene that eventually lead 
to her becoming a dealer: 
 
Claire: Yes, I met a guy when I was 20. He’s my longest relationship I’ve ever had we were 
going for four years. We had a great group of friends, I met really great friends from 
him, he was seven years older than me, and had really great friends. They were all older 
but they were really nice people. They all partied and did lots of coke but they were all 
much nicer people than what I had hung out with before. Not that the people I grew up 
with weren’t nice they were just a bit scummy, (laughs) basically. They didn’t have 
jobs or anything like that. These guys were really sound and I’m still really good friends 
with them all now. They are my good mates I’m still friends with. I met a lot of people, 
when I was 19, 20ish, from Pizza Shop (employer) that were all really sound who are 
all still my friends now. So that was kind of the age where I met a really good group of 
people whom I’m still friends with now. I was like living in this small town, kind of 
place, where all we would do was go to the pub, and get fucked, get coke. Go back to 
somebody’s house and stay up for the night. That was our life for years, you know?  
 
Mark: Sure. 
 
Claire: It was a cycle of doing that, that was from 19, 20 to about 25. I reckon I did coke every 
weekend for that, unless I was away in another country which was maybe like once a 
year. I was doing coke every weekend for those five years I think. Not many other 
drugs, occasionally I’d do MDMA if someone had some, mainly just a cokey lifestyle. 
There was a little stage when Methedrone came out, one summer when we all did a lot 
of Methedrone (laughs) which was horrible, at the time it was amazing. We were all 
like, “We’ve found the perfect drug.” It was great getting high off it, but then it would 
quickly deteriorate. It was so fucking addictive, really. It was horrible; you can stay up 
for fucking days on it. It was gross. And also around that sort of time when I started 
going out with Zack, around 21, I started going to festivals. I got into that Festival kind 
of lifestyle, I was going to like 6-7 festivals every summer with those guys. Not 
working, just messing around. And I think with Zack, when I would occasionally start 
selling a few drugs. For example, Glastonbury we took loads of ketamine and MDMA 
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to sell. It was just a summer thing; we would occasionally get a bit to sell at some 
festivals, just to sell to our mates basically. 
 
Music festivals are renowned for drug use, making them ideal places to sell them. They can 
enable people to make money quickly in a way that does not interfere with their daily life.  
Dealers may feel less at risk in these environments when the majority of the punters are there 
to have a good time. Occasional dealers may attract less police attention than those who sell on 
a daily basis. By going with her boyfriend and selling only to their trusted friends, Claire 
reduced the risks of her activities even further. However, I have known Claire to sell to friends 
of friends, provided they have been vouched for. Studies demonstrate that female drug dealers 
can reduce the risks of being robbed by embodying the image of their male counterparts 
(Grundetjern and Sandberg 2012; Holligan et al. 2019), enlisting support from enforcers 
(Denton and O'Malley 1999), or employing heightened secrecy by restricting information and 
limiting contacts (Hutton 2005). Claire is a white middle-class female who is university 
educated and, although streetwise, does not embody a ‘street’ identity. By restricting her 
operations to certain markets that have non-violent and altruistic cultural features, she can 
operate with less risk of reprisal and maintain her ‘natural’ identity. In this respect, trust can be 
placed in the market itself due to the cultural values that affect the behaviours of people within 
it. We can thus add an additional level of trust to the framework provided by Von Lampe and 
Johansen (2004b): ‘trust based on market cultures’.  
 
The participants in this study report that females receive less police attention and lighter 
searches from security staff, making them well suited to carrying drugs. During my time in the 
field, there were also some cases of female dealers operating in high risk environments. Fiona 
was a drug runner who worked for one of the lads called Derrick and his crew. She would 
deliver cocaine around the city, driving around in her car, sometimes alone. Fiona is white, 
working-class, slightly overweight and embodied some masculine attributes but not overtly so. 
It was the reputation and backup of her male crew that provided her with safety when she was 
out on the rounds. Generally, women occupy more marginal positions in Red City’s drug trade.  
 
 
Late starters 
 
The majority of the dealers in this study entered the drug market at a young age. However, this 
is not always the case. Organised crime requires access to resources such as the drugs 
themselves. If you have no access to a supplier, then it is impossible to become a dealer 
regardless of what age you are. Teeth and Buster are the only dealers in this study who began 
selling drugs in adulthood. Their transitions into the market do not represent the typical user 
dealer scenario (or user-to-dealer as in Andy and Max’s case) that is common throughout the 
study. Furthermore, the drugs they sold were Class-As and at the harmful end of the scale. For 
Teeth, it was heroin and crack cocaine at the retail level, whereas Buster got in deep trafficking 
wholesale amounts of heroin and powdered cocaine. How they were able to justify the risks 
and consequences of distributing these drugs is in question, especially considering the fact they 
had not sold drugs before. 
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Teeth 
 
The first time I met Teeth was in my late teens. His partner Sandra was a friend of Ryan’s mum 
and lived a few houses down from where they lived. Sandra ran a brothel and had personal 
experience selling her body as a private escort. Her husband Teeth was a black stocky Londoner 
who had moved into the city after meeting her in a nightclub. Teeth sold heroin and crack and 
would always have one of his drug runners following in toe. At the time, his runner’s name 
was Baker, a heroin addict with a gangrenous leg who slept in Sandra’s shed. Teeth would feed 
the poor soul scraps of food from his plate and would punch him in his leg if he stepped out of 
line, causing him to yelp and sob with pain. Teeth was a hardened career criminal with 
psychopathic tendencies and very little pity for drug addicts. His ability to dehumanise addicts 
is one of the factors that enables him to participate in this trade without conscience, that 
alongside his belief in providing a ‘good service’ due to the quality of his drugs. Whilst he was 
a dealer when I met him, he had started his life of crime in the motor industry. Teeth speaks 
with a deep cockney accent, pronouncing each of his words with authority, whilst holding an 
unwavering stare: 
 
Teeth: Back then you could do a day release from school to attend college once a week and 
that’s when I started doing mechanics, I left school and got an apprenticeship and by 
the time I was 19 I was a fully qualified mechanic. I worked on trucks, you need the 
skills to do that and there’s a lot more money in it than just working on cars. I’ve still 
got all the certificates that I did and I’m quite proud of them. I could always go back to 
that if I wanted to get away from the dark (heroin). So, I started knocking around with 
bad company, I wanted parts for the cars, and I didn’t have the money so we would 
steal them. That’s how it started. It was easier to break into cars back then, you just hot 
wire them, no hassle. When we got deep into it one of my boys bought a tow truck and 
he would just jack up the cars and tow them off. He didn’t give a fuck. He would wave 
to you as your car was being towed down the street and you would never see it again. 
 
Mark: What about the drugs? 
 
Teeth: It all started when I moved up here to Red City, I’d never been anywhere near drugs 
until that point not even seen them. I went down to this house in Westcroft where a few 
people were that I know. Baker who I got working for me had got himself into a bit of 
trouble. Lennox was a big player and was pissed at him over something and they were 
going to kill him, right there and then. When I walked in the house they had him tied to 
a chair, they were taunting him, kicking the legs out, beating him round the head. And 
you know what, I took pity on the cunt, I told them I wasn’t going to have that, no one 
was doing any killing on my watch. I said “he’s mine now, I own this man” and they 
didn’t like it but there was nothing they could do. Baker was my entry point, he had 
been selling dark and knew where to get it. So, I saw it as a business opportunity... 
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Teeth grew up in what he describes as a good family home with a good education, he left school 
with qualifications, career prospects and had never been involved in any serious criminal 
activity before that time. At the age of 16, he began training as a mechanic but did not have the 
means to buy the parts for his own vehicle as he was still an apprentice. Having got mixed up 
in a bad crowd, he turned to crime realising he could use his skills to steal cars for himself. He 
then progressed to the point where he was stealing cars on a regular basis. As the locking 
systems on the vehicles became more difficult, he decided to move into a less risky line of 
work when the opportunity presented itself: dealing drugs.  
 
The demand for illicit drugs has generally not wavered over the years, creating opportunities 
for people to make money if they choose to engage in it. As a staple criminal enterprise, the 
illicit drug market is often the go-to activity for criminals who cannot make money through 
alternative criminal pursuits. When safe cracking became more difficult due to technological 
advances and increased surveillance, many professional thieves switched to armed robbery, 
before moving into the drug market, as their skills became redundant (Hobbs 2010). Similar 
examples have been found in other criminal groups: Varese notes how Italy’s mafia moved 
back into drugs after the government had imposed policies making extortion of local business 
more difficult (Varese 2017). The ubiquity of the drug market is itself one of the reasons why 
the participants in this study got involved in it. The opportunity to sell drugs is everywhere; all 
that is required is the correct social contacts or access to the internet.  
 
Although Teeth had been involved in crime for many years, this event marks a significant 
turning point in his career as he had no previous involvement in the drug market. He was able 
to capitalise on this opportunity because he had enough criminal capital to save Baker from his 
attackers. Opportunities must, therefore, be examined within the context they unfold. 
Furthermore, dealing heroin is not an occupation to be taken lightly, due to the ravenous effects 
it has on its users. Even if the possibility to sell the drug was there, it is likely that many people 
would not choose it. Teeth, however, is an individual who cares more about making money 
than the harm the drug causes. Inflicting pain and having power over others is something he 
relishes, such ‘perks’ he would not have found working legally as a mechanic or in other less 
violent drug markets such as cannabis for that matter (Sandberg 2012). Nonetheless, it would 
be a gross generalisation to suggest that all dealers who operate in this market are of this 
disposition. Other crack and heroin sellers in this study did not demonstrate these kinds of 
tendencies and instead justified their actions by differing responsibility, “if I didn’t sell them, 
someone else would…” is the common line of reasoning. That being said, even Teeth had his 
own moral code, “I don’t sell to kids, disabled people or someone who’s never tried it before, 
if they are really in a bad way and beg me for it, I might give them something else to ease their 
pain”. Whether or not Teeth strictly followed this code in practice is debatable, especially in 
respect of drug addicts who have become disabled through their activities. Nonetheless, 
narratives are ‘an extremely powerful tool for creating, negotiating, and displaying the moral 
standing of the self’ (Linde 1993, p. 123); however, even politicians may lie to themselves as 
well as others. As Teeth himself remarks, “people will believe anything”: 
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“the evolution of misconduct from identifiable and culturally intelligible causes 
positions him/her as less bad or wrong than ascribed labels suggest (e.g., 
‘offender’). The ‘whole story’ complicates and historicizes who he/she really is.” 
(Presser 2009, p. 179). 
 
 
Buster 
 
So far, the dealers in this study started their criminal careers in their youth; Teeth was in his 
late twenties when he became a dealer but had a background in car theft, making his transition 
into drugs normatively easier. There is only one participant in this study who started out in his 
adulthood, and that is Buster (someone I met working as a bouncer). What is significant about 
this case is the seriousness of his offending. He went from a relatively non-criminal background 
to a wholesale drugs courier responsible for transporting millions of pounds worth of heroin 
and cocaine: 
 
Buster: I had a really good job when the flats were being built, I was the supervisor 
for the company, for installations and I was working on the door (as a 
bouncer) Thursday, Friday and Saturday... So, the drugs (use) start getting 
a bit more, started to do it like weeknights go out, obviously working on 
the weekends and I started ended up not turning up for work… I skipped 
days off and basically, I got reported… I was instantly dismissed from 
work. 
 
Mark: Sure. 
 
Buster: And then from that the only work I had obviously was the door work, 
obviously money got tight, and basically, I met a guy working on the door, 
thinking back now. Over the space of probably about a year was recruiting 
me as I would say.  
 
Mark: Buttering you up? 
 
Buster: Yeah opening my eyes up to like, not giving anything out straight away, 
just didn't notice it at the time, looking back now and it's like, planting little 
seeds. And then he started off with a few small little jobs picking people 
up, “go meet this person, entertain this person for a bit”. The person lived 
in Sweden and Lithuania for quite a few years, so I knew he had 
international connections so basically it was like “I got a friend coming over 
from Lithuania or Amsterdam, entertain them for a bit” stuff like that “cos 
I'm not available at the moment”. I would take them for coffees and 
everything else, after a while of things like that going on it was basically 
laid out in front of me this is an operation that is going on. Um and basically 
spelled it out. Importation. 
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The logistics of a criminal operation may require individuals who possess certain skills or are 
willing to take on risky tasks. Handling and transporting illicit goods is considerably risky, 
especially when moved in bulk. If an individual is caught with a consignment of drugs, the 
police will have enough evidence to charge them immediately. By paying couriers and drug 
mules to take on this role, the risks for key members of the group are significantly reduced 
(Dorn et al. 1998). Couriers are provided with restricted information about the organisation so 
have limited use for the police and the organisation can continue to function. The trafficking 
group who recruited Buster told him just enough information for him to be able to carry out 
his role. The true extent of the operation was later revealed to him in court in a high-profile 
case that resulted in the arrests of many of the key members of the group. Buster’s job was to 
meet a contact at London Docks travelling from Amsterdam and pick up their vehicle. The 
contact posed as a business-woman who liked to shop in London. Buster would drive her car 
that had the drugs hidden inside to Red City and deliver it to a mechanic who would remove 
them. He would then take the vehicle and return it to his contact in London.  
 
According to Kleemans, social opportunity structures that arise later in life explain why some 
people turn to organised crime in later years (Kleemans and de Poot 2008). Without suitable 
contacts, it would not be possible for Buster to take on this type of role. It has been well 
documented that the night economy holds the largest market for the distribution and 
consumption of psychoactive drugs. Night clubs are criminal convergence settings (Felson 
2006) that are generally only accessible after the age of 18. This could explain why this type 
of opportunity was not available to the lads in their youth. The fact that they could not drive 
would have made this role an impossibility. After losing his job, Buster was in a poor financial 
position and needed additional income to fund his lifestyle. It was here that his recruiter, whom 
he describes as “Mr X”, spotted the opportunity and introduced him to the operation; this was 
a significant turning point in his life. The combination of opportunity and financial hardship 
does appear to be what led Buster to take on the role. That being said, as a user of cocaine, he 
would have had access to a supplier and potentially could have retailed the drug himself with 
lighter consequences if apprehended. It was Mr X who took advantage of Buster’s position and 
used neutralisation techniques (Sykes and Matza 1957) to bring him on board without revealing 
the extent of the risks. It was not until he was arrested that the seriousness of his involvement 
began to sink in: 
 
Buster: I was charged with conspiracy for fraudulent evasion of importation of class A drugs 
and they estimated the street value at four million, four hundred and ten pounds worth.  
 
Mark: And how often were these things coming across?  
 
Buster: It depends every two three weeks depending… Basically if I had known, the depth of 
what I was getting involved in, like I knew it was illegal no point me saying I didn't but 
when I got into court and they were threatening me with life imprisonment, with a 
minimum of twelve to fourteen years. 
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Mark: Fucking hell. 
 
Buster: I was like well, it was really not worth it, the money was like good but that's the other 
side of it, buttered up and recruited, "oh it takes you two hours". 
 
Mark: Two hours easy money. 
 
Buster: Yeah. 
 
Mark: How much were you making from it? 
 
Buster: About two thousand pound a trip. Yeah, but for the risk that's nothing is it really. 
 
It is possible that what attracted Buster to this role was the infrequency of the drops. His role 
required relatively infrequent trips that would be easy to hide from his close friends and family. 
If he had decided to retail cocaine instead, he would have been required to make many 
transactions on a daily basis, which would have been harder to hide and significantly altered 
his routine activities. Although the offence was serious, the transition was gentle.  
 
It is interesting to note that Buster’s description of events is much more clinical and detached 
than many of the other participants in this study. It is possible that this is because of his limited 
immersion in the market and the level of the trade in which he operated. It could also relate to 
the fact that he was no longer involved in crime at the time of the interview. Teeth’s reflections 
of the past are much more positive, boastful and littered with argot. Teeth is heavily immersed 
in the crack and heroin market, operates daily and enjoys what he does. Indeed, the framing of 
narratives and construction of self-identity relates to the likelihood that people will commit 
crime in the future (Stevens 2012; King 2013; Bachman et al. 2016). When offenders begin to 
frame their criminal activities in a negative light, they can ‘construct a new [non-criminal] view 
of who they would like to be’ (Paternoster and Bushway 2009, p. 1127). (There will be more 
on desistance in chapter 8). 
 
Discussion & Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the start phase of the drug dealing career, where the participants in this 
study first establish themselves as distributors. It aimed to understand how people become 
dealers of drugs and the reasons why they took this role. The majority of the participants in this 
study used drugs before they began selling them. They began using drugs in their teens, often 
beginning with cannabis as this was the drug that was most readily available. It was more 
culturally accepted and received fewer penalties for arrest. Distribution in youth was mainly in 
the form of social supply and was not be defined as actual dealing by the majority of 
participants. The majority of the participants established themselves as dealers in their late 
teens when they had access to money to buy larger amounts of drugs either through work or 
the benefits system. Acquiring drugs on credit requires trust and older dealers may feel that 
youths are too much of a risk (early to mid-teens). Users in their late teens may have been 
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exposed to drugs for a number of years and benefitted through social supply, making the 
thought of dealing normatively easier and more appealing. In this respect, there is a slow 
transition of drift from drug use to drug supply, although by no means all users of drugs ever 
sell drugs, let alone become regular drug dealers.  
 
Personal circumstances, life experiences, and the opportunities to sell drugs influence whether 
someone will sell them. Distributors require the correct social contacts to be a dealer, and these 
are found through exposure to different environments at different age ranges. The extent of 
policing, and social acceptability of the drug, can affect decisions to take these opportunities. 
Criminal groups may also seek out suitable targets to take on the riskiest aspects of the trade, 
as was the case with Buster. This opportunity came to him in adulthood, however, as he made 
contact with a drug trafficker in the nightclub where he was working. Nightclubs are criminal 
convergence settings that largely bar young people from entry and limit their criminal 
opportunities in youth. The youngest person to sell drugs in this study was Wolf, who began 
dealing hash at the age of 14. This was supplied by his father after Wolf had moved out of his 
mother’s home. It is these close social ties that facilitate entry into the drug market. At around 
the age of 17, he had been dealing for a few years when he assaulted a “nonce” who had 
inappropriately groped one of his female friends. Due to the severity of the attack, Wolf gained 
the respect of some older dealers who set him up with heroin, crack and larger assignments of 
hash. Hash was the main drug he was selling at this age. 
 
It must be noted that the dealers in this study were interviewed in adulthood and began selling 
drugs from around the year 2000 onwards. At this time, the internet was in its infancy in 
comparison to today’s standards, as were mobile phones. Indeed, people are increasingly living 
their lives through social media and can get access to drugs from peers within these sites. There 
are a number of dealers in this study who communicate through social media by using the 
messaging service or making phone calls directly through apps, as these can be more difficult 
to trace if they employ end-to-end encryption (Moyle et al. 2019). Peter (the senior officer) 
was confident that all forms of ICT could be accessed by the police if they were given enough 
resources. Yet, he remarked that a single Apple iPhone would cost over £1000 to access. Given 
the heavy cuts to public services that the police have faced in recent years, they may be fighting 
a losing battle in this respect (this matter will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7). 
Nonetheless, entry into the drug market via social media may now be quite common. 
 
Lastly, in recent years there has been an increased focus from the government and media on 
the relationship between the illicit drug market and the exploitation of vulnerable children; see, 
for example, the Children’s Commissioner (2019) report on gangs. None of the participants in 
this study employed youths to act as their drug runners. In regard to county lines, it is interesting 
to note that some participants started their drug dealing careers in rural areas before moving 
into the city to sell them at a later date. Moving outside of the city to sell drugs was relatively 
uncommon. Nonetheless, engagement in the drug market does make young people more 
vulnerable as they try to avoid the authorities and hide their activities. They may consume 
drugs in places away from adults or guardians who would condemn their drug use. The very 
illegality of drugs creates the conditions in which people can become victims of crime, as is 
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the case with Bret who was sexually abused. For the most part, decisions to sell drugs emerged 
from within the participants themselves rather than from outside sources looking for recruits. 
Motives to distribute drugs were tied to economic factors and social status.   
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5) ‘Street’ Dealing: 
Illicit Enterprise in Parallel Markets 
 
I pick it up and go back into the room, plain as day. Grabbed him by his hair and push his head 
back into the chair. With that I put the blade to his temple and start cutting. Now I could feel 
the blade grinding against skin and the blood starts spraying everywhere. The people there 
they started laughing cos it didn’t look real, they had never seen anything like it before, they 
thought it was fake blood. They thought it was a fucking party trick. So I think this is really 
fucking funny, and I’m sawing in deeper, and I’m laughing my fucking head off. I got in real 
deep and you could see all this white membrane near his skull, so I figured I’d done enough. 
He can’t pay me back if he’s dead. 
 
Introduction 
 
The following chapter examines how drug dealing is conducted in the city streets. It draws 
upon ethnographic data from two parallel drug markets that sit at opposite ends of the spectrum 
in terms of their harms and ‘legitimacy’. No two drug markets are the same; they each have 
distinctive features, depending largely on the type of drug sold, their place in the supply chain 
and the setting in which they operate. This chapter compares the operational structure of two 
criminal groups; it outlines the risks they encounter and how this affects their visibility and 
ability to expand. It demonstrates that drug dealing is not a singular phenomenon as it is widely 
portrayed in the media. Dealers can act very differently depending on the market they are in. 
Some dealers are highly ethical in their practices whilst others are not (although, this may 
change throughout their careers). Nonetheless, a drug dealer is a term that has negative 
connotations no matter what drugs are sold. The street is a place where all types of illicit drugs 
can be bought and sold, although, certain areas may have a prevalence for certain products 
depending on their demographic makeup.  
 
Organised crime is a form of enterprise in that it shares much of the same characteristics of 
legitimate business. It involves the supply of goods and services, albeit illicit ones. According 
to Smith (1980), illicit enterprises work across a spectrum of legitimacy. Those that are close 
to legitimacy will function in ways that closely resemble legal enterprises. This is largely due 
to the ‘task environment’ which shapes market structures by exerting variable pressures upon 
them. Indeed, the institutional effects of drug policy and policing differentially constrain drug 
markets by making certain products riskier to sell. To add to this, some drugs are more socially 
acceptable to the community who are the primary source of information to the police. Drugs 
which cause the most amount of harm are generally those that pose the greatest risk, although 
this is not always necessarily the case.  There is, in fact, a whole ecology of risk that relates to 
what is sold and where it is sold. Class A drugs such as heroin and crack arguably pose the 
greatest risk for distributors because they are highly addictive, harmful to the community, 
receive the greatest probability of police intervention and the greatest legal penalties for 
distribution. At the other end of the spectrum sit semi-legal drugs, such as nitrous oxide, which 
are difficult to prosecute against and are relatively harmless. How offenders perceive these 
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risks, however, may not be so clear cut (Gibbs 1975; Jacobs 1996; Jacobs and Cherbonneau 
2018).  
 
There is little criminological research that actively compares the structure of illicit drug 
markets, depending on the product sold. To test Smith’s claim, this chapter compares two illicit 
enterprises that sit at opposite ends of the spectrum. It examines the activities of Teeth who 
sales heroin and crack, before moving on to discuss the exploits of Max, who distributes nitrous 
oxide. Both dealers distribute at the retail level. 
 
 
Teeth 
 
A few used nos canisters glisten in the gutter as I wait on the road contemplating the night 
ahead. These are the signs of a drug market that functions healthily beneath the pressure of city 
policing. The remnant of drug use breaking through the cities’ skin like pimples beneath cheap 
foundation. It is nearing 10pm and I bide my time waiting for Teeth. This is the first time I 
have been in the field with him since I started the project and he is eager to show me his work, 
“you been hanging around with all these fucking muppets Mark, I’m gonna show you, what 
it’s really all about”. A few minutes later and I look up to see Teeth creeping up the road in an 
ageing sedan. The paintwork is a worn navy blue that matches his modest clothing. On the 
surface, it might be easy to assume that Teeth is a poor middle-aged black guy with a beat-up 
motor he can barely afford, but this could not be farther from the truth. Beneath the hood of 
the saloon lies a beast of an engine that would put most modern vehicles to shame. Whilst at 
work Teeth has the look of a pauper, but when he is out in a nightclub, he is a different character 
entirely: silk shirts, gold and gleam. I get in: 
 
Mark: You alright, how’s things? 
 
Teeth: Good, good… listen, I want to give you a real insight into what I do, I’ve some business 
to do then I’ll sit you down for a chat. I don’t like to talk in the car as it could be bugged 
you never know when they might be listening… Right, first of all we need to pick up 
Hector, he’s my top runner at the moment, then I need to pick some money from this 
nurse Shelly. You’ll see her she’s fucking rotten, real shame about that one. Used to 
have a decent job working at the hospital but she got involved with this bloke. Now he 
was a nasty cunt, real piece of work, got her on the dark (heroin). Once you go to the 
dark you don’t come back. She lost her foot but that doesn’t stop her. 
 
Mark: From shooting up?  
 
Teeth: Yeah, they’ll inject anywhere they can, if it becomes infected and you don’t sort it, 
you’ll lose the limb. 
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Teeth takes me on a short drive through a residential zone before pulling in down a side road. 
A gaunt looking white guy in his early 30s appears from a house with his head held low. He 
jumps in the vehicle behind Teeth.  
 
Teeth: Mark this is Hector, Hector this is the man I’ve been telling you about. I’m going to 
show him what we do and we’re gonna have a little chat.  
 
Hector appears to have had a hard life. His face is a pale calloused white with deep wrinkled 
groves; dark purple bags weigh heavily under sad looking eyes. I start making casual 
conversation, and he tells me he has known Teeth for a few years. His face twitches as we 
speak, and he stammers repeatedly. Teeth’s phone begins to ring: 
 
Teeth: “It’s me” (pause as there is talking on the other side of the line) “ok I’ll make it eleven, 
five minutes you know the place”. 
 
It is another few minutes’ drive, and we make the stop. A dark-haired woman, who bares much 
of the same physical description as Hector, waits impatiently on the side of the road.  
 
Teeth: This is her. I don’t really want her getting in the car, she’s hanging…  yeah alright, let 
her in. 
 
Shelly gets in the back, and a faint smell of unwashed body and cheap perfume fills the air. 
She looks over and says hello. It seems she recognises me and starts talking as if we know each 
other well. Shelly speaks with a strong local accent: 
 
Teeth: Do you know this man? 
 
Shelly: Oh sorry I thought he was your son, I was going to say that he looked like he’s got big. 
His face is familiar. 
 
Teeth: Well there’s a bit of a difference (skin colour). 
 
Mark: Ah, don’t worry you probably know me from Space. I’ve been working that club for 
years, you been there before? 
 
Shelly: I’ve been there a few times but not for a long while. I bet I’ve seen you there on a night 
out but I didn’t realise it was you… look I’m not a skank alright, I only smoke a bit of 
white (crack).  
 
Teeth raises a dubious eyebrow and looks her over with disdain. He puts the car into gear and 
takes a slow cruise up the road. I look back to see Hector reaching deep into his groin where 
he removes a few marble sized cellophane wraps. He waits for Shelly to hand him the cash 
before counting it out and passing it to Teeth. The drugs and money are passed low beneath 
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the level of the window, well out of sight of onlookers. We drive a few more blocks before 
letting her out.  
 
Drug dealers aim to carry out their movements in ways that blend into the flows of city life.  
By picking up customers and dropping them a few blocks away, Teeth is hoping to minimise 
suspicion from onlookers. If a customer gets in the car and gets out shortly after, it looks, as 
Max puts it “dodgy as fuck”. To remain ‘invisible’ organised criminals can operate under the 
cover of activity that replicates the activities of something or someone else. Sacks makes this 
point:  
 
“the police are occupational specialists on inferring the probability of criminality 
from the appearances persons present in public places… given the orientation of 
the police, those routinely engaged in illegal activities will attempt to construct a 
front such that their routine appearance in a territory will (or can) be treated as a 
normal appearance of the territory by its patrolmen.” (Sacks 1972, p. 282).  
 
Officers in the city confirm this fact:   
 
Mark: When you're out on patrol, what things are you looking out for? 
 
Officer May: Just people acting suspicious, really. If they're out on foot if they're acting 
suspicious, hanging around certain areas which you think might be a bit of a drug spot, 
quiet lanes, vans late at night, two, three in the morning, those vans hanging around. 
 
Mark: Do you try and look at the way people dress and stuff like that? 
 
Officer May: Yes. You shouldn't really but yes, everybody does to a certain degree, yes. Or 
another thing on the evening if there's a car with three or four people, you'd massively 
think, "Why is there so many? What are they doing”. 
 
The vast majority of investigative work is conducted by uniformed officers like May as part of 
their normal policing duties. More specialist investigatory work is assigned to detectives who 
employ more ‘proactive’ measures. ‘Drug detectives spend much of their time trawling the 
streets for signs of drug market activity, ‘wheeling and dealing’ with informants and using 
covert and deceptive techniques in order to obtain information on possible operational 
‘targets’’ (Bacon 2017, p. 26). Detectives on the front-line also work in tandem with desk-
based intelligence officers and civilian analyst that are responsible with collecting and 
analysing raw information. Intelligence can be shared from the top down or bottom up, 
although this system is undermined due to incongruities between actors, departments and 
resistance to procedural change (Cope 2004). According to a thirty-year old study by 
McConville et al. (1991), police investigations generally involve the monitoring of suspect 
populations of particular social characteristics and known offenders with the aim of 
constructing cases against them. These actors are often judged to be guilty prior to establishing 
any proof of their activities. Furthermore, some detectives demonstrate prejudice towards 
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certain known offenders and pursue personal ‘vendettas’ against them (Bacon 2017, p. 149), 
which may not always relate to their perceived danger to the public. In this respect the policing 
of drug markets often revolves around the usual suspects as the police target offenders which 
conform to their personal and institutional biases:  
 
“proactively, more or less formal decisions will be taken that will result in either 
information - or evidence gathering operations against specific individuals and/or 
groups… But if as seems often to be the case, police believe they ‘know’ who has 
committed some crime or crimes then the objective of information gathering is to 
obtain not knowledge in the sense of ‘finding out’ something but rather, 
confirmation of that belief” (Gill 2000, p. 131). 
 
Teeth is well aware of the signs that the police look out for when they are conducting 
surveillance. This is why he dresses modestly, does not drive a flash vehicle or wear jewellery 
when on the job. Teeth is known to the police, however, having spent time in prison for drugs, 
making his efforts at blending in more difficult. By having Hector carry the drugs and make 
the transactions, he is also reducing the most-risky element of the business, a technique used 
by many drug traffickers. The difference in this instance is that Hector knows Teeth personally 
and has built a level of trust, whereas drug mules and couriers such as Buster (see chapter 4) 
are generally given limited information about the core of the criminal organisation. Drawing 
upon the work of Williams (1990), Gambetta (1990b) argues there are four central factors that 
underly cooperation in any human activity: coercion, interests, values, and personal bonds. 
Teeth works across all of these dimensions with his drug runners but with a specific focus on 
(economic) interests and coercion. His runners benefit economically from their actions by 
working in exchange for drugs that they otherwise could not afford; however, they are bonded 
by debt which is enforced through the use of violence. The primary issue for Teeth is ensuring 
his runners remain loyal and do not act as informants for the police. Yet, because drug addicts 
lead chaotic lives, engage in crimes such as robbery and take on the risks of handling drugs, 
this makes them more likely to get arrested. Such actors rarely work for the police out of 
goodwill and are pressurised into doing so through the threat of legal sanctions (Bean and 
Billingsley 2001; Bacon 2017). This can override any loyalties they have to their supplier, 
especially where personal bonds are weak, and distrust has been fostered through violent 
coercion (Gambetta 1990a; Tzanetakis 2016). 
 
The conversation I had with Shelly is interesting because she did not want to be seen as a heroin 
user but was content to be seen as someone who smoked crack cocaine on occasion. People 
construct their identities through the narratives they provide to others. The narratives of drug 
users contain ‘symbolic boundaries’ which locate them within desired social groups, whilst 
distancing them from those that are deemed less so. According to Copes et al (2016), this 
boundary work is a normal aspect of social interaction but is especially important for those 
within stigmatised social groups. In these settings, however, boundaries can have an adverse 
effect in that they can facilitate drug use and constrain recovery. Evidently, Shelly had 
attempted to provide a positive image of herself by describing herself in this way but was, 
nonetheless, addicted to crack cocaine.  
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After making the drop we head into town, Teeth has decided the best place for us to talk is in 
a bar - somewhere we can relax and have a drink. It is a ten-minute drive before we reach the 
city centre and I busy myself making small talk. We eventually arrive at a well-used multi-
story car park. The dilapidated condition of the stairwells speaks equally of drug use. A 
secluded space with some protection from the elements making it a convenient place to deliver 
injections and bed down for the night, albeit without sanitation. Teeth stops us before we get 
out of the car; it seems it is time for him to make a demonstration: 
 
Teeth: You see Mark, Hector here he does everything for me, he checks my money, counts it 
makes sure it’s right. He will do anything I want, and when I say “anything” I mean 
anything. I don’t open doors he does, that’s why he walks in front, you’ll see… Hector, 
we’re gonna go to the bar, and you know how I like to look when I go out, and right 
now I feel a bit scruffy. 
 
Hector: That’s no good. 
 
Teeth: No it’s not. See the thing is it’s my shoes, there’s a bit of dirt on them and I can’t have 
that. 
 
He reaches into the glove compartment, pulls out a pack of wet wipes and hands one back to 
Hector. 
 
Teeth: Here you go, that’s right come round here and clean my shoes. 
 
Hector pauses for a brief moment before getting out of the car. He walks around to the driver 
side where Teeth is waiting for him. I can see the look of shame on his face as he gets on his 
hands and knees and starts scrubbing.  A couple of minutes later and Teeth tells him to stop. 
 
Teeth: “Alright that’s enough... See I told you, Mark, he is mine. Anything I want doing he 
will do it for me. I own you don’t I hector”. 
 
Hector: Yes. Uh, yes Teeth. 
 
The fact that Hector is addicted to heroin and crack gives Teeth significant power over him. 
The withdrawal symptoms from these drugs are severe and kick in rapidly. Addicts will go to 
great lengths to reduce the pains of withdrawal even if this means becoming servants to drug 
dealers like Teeth. Teeth provides the drugs on credit, keeping his runners continually indebted 
to him. He then assigns them with tasks, as a form of employment, to pay off what they owe. 
Teeth combines this debt bonding with psychological manipulation and physical violence to 
keep them under control. These are the techniques that drug dealers use in the so-called 
phenomena of ‘county lines’ (Coomber and Moyle 2017): a policing concept constructed on 
stereotypes to suit their agendas. One minute he is all niceties and treats his runners with 
kindness and respect, at others he is mean, cold and threatening. Teeth relishes the power he 
has over his runners and has no pity for their plight: he bears all the characteristics of a 
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psychopath. This type of ‘modern slavery’ is endemic within this marketplace, but like Teeth, 
the public has little pity for drug addicts and treat them with contempt. It is this stigma and 
marginalisation that contributes to feelings of shame in the drug user that worsens their 
condition (O'Connor et al. 1994; Accenture 2015) and subsequent servitude.  
 
Hector gets up off the floor and dusts himself off; his eyes glisten with tears. We take a short 
walk to the bar, and I notice how exceptionally aware he is of the environment around us. He 
continually scans for signs of police and opportunities to steal things. Hector picks up on the 
smallest of details, body language, facial expressions, clothing, and feeds this information back 
to Teeth at regular intervals. This type of environmental scanning is a common technique used 
by burglars to establish their targets, something which Hector is well versed in. Drug addicts 
often resort to thievery in order to fund their habits, resulting in increases in burglary in drug-
ridden neighbourhoods. Hector trades the stolen items for drugs, giving Teeth a ready supply 
of illegal goods which he fences off for a profit. In areas where addiction is rife, the informal 
economy can become flooded with these items, deflating their value (Wright and Decker 1994, 
p. 184). The fact addicts are desperate for their fix often means they will sell or trade them at 
a low price for a rapid turnover. Hector opens the door for us as we arrive at the bar; we walk 
in to find it relatively busy. Teeth points to a quiet corner, and we take a seat:  
 
Teeth: Hector, get us some drinks what do you want Mark? 
 
Mark: Pint’s fine cheers.  
 
Teeth pulls out a small wallet from his pocket as Hector gets in the round. He flicks it open, 
showing a thick wad of cash and a number of credit cards in other people’s names. One of them 
is Hector’s. 
 
Teeth: See Mark, I don’t keep anything in my name, I sub-let I’m not on the voters list, even 
the social (social security/DWP) don’t know where I live. I’ve put myself down as 
homeless. I don’t use any of my cards, I use my friends’ cards. I use their own money 
to pay for things and sometimes I’ll get them to put money in their account for me. 
 
Mark: Right, so you’re using your runner’s cards and your customers, the people who buy from 
you, I guess you give them some money back right? 
 
Teeth: No I don’t give them a penny. I’m meeting someone later, he’s crazy a mad man, not 
right in the head, you’ll see what I mean. I get £200 every week from him, that’s his 
money from the social. That money goes to me, the other goes to me. I take everything 
they’ve got. 
 
Mark: How do they survive? 
 
Teeth: If you’re hungry, you’ll find a way. Dustbins mainly, they eat from the bins.  
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The pains of addiction make Teeth’s clients fully complicit to his demands and enables him to 
use them as conduits to cover his activities. Credit cards are designed to allow people to make 
payments without having to carry large amounts of money, but this has a downside. It enables 
criminals to gain control over other people’s finances and launder their funds. Depositing 
money in other people’s accounts is a common technique used by criminals to launder cash 
and is relatively unsophisticated (Levi 2015). Such straw men are often friends and family 
members, people within one’s immediate social circles. People who can be trusted and agree 
to help for a fee. These ties are strengthened through personal bonds and mutual economic 
interests whereby enablers do not necessarily need to know the criminal activities they are 
supporting (Gambetta 1990b). Providing limited information  not only protects the core of the 
criminal organisation (Dorn et al. 1998; Matrix Knowledge Group 2007); it can also protect 
those on the periphery who may feign ignorance to the authorities. These actors might still be 
required to prove they received the funds legitimately, however (Johannes Teichmann 2018). 
Teeth has used similar techniques by registering his home address and the cars he drives in 
someone else’s name. He owns an expensive Mercedes convertible, which is registered to a 
family member. He never drives this car in the city. Hector arrives at the table with the drinks, 
he takes a seat next to me and continues to keep a lookout:  
 
Mark: You ever have any problems with people owing you money? 
 
Teeth: Not so much anymore. There was this one guy owed me a few grand, he thought he was 
right funny. I found out he was saying shit about me behind my back, talking it up, that 
he was never going to pay and there was nothing I could do about it. I got a tipoff that 
he was at this house party, went in with one of my runners and there he was sitting in 
this chair, high as a kite. A few girls and some other people were there doing drugs, and 
nobody realised what was about to go down, they didn’t have a clue. First thing I do is 
I go straight into the kitchen, laying out on the side is one of those knives, you know 
the long ones with the rough jagged blade?  
 
Mark: A bread knife.  
 
Teeth: Yeah, a bread knife. So, I pick it up and go back into the room, plain as day. Grabbed 
him by his hair and push his head back into the chair. With that I put the blade to his 
temple and start cutting. Now I could feel the blade grinding against skin and the blood 
starts spraying everywhere. The people there they started laughing cos it didn’t look 
real, they had never seen anything like it before, they thought it was fake blood. They 
thought it was a fucking party trick. So I think this is really fucking funny and I’m 
sawing in deeper and I’m laughing my fucking head off. I got in real deep and you 
could see all this white membrane near his skull, so I figured I’d done enough. He can’t 
pay me back if he’s dead. With that I take a step away and told him that he made a real 
bad mistake fucking with me.  
 
Mark: No shit. 
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The supply of goods on credit is common to most illicit drug markets. Keeping customers 
indebted is a sure way to keep them loyal. Customers appreciate being able to get drugs when 
they do not have the funds to buy them, and once they have settled their debt, they may need 
to borrow more. The targeting of finances has become a significant tool for the police in 
disrupting criminal operations. According to Naylor (1999), ‘follow the money’ is a key 
rhetorical device guiding law enforcement agencies aiming to ‘hit criminals where it hurts 
most’. This approach assumes that once criminal assets are seized (if they actually have any), 
the perpetrators will have difficulty continuing operations in the future, whatever sentence they 
are given. It is well known that drug dealers can rely on credit and often do so. If their assets 
are seized, however, they can simply increase the size of their loans, providing their creditors 
are willing (Levi 2015).  
 
Because loans are made through informal agreements, there is no legal recourse that drug 
dealers can appeal to if their customers do not pay up. In these cases, drug dealers rely on 
violence, or the threat of it, to ensure that debts are paid. By going to extremes, criminals not 
only punish the transgressor but also send a message to deter others from taking the same 
action. The reality is that these violent events are less common than one might assume, but 
those that are leave a legacy to deter others later down the line (Reuter 2009). Violent acts 
become glorified in stories that are regurgitated by criminals on a regular basis. The more 
exotic the story, the more it catches the imagination, and the more likely it is to be passed on 
through social networks. ‘The offender like everyone else, acts in ways that are mindful of ‘the 
narrative possibilities’ of the action. In acting, one is playing out a moral tale of some sort, one 
that posits its protagonist as a particular sort of person’ (Presser 2009, p. 185). Avoiding violent 
confrontation is preferable as it can become deadly for both parties and draws unwanted 
attention from the police. Avoiding police attention is one of the primary reasons Teeth restricts 
himself to the retail market: 
 
Mark: So, in terms of levels of your business, where would you situate yourself. 
 
Teeth: I’m local level, I know some people who are far up in the chain, some smugglers but 
I’m not interested in going up that high. It’s a big risk and the police get excited when 
you go to that level. I could move up if I wanted to no problem, but you know, why fix 
a bike if it’s not broken. I know how to work the game and I do it well, it’s enough for 
me. I’ve got a good life, I’ve got money, I can relax, read the news, sleep in, have a 
siesta, I’m happy. 
 
Mark: You get much problems with the police? 
 
Teeth: Sometimes. You’ve always got to be careful but the cops you got to watch out for are 
the ones who don’t follow protocol. There was this super cop I used to have a problem 
with he was a real nasty piece of work, had a PhD and all that so he knew the game real 
well. This cunt would appear from nowhere he would just keep popping up. One time 
they caught me and I’d thrown the drugs on the side of the road, but they didn’t see me 
do it. I got arrested again and the next day I got to see my brief (solicitor), he tells me 
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the good news is I’m not going to jail today. The thing with the police is they are all 
about box ticking. They got to have some form of physical evidence to do you. You got 
to build up a rapport with them, make them like you, make them feel good about 
themselves. The guy who was interviewing me I could tell he liked me. So, I’m chatting 
to him, and I put my hand out for him to shake it. Now that’s a show of friendship. He 
took my hand and all of a sudden, he puts my car keys down on the table, then he puts 
my £400 that I had on me down and four mobile phones. I was out the same day. He 
told me my car was parked outside of the police station. 
 
The police interview suspects to gather information to build their cases. Not all suspects are 
guilty of an offence, but those who are may look to find ways to convince the officer that they 
are not guilty. By building a rapport and demonstrating friendliness, Teeth was hoping to 
display an image of an honest, law-abiding citizen. Someone who had nothing to hide. A show 
of nervousness and hostility in the suspect may be a sign of someone who is hiding their crimes. 
Rapport is defined as “a relationship marked by harmony, conformity, accord, and affinity” 
(Bernieri et al. 1996, p. 110). It is a major investigatory technique used by the police to gather 
information and is believed to be the most effective tool in successful interrogations (Vallano 
and Schreiber Compo 2015). By getting the suspect to talk freely, it is hoped they will reveal 
incriminating information as they become more relaxed, open and cooperative. The point here, 
however, is that if a criminal does enter into a state of rapport without incriminating themselves, 
then the officer may believe they are in fact, innocent. This is a skill that requires someone who 
will not get flustered or tripped up by police questioning. It may be something that comes 
naturally or something that is learned. Indeed, criminals with higher verbal intelligence are 
more likely to avoid arrest for their crimes (Boccio et al. 2018). Furthermore, the more 
exposure one has to difficult situations the more they feel at ease with it; as therapists who deal 
with phobias are well aware (Muris et al. 1998). This may make career criminals exceptionally 
proficient at this performance, yet their criminal records may cheat them of any law-abiding 
image they hope to portray. Teeth, however, went to extreme lengths to develop a positive 
image of himself, and even signed up to volunteer within the third sector:  
 
Teeth: Before I went to jail I did a bit of voluntary work, it gave me insider’s perspective on 
what they do, I was up working in the police station where they keep all the radios and 
that, they didn’t have a clue how dirty I was. I wanted to build up a good profile to keep 
the police off my back and it looks good if you go to court. But the Judge put a stop to 
that, he had one look at the papers and thought this doesn’t ring true, he wasn’t stupid 
he knew what I was up to, so he made them disappear. I hadn’t been in any sort of 
trouble for ten years; he knew something was up with it.  
 
Mark: Right. 
 
Teeth: I didn’t do the voluntary work for very long, but I did enjoy it… I used to do a bit of 
counselling, they put me on a five-track counselling course, so I did a bit of that. The 
good thing about voluntary work is a lot of women sign up for it, they do it to build up 
their career and there weren’t many guys there, especially not many black guys like me. 
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There was two blokes and fifteen women, and they were curious about me. Yeah, I had 
a couple of them, took them out and showed them a good time, obviously I had to be 
careful with what I told them, but people will believe anything. 
 
Covert strategies are not only restricted to the police or researchers such as me for that matter. 
In this instance, Teeth went undercover and infiltrated the criminal justice system through his 
role in the third sector, to gather information and build a humanitarian, law-abiding image of 
himself. Going undercover is a conventional technique that the police employ to gather 
information on criminal groups. Undercover officers will need to create a false identity to do 
this successfully. This means employing contextually appropriate clothing, language and 
adopting the lifestyle of their given role (Dorn et al. 1992). The police are also known to create 
false social media accounts to gather intelligence (Guardian 2017). Teeth does not use any form 
of social media specifically for this reason. Drug dealers such as Hector pride themselves on 
being able to identify signs of undercover operatives. If an officer is to pose as an addict, having 
a dishevelled appearance may not be enough to quell suspicions. This may mean that they have 
to engage in criminal activity, something which can be evidentially problematic in court as 
well as ethically questionable (Joh 2009). Indeed, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000, which set the legal framework for carrying out covert operations, gave ‘considerable 
latitude to authorising officers and thus allow[s] them to legitimise illegal activities that are 
deemed necessary and proportionate’ (Bacon 2017, p. 201). This includes the unofficial 
‘licensing’ of criminals, whereby informants are permitted to continue their criminal activities 
provided they work with the police and provide information (Reuter 1982; Bean and 
Billingsley 2001; Bacon 2017). Such practices, however, are highly unethical. It remains to be 
seen whether this will be changed by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and its subsequent 
regulations. 
 
As for Teeth, voluntary workers are perhaps the least likely people to be suspected of dealing 
heroin and crack cocaine but getting this close to the police is risky. A heroin dealer named 
Rocco did not need to employ such extreme measures. He had a contact in the police force who 
gave him the heads up when the police were conducting drug raids in his area. The officer in 
question was a friend of the family. It is these close social ties that facilitate corruption of 
official actors (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016; Albanese 2018). 
 
We spend a few hours at the bar talking about Teeth’s exploits before moving on. We visit a 
few other venues before he finally decides to take me home. Hector points out a few expensive 
bikes locked to a railing as we walk back to the car. He weighs up the difficulties in stealing 
one. With the right tools it would take him a few minutes he explains; fortunately, he does not 
have any at hand, “what we used to do when I was younger was get an aerosol can on it, that 
would freeze the metal and then you just hit it with a hammer to break it”. A few minutes later 
and we are back at the car. Teeth makes a couple more drops on the way home; heroin, crack, 
and the odd zopiclone as an added extra to help his customers sleep. It is now 2am and the 
streets are relatively deserted. A police car passes slowly on the opposite side of the road. The 
officer turns his head towards us. He seems to be scoping us out. 
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Teeth: Hector get your head down and get ready to run. 
 
Mark: What’s up, you worried they might find what he’s got stashed there?  
 
Teeth: Nah it’s not that. In this game you only carry what you need, and Hector can stick a 
tennis ball up his arse if I need him to. One of my old runners could swallow a whole 
durex condom full of drugs. One time he had swallowed a lot of my gear and he couldn’t 
get it up. The dick head says to me that I’m going to have to wait for him to pass it. I 
told him your having a fucking laugh aren’t you? So, you know what we did? 
 
Mark: What’s that? 
 
Teeth: We gave him the bleach. We mixed it up with a load of salt and some other nasty shit 
and made him swallow it. 
 
Mark: I bet that worked? 
 
Teeth: It worked alright. You should have seen his face after he had the bleach, he was as white 
as a ghost (laughs). The problem with Hector is he is a bit of a celebrity. The police are 
after him for two armed robberies and I don’t want them to see us together. They’ve 
got nothing on him, but I could do without the heat. 
 
We drive a little further up the road and Teeth looks back in the rear-view mirror to check if 
we were followed.  
 
Teeth: Do you think that was Smith, Hector? 
 
Hector: Couldn’t tell 
 
Mark: Who’s Smith? 
 
Teeth: This copper he’s a bit of a jobsworth. I only usually get stopped twice a year but since 
he’s been on the scene, he’s stopped me three times this year already. Last time I just 
pulled over as soon as I saw him. I’m not going to take any chances though. 
 
Teeth makes a sudden turn down a side road; he drops a gear and puts the pedal to the floor. 
The modified engine kicks in and I’m pinned to my seat as the car speeds forward - 40, 50, 60, 
70 miles per hour and still climbing. The residential houses become a blur around me as we hit 
the 80 miles per hour mark. We reach a road with a slow arcing bend, but due to the speed, 
Teeth has to cut across and drive in the oncoming lane. All the while, he has a calm relaxed 
demeanour, without even the slightest tension in his face. I can tell he is enjoying the 
demonstration. He makes a few more gut-wrenching turns as he navigates his way through the 
city streets and drops his speed. 
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Teeth: See this is why police don’t fuck with man. Back in London, I used to be a getaway 
driver, that’s where I learned to drive like this. 
 
There is an element of excitement in living on the edge that Teeth clearly enjoys. The sensual 
attractions of doing evil, as Katz (1988) puts it, motivates criminals in ways that economic 
explanations of crime cannot account for. These motives are rooted in the experiential 
‘foreground’ of the criminal act, whereby offenders push risk-taking to its limits. Those who 
work the edges play on the boundaries between success and failure, employing well-honed 
skills to achieve the spectacle of their craft. It is this artful mastery of the criminal act at its 
most dangerous form that fuels the experiential adrenaline surge that these ‘edge-workers’ 
crave so highly. Research in this field has been taken up most readily by cultural criminologists 
of the left who reinterpret these acts as a form of resistance to the repression of capitalist 
society. The excitement of edgework is counter fact to the drudgery of labour (Lyng 2004; 
Ferrell 2005). This may be true of the lads’ experience (see chapter 4), but in this case, there is 
something more. Organised crime has been defined as a script in that it has a number of steps 
and sequences that must be completed for the offence to be accomplished (Cornish and Clarke 
2002). The script is like a movie script, as it will have a range of actors and props (tools), which 
are assigned into certain roles. The example of the late-night getaway demonstrates that events 
within the script cannot always be predetermined. A certain amount of improvisation is 
required to manage situations that arise in situ. Risk-taking in some parts of the script may also 
be necessary to reduce risks in others. Teeth’s high-octane police evasion was a risky 
endeavour that saved himself and the passengers of the vehicle from police questioning: an 
ethical dilemma I appreciated not having to engage with. Furthermore, associating with 
criminals who are under investigation, or known to the police, increases the likelihood that one 
will become a police priority (Bacon 2017). It is also likely that Hector had given some of the 
goods from the robbery to Teeth to be sold on; hence, why he was so keen to get away.  
 
 
Max 
 
Having discussed some of the aspects of the heroin and crack trade, the next section of the 
chapter looks at an entirely different drug market in the city, nitrous oxide (nos). Nitrous oxide 
is a drug that is fairly benign, it is relatively harmless and is not physically addictive. The 
effects are short-lived as the drug is eliminated from the bloodstream within minutes. Whilst 
the user is heavily intoxicated after inhalation and will experience dizziness and distortions of 
vision, there are little side effects to the drug (Nutt 2012). This is the gas that is given to women 
who are birthing to control their pain. In regard to the law, it can be sold for catering purposes 
without a licence, making dealers difficult to prosecute when it is sold illegally for human 
consumption. At the time of writing, there have been no successful prosecutions of illicit sales 
of nos in the UK, making dealers of the drug relatively immune from the authorities. In Red 
City, the drug is consumed recreationally at nightclubs and house parties, alongside other party 
drugs such as MDMA, cocaine, and of course, alcohol. A number of street vendors sell the 
drug outside clubs on weekends; however, since the Psychoactive Substance Act 2016 has been 
introduced, the police have been cracking down by stopping street dealers and confiscating 
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supplies. There are also a number of enterprises that will deliver the drug and required 
paraphernalia (balloons and dispensers) on demand. Max is one of these people and counted 
himself as one of the largest suppliers in the city. In his eyes, his business was entirely legal. 
He registered his sales and paid his taxes. The following account is taken from my time spent 
with him in the field:  
 
I take a seat on the auburn two-seater sofa in Max’s lounge as he potters around cleaning up 
the kitchen. He owns a modern two-bedroom flat that was recently built on the outskirts of the 
city. Max is in his early 30s and has been running the business for a little over a year after 
having invested his funds from drugs. His primary motive for this transition was to protect his 
daughter. He worried that he might end up in prison but felt he could not go back to working 
for someone else. He enjoyed the freedom of being his own boss. Somehow, Max needed to 
find a way to continue his lifestyle in way that was not going to get him arrested. He saw a gap 
in the market and capitalised on it. It is around 10pm, and Max’s work phone is a little quiet, 
he is a little concerned about the lack of business but explains people are saving their money 
after the Christmas ‘blow out’. It seems that New Year’s Eve was a very busy night for Max, 
although, it did not come without fault: 
 
Max: Ah mate New Year’s Eve was a fucking nightmare, I had all my staff on but one of their 
cars broke down at 11pm just as it was kicking off. It’s one of those things there was 
nothing we could do about it, he called out the AA but they weren’t able to fix it on the 
spot, so I was a man down. 
 
Mark: Fuck, so what happened did you have to turn people down or? 
 
Max: Nah it was just a case of telling them they would have to wait an hour and a half but by 
the time we arrived their phones would be off, and we missed loads of deliveries. I 
usually give people a hard time if they cancel but I couldn’t say anything, we missed 
out on money and it damaged the reputation which is something I’ve been building for 
a long time. People see our service as better than our competitors as we are more 
reliable. 
 
Max prides himself on his quality of service, and it is this that he believes has made him so 
successful. A large majority of his customers are repeat purchasers and have built a positive 
relationship with his business over time. Research on the fast food industry has demonstrated 
that customer satisfaction is essential to long-term success of the business. ‘High customer 
satisfaction leads to greater loyalty, which in turn leads to future revenue’ (Gilbert et al. 2004). 
Customer satisfaction relates to what is sold and also how it is sold. In illicit drug markets 
products are often adulterated by suppliers in an attempt to increase profit margins (Caulkins 
2007). Nitrous oxide is almost impossible to adulterate at this level. Legitimate wholesale 
manufacturers compress the gas into small canisters for one-time usage. The mark up on the 
drug is significant, making it a lucrative product to sell without adulteration. In this respect, 
the product will always be of a certain standard regardless of who distributes it.  
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Nitrous oxide suppliers compete by aiming to provide a superior service than their competitors, 
namely through availability (providing a twenty-four-hour delivery service), price, and speed 
of delivery. Interestingly the major suppliers of nos in the city did not try to undercut each other 
and pitched their products at the same price. The matching of product prices within 
supermarket stores has been demonstrated to keep market prices high (Hess and Gerstner 
1991). Undercutting rivals can lead to a price war, reducing profits for all parties (Rao et al. 
2000). It may, therefore, be in their interests to match the prices of other suppliers rather than 
undercut them. We get on to a conversation about Max’s staff. Max informs me that he only 
employs friends and people whom he can trust, but this has its difficulties: 
 
Max: It’s hard because I don’t like having to tell them off, but sometimes I have to talk to them 
like a cunt to get them to listen. If people fuck up there has to be repercussions, else 
people know they can take the piss and get away with it. It’s good working with friends 
because I know I can trust them more or less, but it means that I find it hard to get staff 
sometimes. I had a guy who approached me and started asking loads of questions about 
the company. He said he worked for one of my competitors but felt they weren’t treating 
him fairly and was asking if I would give him a job. I didn’t give him much information 
about the business as I don’t like to give information out especially if my competitors 
get hold of it and are able to use it against me. I talked with him for a long time on the 
phone and mined him for information. He sounded good and I could use someone like 
that, but I find it hard to trust people. I think it’s trust that enables me to run better. If 
my competitors find out how I run business I don’t want them to perform better. I can’t 
risk outsiders passing on the structure of business to our competitors. 
 
Mark: Do you think that limits how much your business can grow if you can’t get the extra 
staff? 
 
Max: Yeah it does, one of my competitors has franchised, he’s set up outside Red City, he’s 
got business in two other cities. There’s a financial incentive to get others on board. 
 
Trust-based employment is a persistent trend across illicit drug markets (Von Lampe and 
Johansen 2004a). Whilst Max contends that his business is entirely legitimate, he runs the 
operation with suspicion and is highly risk averse. One of the primary reasons that Max entered 
this market was that it was less risky in terms of prosecution than his previous work in the illicit 
drug trade. While these markets rely on trust to function, they are inherently marked by distrust. 
Robbery in the drug trade is common as is infiltration from the police (Jacobs 2000). Max 
traded the potential of increasing the efficiency of his business to maintain its security (Morselli 
et al. 2007). He was concerned that the person who contacted him might pass on ‘trade secrets’ 
about his business conduct. The relationship between secrecy and trust in Max’s enterprise 
revolved around the need to maintain a comparative and competitive advantage in the industry, 
rather than protection from the law. The protection of methodological trade secrets is seldom 
discussed in the literature on trust in criminal markets (e.g. Gambetta 1990b; Von Lampe and 
Johansen 2004b; Taylor and Potter 2013; Moeller and Sandberg 2015; Jaspers 2019). This is 
likely because of the types of risks involved in the criminal activities they are referring to, 
which are not directly applicable to Max. The legal protection of intellectual property is 
essential to the success of many legitimate businesses (Risch 2007); however, this is not a 
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recourse that is available to drug dealers, even semi-legitimate ones. Whether or not this is an 
issue, may depend on the market itself; crack dealers may be more concerned with avoiding 
police attention than their competitors knowing their strategies. 
 
The barriers to setting up an enterprise like Max’s are relatively low: all that is required is some 
level of economic resources and technical skills or contacts to set up a website.  One might ask 
why other drug dealers do not migrate to this industry, considering the risks of what they do. 
One possible reason is that criminals work with a bounded rationality and can become locked 
into pathways based on their past histories and current environment. Making a leap into a 
different line of business may seem difficult, or it may not even be recognised as an option at 
all: 
 
“The options available for current decisions (opportunity set) are, therefore, neither 
independent of individual history (the past) nor from the specific social 
environment and social configuration in which he/she lives. Thus, even a 
perception of the future might be partially conditioned by past behaviour. In other 
words, at an individual level, some form of path dependency may be prevalent.” 
(Anxo and Erhel 2006, p. 10). 
 
The phone is still quiet, and one of Max’s members of staff is about to finish the shift without 
much by way of sales. Max begins to pace the living room like a caged animal. He checks his 
phone repeatedly to see if any new orders have come through. 
 
Max: I need to have people on even if it’s quiet just in case it picks up: but I’m worried that 
my staff will be averse to working if their last shift was shit. 
 
Mark: You pay them commission don’t you, so I guess when it’s dead they don’t make much 
money? 
 
Max: It’s true but I was speaking to one of the guys who works for someone else and he gets a 
flat hourly rate which is good when it’s quiet but when you’re busy you aren’t being 
rewarded. 
 
Max’s staff get paid on commission, which he believes makes them work harder when nos is 
in high demand. If one of his workers makes more drops within the hour, they will get paid a 
larger amount giving them an incentive to reach his customers in short succession. This is 
similar to the taxi industry, whereby drivers aim to get more profit by increasing the number 
of fares within the hour (Zhang and Ukkusuri 2016). In the fast food industry, delivery time 
has been closely related to customer satisfaction (Church and Newman 2000), even long before 
the Deliveroo and UberEats ‘revolution’ (Dablanc et al. 2017). The illicit drug market is no 
different, whilst some users may buy their drugs in advance, the vast majority purchase their 
drugs around the time in which they wish to consume them. This is demonstrated in the table 
below. Max provided the sales data that he used mainly for tax purposes: 
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Figure A 
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Figure B 
 
 
Figure C: 
 
 
 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
In Pound Sterling 535 5 150 17372 32.47 19.493 
Valid N (listwise) 535      
 
Figure A displays the average number of nitrous oxide sales per hour over a twenty-four-hour 
period. Figure B displays the total number of sales per day for the month of August 2015. The 
highest peaks in sales are during weekends (this trend was observed across all psychoactive 
drug types in this study). Figure C displays the total number of sales for the month of August 
2015, which equates to £17,372. In Figure A, the highest peak in sales is around 00.00 hours, 
at around 04.00 there is another peak in sales which Max attributes to people coming home 
from nightclubs: “we get a business pick up when they can’t get their hands on any illegal 
drugs. We get a pick up around 4/5 in the morning, for them it’s better than nothing”. The 
majority of clubs in Red City close at 04.00 on weekends; there are a few that close later than 
that but most people choose to go home around this time. There are not many retail dealers of 
Class A drugs who will be out at this time as they will have already had a busy night and would 
have made enough profit to satisfy them. Driving around selling drugs at early hours is risky 
because there are fewer cars on the road, making it difficult to blend in.  
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The phone rings suddenly: 
 
Max: Oh, here we go “Hello Nos Man” 
 
Female Customer: “Hello can you deliver to East Way?”. 
 
Max: “Some areas we deliver to some areas we don’t, depending on how far it is you might 
have to pay a £5 delivery charge. Can you tell me the postcode… Yeah that will be a 
fiver delivery on that one and it would be about an hour before we get to you”. 
 
Female Customer: “That’s ok can we have four boxes please?”. 
 
Max: “Yes you can, that’ll be four boxes for £35 plus the £5 delivery charge, for an extra fiver 
you can have another box, we do 5 boxes for forty?”. 
 
Female Customer: “no thanks just four is fine”. 
 
Max: “No problem if you can text me through your name, address and postcode and we’ll be 
right over to you”. 
 
Max answers the phone with a polite but professional tone. He speaks relatively quickly as to 
not block the line from other potential customers; however, orders can be made directly through 
his website. Max gives discounts for larger amounts as an incentive to buy more, and always 
offers these deals when taking orders over the phone. He purchases the drugs at £5 per box and 
is making a significant profit. I notice he raises the pitch of his voice ever so slightly when 
making the offer. He does this in an attempt to make it sound more appealing, “we do five 
boxes for forty”. Max informed me that he had created sales scripts for his staff to read when 
they are working the phone lines. Max’s script is designed to get as much money as possible 
from the customers, whilst also providing a method of questioning that checks their age. Max 
does not sell nitrous oxide to people below eighteen years of age, a personal choice. The sales 
techniques that he uses are similar to those that are found in call centres. Research in this field 
demonstrates that customers will generally form their opinions of a company based on their 
interactions with agents on the phone. High-level communication skills are essential to making 
sales (Brown and Maxwell 2002) but can be assisted through the use of scripts, which is a 
distinctive feature within this sector (Taylor and Bain 1999; Woydack and Rampton 2016). 
 
Max calls his runner Tom, who is about to come off shift and explains that a long-distance 
order has come through, “it’s a long-distance mate but better than nothing” he remarks. Tom 
accepts the order, so Max sends over the details via text message. He works with two phones, 
one for incoming calls and outgoing receipts to and from his customers, whilst the other is a 
direct line to his staff. Each of his team is provided with a mobile phone for the shift along with 
a hands-free kit, should they choose to use it. 
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Max: I might have to sort him out, top him up a bit just to say nice one for being available. I 
like my staff to feel valued, there’s a fine line between telling them they are really 
valued but at the same time I can replace you. If you make them feel valued, they are 
more likely to fall in line when you need them to buck their ideas up. 
 
Another call comes in: 
 
Max: “Hello Nos Man” 
 
Male customer: “Hello do you sell nos?” 
 
Max: “Yes we do what are you after?” 
 
Male customer: “Can I have one box?” 
 
Max: “Sorry but the minimum order is £20 is that ok?” 
 
Male customer: “Yeah alright mate can you deliver to Rawling?” 
 
Max: “Yup that’s absolutely fine, text through your name, postcode and house number and 
we’ll be with you in 40 minutes”. 
 
CALL END 
 
Max: That’s another indicator of how old they are if they ask for just one box, kids don’t have 
a lot of money to spend. You could tell he was over 18 though just by listening to his 
voice. 
 
Mark: So why don’t you sell to under 18s? is it a moral thing or is it because you don’t want 
to get into trouble for it? 
 
Max: It’s a bit of both, the last thing I need is for newspapers to catch us selling to under 18s 
but there’s also a moral side, and a third side in that I want to run this business as legit 
as possible. The morality side is a thing is also a thing of not wanting my staff doing 
something I wouldn’t do myself and I don’t want staff going all the way out somewhere 
for nothing. The other thing is as soon as one group of kids gets away with it, they all 
try. I’m also a parent and I wouldn’t be happy if it were my kids doing it. All in all, I’d 
say it’s 70 percent a business concern and 30 percent morality. I won’t let greed cloud 
my judgement. 
 
Mark: Right. 
 
Max: In how people perceive us, most of them are recreational drug users, we get a business 
pick up when they can’t get their hands on any illegal drugs. We get a pick up around 
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4/5 in the morning, for them it’s better than nothing. Most people think we are just drug 
dealers, there have been plenty of times when people have been surprised or shocked 
at just how transparent we are, we’re not shady and this helps our image and impacts 
on payment. Some people don’t want to make card payments because they think we 
could rip them off. People are surprised we do card payments; it adds legitimacy makes 
it seem more socially acceptable. I’ve become a bit desensitised to what I do, but when 
people ask, I’m normally cagey.  
 
The legal age for drinking and smoking in the UK is 18 years of age. In America, most states 
have set the age limit at 21. Critics of these policies assert that age restrictions equate to a 
deprivation of liberty and an overly paternalistic form of state governance. Yet, there is 
significant evidence from psychology and neuroscience which demonstrates that people do not 
reach cognitive maturity until the age of 18 with further brain development until the age of 21 
(Morain and Malek 2017). Young people are more likely to engage in risky and harmful 
activity as is evident in offending rates that peak in the late teens (Farrington 2011). The 
argument here is that minors do not have the capacity to make entirely rational decisions, and 
thus must be protected by the state until they are at an age in which they can. Moreover, taking 
drugs such as cigarettes at a young age may lead to a life of addiction and ill health. The 
problem with any type of regulation is that the people may seek alternative sources of drugs 
from the black market. It is doubtful that all dealers would be as conscientious as Max, due to 
his high level of visibility and personal moral code. Nonetheless, there was one occasion during 
fieldwork where Max sold to an individual who was 18 years old but had friends in the street 
who looked younger. It is possible that the customer was also purchasing the drugs for his 
friends (a tactic that also applies to otherwise legitimate drugs such as alcohol). Max explained 
that he felt uncomfortable about the sale and had considered refusing it. It is likely that such 
events had occurred previously; however, Max had not mentioned this in the interview. Indeed, 
what is not said may be equally important as what is said, when constructing ‘moral versions’ 
of the self (Petraki et al. 2007).  
 
Max calls Tom regarding the staff take-over; Jerry is just about to come on shift. It seems that 
Tom has gone home with the second set of keys for the office. Max has an office located in the 
city centre, a place that enables his staff to pick up stock during the night, relax and use the 
bathroom if need be. Tom is just about to go to bed, so he suggests that he leaves the keys 
under his dustbin for us to pick up later in the night.  
 
Mark: So how does it work then? Do your staff take any of the incoming calls? 
 
Max: I am the gatekeeper for the jobs that come in online or phone, I can be a bottleneck for 
the whole operation. When I’m not on I need one person in charge to delegate to others 
to tell them what to do. That can be me or someone else. I have two guys who work in 
the week, but I do weekends when it’s most busy. My social life has suffered because 
of it. I’m looking at restructuring, so I get some time off, but I need someone with the 
same skills as me to step in, but they need to have the finger on the pulse. It’s tricky 
and would rather just deal with accounts and stock can’t be fucked with delivering 
anymore. Time is precious and I’m spending too much of my life dedicated to 
delivering nos. 
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Mark: So how do you know when a job is completed? They just text it through do they? 
 
Max: The texts come in to confirm the job is done. I have a vigorous system in place to know 
where everyone is. I can be a bit of a control freak, but it enables me to run the business 
well, my staff get annoyed with my attention to detail they just don’t get it. It’s the tiny 
things that are most important as soon as you let small details slip it can snowball. 
 
As the business is relatively above board, everything is logged both digitally and on paper. 
This gives Max the opportunity to control his overall operation in ways that other drug dealers 
cannot. When he is on shift, he is the central point of command for the business. He has 
complete control over incoming orders, which he sends out to his runners who complete the 
jobs on his behalf. Max does not supply nos on credit, so does not need to worry about 
enforcing loans and his staff are paid in cash after completing the shift. Max informed me that 
if there was a problem with his staff getting robbed, he would have no issue going to the police. 
The mechanisms of social control are much more formal in his line of work. Max’s phone 
beeps again an email order has come through: 
 
Max: Right we are going to take this one. I’m gonna take a piss before we go as I don’t know 
how long we will be on the road for. 
 
Mark: Yeah, I think I’ll do the same. 
 
We make our rounds to the bathroom before heading out to the car. The seat on my side of the 
vehicle will not go down any further because Max has crammed some boxes of nos beneath it. 
The boot of the estate is also stacked to the brim, making it a hefty load. Evidently, he is not 
concerned about trying to hide the drugs from the police. I clamber my way in, pull out my 
notepad and begin taking notes. Max punches the address into the sat nav and we head out. 
When I look back up, I realise we have covered a vast distance in a very short time. I check the 
speedometer to see we are breaching 60 in a 30 mile per hour zone. Max juggles two mobile 
phones whilst working the gearstick and steering wheel. He takes calls and texts orders to his 
staff whilst driving. 
 
Mark: You ever worry about your speed? 
 
Max: Excuse the driving mate, driving like a cunt is part of the job (laughs). 
 
Mark: Do your staff answer the phone whilst driving? 
 
Max: Yeah, they have to answer calls whilst driving but I’ve set them up with hands free kits, 
it’s up to them if they want to use them. I take that risk, but I’ll understand it if they 
don’t want to and won’t try and push them to do it. If they want to text or talk whilst 
driving, it’s up to them. 
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Mark: Where we off to? 
 
Max: Mills Road and then there’s another come through at Bentley Square. 
 
We arrive at the first destination in short succession. Max gives the customer a call to tell them 
we are outside.  
 
Max: “Hello mate it’s Nos Man I’m outside”. 
 
The first customer approaches the car; a spritely looking hipster in his mid-twenties. A well-
groomed beard covers his jaw. Max winds down the window and starts making small talk. He 
puts on a warm smile as he makes the sale. The customer speaks with middle-class accent of 
estuary English:  
 
Max: Hello mate how are you doing are you having a good night? 
 
Male customer: Yeah just getting ready for a night with my mates, thought I’d get some 
balloons in. 
 
Max: Well you’ve made the right choice there. How was your new year and that? 
 
Male customer: Ahh it was really good I spent it with my family. You been busy then? 
 
Max: Nah it’s after Christmas so it’s a bit quiet, so are you out tonight then? 
 
Male customer: We’re staying in, smoke a few joints and a couple of balloons, could be doing 
worse stuff. 
 
Max: How are you paying cash or card? 
 
Male customer: I’ve got a card is that alright. 
 
Max: That’s fine mate just pop your card in there. 
 
Max pulls out a mobile card reader. The customer gets out his card and types his pin code into 
the machine. 
 
Max: You want a receipt, I can text it to you or email? 
 
Customer: Text is fine cheers. 
 
Max packs a navy-blue carrier bag with nos and matching blue balloons.  He hands it over to 
the customer through the window of the car. 
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Max: There you go you’ve got one, two, three, four, five boxes and some balloons. Have a 
good night buddy. 
 
He pulls out a clip board and logs the sale. 
 
In the final phase of the sale, Max gets to meet his customers face to face. Taking orders over 
the phone gives him the opportunity to offer deals and discounts, whilst aiming to present a 
positive image of the business through his friendly tone of voice. When he meets the customers 
in person, he has more time to talk, so builds up a rapport with his customers in an attempt to 
establish a positive relationship with them. Max has a detailed knowledge of the night 
economy, such as what events are on and who the artists are. He is able to relate to his 
customers well. In sales literature, this is described as ‘psychological similarity’ (Duck 1994) 
which leads to an ‘authentic understanding’ in which a ‘service provider and client engage in 
self-revelation, expend emotional energy, and connect as individuals’ (Price and Arnould 1999, 
p. 92). These relationships can develop over time as stakeholders interact through repeat 
transactions. Ultimately, positive rapport increases sales (Gremler and Gwinner 2000). 
 
 
Discussion & Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined how drug dealing is conducted in the city streets. It compared two 
parallel drug markets that sit at the opposite ends of legitimacy. The drugs in question were 
heroin and crack cocaine, and nitrous oxide. The markets contrast in terms of the classification 
of the drugs, the harm they cause and also the public opinion of them. The chapter demonstrated 
that drug policy and policing priorities affect the ability of illicit enterprises to expand in terms 
of the amounts of product sold, their geographical reach, and also in terms of their numbers of 
staff. This also relates to their level of visibility: enterprises closest to legality can openly 
advertise their services without being pursued by the police. The police have limited resources 
and often target drugs (and their suppliers) that are perceived to cause the most amount of harm 
to the community and can be effectively controlled.  
 
The first section of the analysis was dedicated to the activities of Teeth who distributes heroin 
and crack at the retail level. His account demonstrates the harsh reality of those working as 
drug runners at the lowest end of the distribution chain, as well as those who are purchasing 
the drugs. Addictions can be crippling, leaving those who have them open to exploitation and 
violence. As drug addicts live chaotic lives and struggle to control the amount they consume, 
they generate significant debts which they must work to pay back. To keep his runners in line 
Teeth employs extreme violence and psychological manipulation, “you know the thing about 
pulling teeth. You gotta get right up into the root, and if they aint screaming you know you aint 
doing it right”. For Teeth, violence was not purely instrumental; there was a level of enjoyment 
in causing pain and having power over others. Conversely, these traumatic experiences 
compound addictions and strengthen bonds to the marketplace. The heightened level of 
concealment due to the risk of arrest and negative public opinion of drug addicts makes 
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violence more commonplace in this market. Drug addicts are also less likely to go to the police 
for help; however, they can become enlisted as informants if they get caught for crime. 
 
Max’s operations, on the other hand, were highly visible. The deficiency of regulation allowed 
him to operate openly and advertise his services. Indeed, his business replicated legitimate 
business almost perfectly and reflects what a legal drug market might look like in the UK. He 
could have encountered issues if people owed him money as he would not have been able to 
use violence against them. This would have given the police the ability to prosecute him. 
Nonetheless, using a legal recourse to resolve his problems would have been difficult as his 
business was semi-legitimate. Ultimately, he preferred to avoid police attention. This chapter 
demonstrated that relationships around trust vary depending on the type of product on sale and 
the extent to which drug markets are policed. Like Teeth, Max found it difficult to place 
complete trust in his drug runners, but for him, distrust was necessary to protect his operational 
trade secrets. Trust functions in ways to promote the survival of enterprises from both the police 
and other predators. Whether this relates to concerns about businesses being shut down or out-
competed is dependent on pressures in the field. 
 
To resolve issues around credit, Max did not give drugs out on loan. Providing drugs on credit 
gave Teeth more control as it kept his clients loyal and indebted. If he did not, it is likely they 
would have gone elsewhere due to their need to resolve their withdrawal symptoms. I did not 
find one case of nos being given on credit in all my time in the field. That is not to say that it 
does not happen, but if customers cannot afford the drug, it is likely that they will be content 
to go without considering its short-lived effects and its non-addictive nature. Nonetheless, nos 
attracts an entirely different clientele and is extremely popular with the student crowd who 
usually have some form of income even if it is limited. Overall, Max’s business was 
considerably humane. His runners were treated with respect and paid fairly. There was an 
atmosphere of positivity that surrounded his operations in terms of the way he interacted with 
clients and his staff. This element of pleasantry was not only a personality trait but a selling 
point and key to the success of his business. By keeping his staff and customers happy, he 
ensured they would come back to him. This is not to say that Teeth was not concerned about 
the happiness of his staff and clientele. Like Max, he would give better deals to those who 
bought more and provided added extras such as zopiclone to help his customers sleep. Teeth’s 
clients, however, had different expectations from their environment, violence being more 
common to them. 
 
In terms of expansion, Max kept his enterprise relatively small compared to other legitimate 
enterprises and employed six members of staff. Nonetheless, he counted himself as the 
“number one supplier of nos” in the city and had enough staff to cover the demand. He could 
have expanded further and reached out into another city like his competitor, but that would 
have meant having less control over the operation from the top down. If his staff did not operate 
by following his guidelines such as not selling to minors, or filling taxes, it could have attracted 
police attention. Teeth also decided to keep his business small with one or two runners working 
at one time. He had no plans to move up to wholesale level or spread out geographically to 
other local areas or out of the city. The only dealer who reported setting up an ongoing illicit 
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enterprise in a rural area outside Red City was Wolf. In this case, it was growing cannabis at a 
friend’s house, and the relationship was not exploitative.  
 
Criminal groups can struggle when setting up in other areas as they may not have the same 
network of reliable contacts to draw upon (Varese 2011). It is likely that the phenomenon of 
moving across county lines to expand the scope of retail distribution is restricted to a small 
section of the drug market and reflects normal distribution patterns across the country. Many 
drug dealers do not need to expand in this way to make money, and expansion creates more 
risks. Exploitation of vulnerable people does happen, but again is mainly restricted to the heroin 
and crack market and is not a new phenomenon as it is made out to be by the press.  
 
This chapter confirms Smith’s argument that criminal organisations work across a spectrum of 
legitimacy, however, in the case of drug markets, it is not only the task environment and the 
type of activity that determines the structure of operations. Illicit drugs have varying degrees 
of addictive properties making staff members more or less exploitable depending on the 
product sold. It is important to note, however, that although these markets are considerably 
different, they also share a number of similarities (as they do with many legitimate businesses).  
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6) Organised Crime in the Night-Time Economy:  
Drugs, Vice & Violence 
 
The blood starts flowing and he’s just standing staring with his hands out to the side, fists 
clenched, now this crew from London they thinking this guy is mad, you know he smashed 
himself in the head. And Zia just went for the guy, rushed him to the floor, and the rest of the 
security they jumped on him tried to beat him from the back, now he just destroyed this guy 
that was under him. This guy was the biggest guy, the toughest guy, the leader of that gang. 
So, he just start demolishing this guy, he's on top of him, biting him, ripping his face to pieces 
so when he actually finished the guy just had bite marks all over his face, his neck, completely 
knocked out. So Zia got up he had blood all over his mouth, his face and he's screaming “come 
on who wants it, come on next one”, and they thinking this is fucking cannibalism he's eating 
somebody, he's a different level of the game now. So it’s not just punching and knocking people 
out, he punching and biting peoples face off and he's standing screaming his head off “who's 
next?”, so I think that just sends a message through the whole rave. 
 
Introduction 
 
The next chapter of this series examines a setting where perhaps the greatest amount of 
psychoactive substances are consumed. Driven largely by commercial interests, the night-time 
economy is a place of consumption and hedonism that actively encourages the transgression of 
its clientele. The private sector largely controls the monopoly of violence in this sector by 
employing bouncers (door supervisors) to maintain order and keep the venues safe. The door 
supervisor is a job that requires the use of physical force and an ability to resort to violence 
when necessary. Because of this, people who are skilled in violence are often attracted to the 
role (Winlow 2001). Through the 1980s and 1990s, bouncers in Red City were typically local 
hard men, many of which originated from criminal family firms. Those from a criminal 
background were well suited to the role, due to their proficiency in violence and level of social 
status they carried within the local community (Hobbs et al. 2003). Yet with criminal actors 
populating positions of power, the night economy became a breeding ground for criminal 
activity to flourish. To resolve this, the government introduced the SIA licensing requirements 
so that all door supervisors would have to undergo a training program and be free of a criminal 
record to work legally (Pratten 2007). This was an administrative approach to reducing 
‘organised crime’ that attempted to bar criminals from working in this sector. Nonetheless, 
there remains little academic research in this field to assess the level of criminal activity today, 
particularly from door supervisors themselves. The following chapter provides an insight into 
the workings of the illicit drug trade within this sector, drawing upon fieldwork and interviews 
with bouncers and drug dealers. 
 
The expansion of the night-time economy has been an unrelenting force in the UK which has 
filled the gap left by deindustrialisation in major cities (Tutenges et al. 2015, p. 129). In light 
of this, the UK government has pursued a ‘liberal approach to alcohol and entertainment 
licensing… designed to attract mobile capital’ and future investment (Hobbs et al. 2000, p. 
704). This change is symptomatic of wider deregulation of businesses in the neo-liberal 
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capitalist era underpinned by an ideology of free-market competition and the drive for 
consumer spending. The use of recreational drugs within this environment is inextricably tied 
to this process (Ayres 2019). Alcohol is the most widely consumed drug in the club scene, 
which is largely responsible for increases in violent crimes and hospital admissions on the 
weekend. Excessive drinking culminates itself in a culture of intoxication that has sparked 
concerns in the media as a threat to the moral order and a drain on public services (Measham 
and Brain 2005). Indeed, perhaps the biggest difference between illicit drugs and alcohol in the 
night economy, is their legal status. 
 
On the other side of the coin, the regulation of security services in this sector has increased, 
aimed at curbing its most criminal and disorderly elements. Established with the legislative 
framework of the Private Security Industry Act 2001, the Security Industry Authority is 
responsible for regulating private security in the UK. The SIA is a nationwide body that 
replaced the ‘door supervisor registration schemes’ (DSRS) under one centralised system. The 
DSRS received a number of criticisms due to irregular licensing practices between local 
authorities and was in need of reform (Hobbs et al. 2003). The SIA has two key roles: ‘one is 
the compulsory licensing of individuals undertaking designated activities within the private 
security industry; the other is to manage the voluntary Approved Contractor Scheme, which 
measures private security suppliers against independently assessed criteria’ (SIA 2019, p. 1). 
The SIA thus provides a harmonised vetting system designed to weed out criminals working 
on the front line (as bouncers) or running security companies themselves. Those with a criminal 
record can still be granted a licence if a sufficient amount of time has passed since the offence. 
This system has been criticised, however, because criminal records do not necessarily equate 
to future offending, they ‘are merely presumed indicators of risk’ (Lister et al. 2001, p. 372). 
Having a criminal record or not, licences do not stop people from engaging in criminal activity 
once they have been granted, nor do they stop offenders setting up companies in other peoples’ 
names. Indeed, a review of the effectiveness of the SIA found ‘evidence of an organised crime 
threat being already evident in the form of shadow company directors, extortion and infiltration 
of legitimate operations’ (Home Office 2017, p. 10). In this respect, the licences may have 
more of a symbolic use in terms of showing that something is being done rather than enacting 
a positive transformation of the industry (Hobbs et al. 2003). It is within this liminal 
environment that bouncers enforce ‘their own informal and pragmatic techniques of 
containment which conform to the demands of commercial and cultural, rather than legally 
justified imperatives’ (Hobbs et al. 2002, p. 352). 
 
There are two primary ways that illicit income can be gained as a security provider in night-
time economy: 1) through the provision of security services obtained through illicit means 
(extortion) and 2) through the distribution of narcotics. In the first instance criminal groups 
may target specific clubs that are known to have weak security teams. They will send in their 
crew to cause havoc and assault the security staff with extreme violence. After having 
demonstrated their capability, they will then offer their services to the club in an attempt to 
replace the previous security providers (Hobbs et al. 2003). More pervasive criminal groups 
will provide security staff as well as controlling the drugs making substantial amounts of 
money overall. ‘Control the doors, control the floors’ is the expression used to describe this 
type of activity (Police Research Group 1998, p. 8). These criminal power structures are not 
always readily knowable to newcomers seeking to establish themselves, however, which can 
lead to disputes.  
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Ade - the Iranian ‘Mafia’ 
 
The following accounts are taken from Ade, who has been working in the security industry in 
Red City since the late 1980s. He has a deep historical knowledge of the sector, providing 
crucial insights into the changes that have occurred before and after the licences were 
introduced. Ade is tall and at the age of 50, is very muscular for his age. His English is excellent 
having spent most of his life in the country, but he still retains a soft Persian accent. Ade was 
originally born in Iran, but his family fled during the Iranian revolution with his father 
(Ebrahim), mother and brother (Kamin). Ade’s father was well respected in Iran; he was a 
professional heavyweight fighter, a ‘community man’ that resolved issues in his area due to 
the absence of protection from the state, something that is common in developing countries 
(Gingeras 2014). When the family arrived in the country, they had no money as their father 
had been conned by a trafficking group who had promised to send his savings. With destitution 
setting in, Ade’s father looked for work using the only resource he had, his physical capital: 
 
Ade: Ebrahim came from a different background so guys in Red City they see him as a father 
figure, as an older uncle because he didn't like criminal activity. But he was a tough 
dude, he came from old school background in Iran and to be a heavyweight fighter to 
get trained in Iran is a different matter. They give you a certain type of background, of 
both mentally and physically you be tough. So, he's got this mentality to him crime is 
hurting you and vulnerable kids, drugs, gambling, but fighting if you helping somebody 
else is not a crime. That’s not bad, that’s good to help the weak people or beat the 
bullies up, so some of the bullies must get punished. They believe in fear and control 
in the middle east they truly believe in punishment to the highest level, so for him 
security was perfect. 
 
Ebrahim found work in a local nightclub and quickly built a reputation for his fighting abilities. 
He set up a gym and before long people from all over the city were coming to him to resolve 
their disputes, even the local police. As in Iran, he commanded significant respect in the 
community. When Ade and his brother were old enough, they too became bouncers having 
been taught by their father to fight professionally from a young age. Although they never 
engaged in the drug market directly, they became mixed up with serious gangsters in the night 
economy who would draw on them for physical support. For Ade and his family, it was about 
respect, it was never about money, and if you were a bully or challenged their authority, they 
would come for you:  
 
Ade: So, we start having experiences with people out of town, people coming to these places, 
popular places and they don't really know who you are and they're young people so they 
come in with a lot of attitude and it's a club land, club world, so people drunk and 
intoxicated and they got drugs in them now. I think we were more looking for these 
type of people, because it gives you that challenge, you know the winning, you know 
it's a war so we get a buzz out of it. So, we start dealing with these people, fighting with 
these people. It got to the point we need to have protection now because they can't beat 
us physically, they gonna go get weapons. So, now they get some guns and come back. 
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So OK, that's like quite easy, we get some guns, so people around us they just got them 
anyway. The life becomes very, very dangerous now.  
 
Reputations must be established and reaffirmed, and they only travel so far. When people from 
out of town came to the clubs Ade’s crew frequented and worked in, they did not show them 
the level of respect they were used to and at times would challenge their authority in an attempt 
to construct legitimacy of their own (Lauger 2012).  Ade’s crew would use this opportunity to 
establish themselves as leaders through acts of violence. These encounters sent a message to 
both newcomers and locals, affirming their position in the social hierarchy. The escalation in 
violence led to an arms race, and their activities became deadly. Their willingness to literally 
fight to the death, however, earned them significant respect in the night economy and people 
enlisted them for help earning them contracts to provide security. Their reputation for violence 
was transformed into commercial value (Marsh 2016). In the early 1990s, a close family friend 
of Iranian descent was approached by someone running illegal raves out in the countryside. 
Like them, Zia was an expert in violence, but readily engaged in organised crime as an enforcer:  
 
Ade: These raves are all coming about, so they go up and next thing you've got twenty thousand 
people turning up buying tickets, it’s a lot of money to do that. So, they had to use 
different security teams from different parts of the country. The guy running the night, 
he got a couple of people who was sponsoring money into the raves, as you need a lot 
of money to set it up, so he was friends with them and they had a criminal background. 
All the money was coming from the top drug dealers they had a lot of money. In the 
rave days there is always drugs, there’s music, its outdoors, it’s in a farm, there’s a lot 
of drugs. The drug dealers come in; they selling the drugs from the south east, south 
west, up north, north west, all coming down to make money, there was a lot of money 
and cash involved so everybody was getting paid. The drug dealers come in to sell the 
drugs and it’s our job to stop it but they didn't know who these guys were (Ade’s crew) 
just a big group of guys walking around telling people what to do and what not to do, 
some of the other security from London see there’s an opportunity: we can let the drug 
dealers in, tax them, get the money out of them and allow them to sell it. 
 
The night economy is a place where illicit income can be generated but also laundered. Drug 
dealers can set up nights or entire festivals using drug money to pay for expenses. Not only is 
the cash cleaned this way, it is also a way to generate additional revenue. During my fieldwork, 
I also found accounts of drug money being laundered through bars; owners put money through 
their tills and write it up to their accountants as legitimate sales. The money goes in dirty and 
comes out clean. Cash businesses are one of the most common ways to launder money and the 
technique is relatively unsophisticated (Levi 2015). By placing a ‘tax’ on drug dealers instead 
of refusing them entry from the establishment, bouncers working at these events can also 
accumulate cash without having to directly sell drugs themselves (Police Research Group 
1998). If they catch a dealer that is not working with them, they can take their drugs and pass 
them on to the dealers who are:  
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Ade: So, Zia went and stopped some of these drugs dealers, they selling drugs and mugging 
people, and cos there’s a gang nobody have the balls to go to them and ask them 
anything or say anything. So Zia went in there with Ethan (who runs his own security 
company), so they go in he says “you can't do this”; he takes the drugs, and slapped the 
guy up not knowing these guys are connected to some of the security from London. So, 
these guys come over and they wanted to fight with Zia, but that’s what he really wants 
to start a fight just to make sure everybody knows, and he would just tell you straight 
“yeah my name is Zia and let’s get it on”. Now these guys from London are rough, you 
imagine ten big black guys all of them bodybuilders. So, Ethan is thinking “shit, we 
need to get some backup to deal with this”; they had no weapons. Ethan was only 
carrying a mag light, you know it was dark, in the field, Zia and leader of this crew are 
standing there. Zia pulls this mag light from Ethan’s hand, brings it up and smashes it 
down over his own head. 
 
Mark: Fuck. 
 
Ade: The blood starts flowing and he’s just standing staring with his hands out to the side, fists 
clenched, now this crew from London they thinking this guy is mad, you know he 
smashed himself in the head. And Zia just went for the guy, rushed him to the floor and 
the rest of the security they jumped on him tried to beat him from the back, now he just 
destroyed this guy that was under him. This guy was the biggest guy, the toughest guy, 
the leader of that gang. So, he just start demolishing this guy, he's on top of him, biting 
him, ripping his face to pieces so when he actually finished the guy just had bite marks 
all over his face, his neck, completely knocked out. So Zia got up he had blood all over 
his mouth, his face and he's screaming “come on who wants it, come on next one”, and 
they thinking this is fucking cannibalism he's eating somebody he's a different level of 
the game now so it’s not just punching and knocking people out, he punching and biting 
peoples face off and he's standing screaming his head off “who's next?” so I think that 
just sends a message through the whole rave. 
 
Zia’s capacity to resort to extreme violence in the face of adversity earned him a significant 
status in the criminal underworld as well as within the police force, and eventually found his 
way to an international most wanted list. Success in the underworld is often determined by 
violence or at least its credible threat (Gambetta 2009, p. 78). I was told that notorious gangsters 
of the likes of Paul Massey would not even look him in the eye when they were dealing with 
him. That being said, Ade’s perspective of Massey was somewhat different from those 
presented in academic literature (See: Varese 2017; Campana and Varese 2018). To them, he 
was just a low-level hooligan, and in Ade’s words, “not much to look at”. Eventually, Zia was 
deported from the country and now is responsible for coordinating organised crime in Spain 
after spending many years in a middle eastern jail. His tastes for violence, however, was not 
the only thing that made him successful; he was charismatic, intelligent and witty. As Marsh 
remarks; leaders of the underworld are men of ‘supreme confidence who possess a sharp, alert, 
and insightful mind’ (Marsh 2016, p. 190). Zia could settle disputes across the country without 
having to rely upon others for backup. According to Varese (2011), criminal groups can 
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struggle when migrating to new areas as they do not have their local resources at their disposal. 
Zia transcended this barrier by gaining the respect of local criminals and targeting those who 
were known to have a reputation. Those who defeat the toughest not only removes the 
competition ‘but advertises himself as an adequate protector’ (Gambetta 1988, p. 140). 
 
In the late 1990s, a well-known gangster from London by the name of Wyatt Douglas started 
to muscle in on the night economy in Red City with his crew. Wyatt engaged in a number of 
serious crimes, from kidnapping officials to trafficking drugs, but settled in the night economy 
extorting local clubs before setting up some strip clubs, brothels and a security company of his 
own. According to Hobbs et al. (2003), security providers can experience difficulty when trying 
to establish themselves in other cities where there is a heightened level of criminal activity  
(especially those that are attempting to provide a legitimate service). As outsiders, criminal 
groups can be easily pushed out by local criminals who have greater resources at their disposal 
(Morselli et al. 2011; Varese 2011). To overcome this, Wyatt targeted clubs that were not 
controlled by any of the major security providers and instead sought to make allegiances with 
them. He also buffered his crew with local security staff who already had ties within the city.  
An early Home Office report by the Police Research Group (1998) (conducted around the time 
that Wyatt moved into Red City) proposed a number of actions to reduce criminal activity in 
the sector. These ranged from the greater use of undercover officers, increased inspections from 
local authorities, and a split team of door supervisors from local and non-local sources. As can 
be seen, however, if the non-local security team is of a criminal background with significant 
force behind them, this can introduce problems where there may have been none previously. 
This report was written before the introduction of the SIA, which has a more stringent vetting 
system. Nonetheless, such criminal activity is still evident (Home Office 2017). 
 
When he arrived in the city, Wyatt became acquainted with Ade and his family and had a great 
deal of respect for their father. He was careful not to upset them, but an incident in a nightclub 
between Ade’s brother Kamin and Wyatt’s crew left Ade with a gunshot wound to his shoulder. 
Kamin had got into a fight with one of Wyatt’s gang not knowing they were his boys; they had 
never met before. Kamin called Ade who arrived on the scene within minutes, something which 
earned them the name ‘the Iranian mafia’, a title that Ade no longer takes very seriously: 
 
Ade: The guys on the street, because I had a lot of friends who go round with me, so they call 
us the Iranian mafia (laughs), you fall out with one the rest of them was gonna get there. 
And there was at the time honest to god we get nine guys in less than five minutes, be 
there and they will fight they don't care what the fuck is gonna happen, so it was a little 
bit tribal they were tribal, deeply rooted. That’s the way we gotta look after each other, 
nothing to do with the money or drugs or territory, it was just like “you disrespect us, 
you don't like us, you are bad, we are good, lets fight” it was as simple as that. 
 
Mark: Like a mafia is supposed to be like this big corporation, with loads of foot soldiers, right? 
 
Ade: Yeah, but with us it was all to do with friendship and love I remember me and Jahan, or 
Izad, or my brother Kamin it was different it was like blood. So, it doesn't matter if you 
get shot on the street that’s my blood so I could die for you it’s as simple as that no 
questions asked. Or with Izad it wasn't about getting paid or, he was just as friend, but 
he stood next me when it was happening. Six people with guns and you know they 
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letting off shots and one of them shot me in the shoulder, he said “I'm not going 
anywhere if we gonna die, we die together”, just purely because of loyalty and 
friendship and love. I love this guy I will die for this guy, simple as that, so that gives 
us an edge over Wyatt and the rest of the criminals out there because they were doing 
it for money. So the people who went round with these guys if there was no money 
there they would go home, they would go with the next crew “fuck it I'm not making 
anything this is stupid”, but my friend would go to jail because we were fighting 
because he wants to protect through friendship and loyalty and very old school tribal 
animal. 
 
The conflict between Wyatt’s crew and Ade’s family had been a case of mistaken identity. 
Wyatt was mortified when he found out what had happened and proceeded to pay the family 
to make up for the damages or risk his own life. Ade’s father had been making plans to hire a 
hitman from Iran to assassinate him but settled for payment. Ade refused to testify in court and 
informed the police it had been an accident but never revealed any names. The police made 
their assumptions and believed a turf war had broken out in the city between an Iranian mafia 
and a London gangster. The mysticism surrounding the event and the family’s reputation fed 
into policing intelligence. Officers from the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) strongly 
believed that Ade’s father was a ‘godfather’ and named him as such, a criminal patriarch in 
full control of all the criminal groups in the region with significant influence across the country. 
Indeed, the social construction of organised crime is heavily influenced by American cultural 
products (Hobbs 2013, p. 11). Iconic Hollywood movies such as The Godfather still find their 
place in the imaginations of the police and policymakers, an institutional dogma based on 
fiction. Like the Italian mafia, the families’ reputation exceeded its ability, but they definitely 
were no ‘paper tigers’ (Reuter 1983, p. XI). Nonetheless, even academics can make the mistake 
of likening their participants to fictional characters in this way. In Bacon’s (2017) UK 
ethnography of undercover policing, he used the pseudo names of several characters from the 
famous American TV show ‘The Wire’ (2002). 
 
Ade’s crew was bonded by friendship rather than enterprise, and this is what gave them their 
strength (Von Lampe 2016). Ethnicity did have a part to play, but not all members of their crew 
were from the middle east. Some were local hard men who trained in their father’s gym and 
ran security companies of their own. They were anti-crime, anti-drugs, but in their eyes, 
violence was not criminal, and their reputation was worth dying for (Marsh 2016). Perhaps the 
only person in their crew who has risen to the status of the mafia is Zia. After many decades of 
involvement in crime, he is one of the top players in Spain. Zia is worth many millions and has 
a fleet of foot soldiers at his disposal. As can be seen, violence and criminal activity was rife 
in the night economy during the 1980s and 1990s, but from 2000 onwards things began to 
change. 
 
Mark: From your experience, do you know is there, this sort of level of people coming into 
raves or wherever selling drugs or people trying to take money from people, crews 
coming down taking over, is that still happening or do you think it’s changed? 
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Ade: I think that’s all gone now, I think the game has changed, the technology now, so a lot of 
things that were happening in the 80s and 90s you would not get away with it now, 
purely because of the technology, so the police can actually it’s a lot easier than before. 
CCTV you know, smartphones, this has just changed the game, and I think the 
government realised we can't just let this go on because, I think the British government 
always had a different approach to organised crime, compared to Italy or compared to 
America. So, I think those days are gone because now they can catch you very easily. 
 
Mark: So now maybe it's just small local dealers who go in and sell a bit of drugs on a lower 
level rather than these big teams of people? 
 
Ade: Yeah and I think there's not much of it because the music scene has changed, so not 
because the promoters or the drug dealers changed the game or the police, the music 
scene has changed. People, they are not into these type of raves anymore; they moved 
on you know what the music scene is like it keeps evolving it keeps changing, so 
therefore, the game changes. But even festivals now, is a lot more organised, all the 
security they have to be, they clean up the security industry. This SIA came in and 
cleaned it all up, like it or not, it might be an element of making money for the 
government but they cleaned it up, you gonna get chucked out, you're gonna get a 
criminal background, so they pushed a lot of muscle out, and the clubs and the bars they 
don't really want people like that anymore. So, if it’s a security company sending 
someone as you know down Space (night club), you sending someone really tough big 
and they don't want it, call you there and then, take you off the door, and they would 
have someone normal small and polite, which is really good a lot better. It was awful 
what used to happen in the past, if you see this in some poor country then you think, 
maybe they don't know any better but not over here it’s just a bit weird.  
 
Ade linked the reduction of ‘organised crime’ in the night economy to three factors. Firstly, 
there is the relationship between surveillance and crime. Surveillance is a key characteristic of 
modernity. It is integral to the advance of disciplinary power and technologies of governance 
in developed countries (Ericson and Haggerty 2006). The UK has some of the largest numbers 
of CCTV cameras in the world, with estimates of around 1.8 million in 2011 (Gerrard and 
Thompson 2011). CCTV provides the police and the courts with evidence to convict criminals, 
making violent activity within the night economy significantly risky. CCTV can reduce crime 
by increasing the possibility that offenders will get caught (Phillips 1999). Studies evaluating 
the effectiveness of CCTV on crime rates have yielded mixed results, although, there does 
appear to be a positive relationship overall (Welsh and Farrington 2009). CCTV does not cover 
all areas, however. The doormen I spoke to were aware of blinds spots in their venue where 
they could assault people or engage in illicit activity off camera if they wanted to. Managers 
can also delete footage at the risk of the club losing its licence if the police feel it has been done 
deliberately. Ade also mentions smartphones which are part of the plethora of technologies that 
are monitored within the new ‘societies of control’ (Deleuze 1992). Smartphones have 
improved the police’s ability to track offenders and monitor conversations, although criminals 
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can resort to older models or use encrypted messaging services (chapter 7 discusses this issue 
in more detail). 
 
The second factor is the relationship between music culture and crime. Electronic dance music 
is both celebrated and produced by artists from the urban poor. These are people who have 
been disaffected by structural inequalities leading to increasing of crime and cultures of 
violence within particular music scenes (Evans 2006; Ilan 2012). The raves Ade mentioned 
mainly played Old School Jungle music which later spawned into Drum and Bass, UK Garage 
also became popular in the late 90s which has now been replaced by Grime and Drill music. 
Garage, in particular, became associated with high levels of violence and a number of popular 
artists were arrested for incidents involving guns and drugs. Garage was banned by the police 
from some clubs and festivals in the UK because of the level of violence at these events (Moore 
2002). The police can refuse to grant licences to music venues if they feel they are likely to 
attract crime. Something which may disproportionately affect the poor who celebrate these 
urban music genres. 
 
The last factor in his discussion was the introduction of the SIA licence, which he states has 
removed much of the muscle from the night economy. Bouncers who acquire a criminal record 
will lose their licence making violence or other criminal activity risky to pursue.  ‘Licences can 
be said to increase the accountability of those awarded them… as the possibility of having it 
revoked may be a significant threat to their livelihood’ (Hobbs et al. 2003, p. 107). Indeed, 
whilst many bouncers break the law on a regular basis, ‘legal sanctions are a real possibility 
that figure within members’ ‘systems of relevances’’ (Monaghan 2004, p. 475). Nonetheless, 
with levels of NTE-related violent crime dropping in the UK, establishments may have less 
need for hard men who may give their club a bad image. Nonetheless, I found that the majority 
of clubs still preferred these types of people, especially if they played certain styles of music 
or were located in areas where violence is prevalent. Furthermore, Space is a venue that has at 
a substantial amount of staff on at all times. Clubs that have a bigger security team can function 
with fewer hard men as they have the critical mass to resolve problems effectively (Hobbs et 
al. 2003). The reputation of one key actor can also be enough to carry the rest of team. From a 
personal experience of the field, I found that smaller bouncers, or those who cannot fight, are 
often down the ranks of the ‘door hierarchy’ (Calvey 2017, p. 130). There are some bars 
throughout Red City that employ one or two doormen that are not particularly capable when it 
comes to physical recourse. This may reflect the fact that the door staff are primarily merely a 
licensing requirement. According to Calvey, security teams are ‘biographically discerned in 
terms of personalities, characteristics and bodily types which are translated into broad 
categories of ‘talkers’ and ‘fighters’’ (Calvey 2017, p. 132). In places where violence is less 
common, there may be a preference towards the ‘talker’ type. Yet, looking physically 
intimidating can often resolve conflict before it escalates. 
 
Some bouncers with active criminal records still operate in Red City but under the guise of 
stewards. Stewarding is legal as long as there are enough bouncers to cover the number of 
clients in the venue. An old-school Jamaican bouncer from Drayton with a hefty criminal 
record for drugs, violent offences and firearms, works as a steward in a venue called The Pit 
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that has a particular drug problem. I personally witnessed him dealing within the venue. The 
use of stewards in Red City is fairly uncommon, however. Nonetheless, there are a number of 
bouncers who distribute drugs themselves, but this is uncommon, and their activities are often 
restricted to outside of the workplace. 
 
Since the ten years I have worked as bouncer, I did not hear of one instance of violent conflict 
between security companies other than petty altercations over personal disputes (although gang 
violence can be a problem). There were no attempts by any actors to take over another security 
firms’ doors. Stories of these acts were relegated to the ‘good old days’ where people were 
getting shot and the pay was much better. Most owners of security firms that were involved in 
crime have long gone straight and are now making a significant amount of money through their 
legitimate businesses. Nevertheless, when a new manager took over Space and wanted to run 
the club with a clean slate by replacing all of the staff, including the security, no other company 
would take on the contract. The Iranians had run the door for over two decades and the risk of 
going to war with them was not worth the money. Indeed, the ‘criminal legacy’ that these 
security firms have accumulated over the years has stayed with them (Calvey 2017, p. 131). 
The best the manager could do was get the designated ‘head’ of security to stand down, which 
at that time was me.  
 
Overall the night economy in Red City has gone through a partial civilising process reducing 
the violence, and the level of control that criminal groups have on the sector. The drugs are still 
there but are no longer being supplied, or illegally controlled, by bouncers to the extent that 
they were in the past. Indeed, ‘punters are increasingly cynical of door staff and such is the 
current availability of recreational drugs that they no longer need to buy them from security 
teams’ (Silverstone 2016, p. 148). It is important to keep in mind that bouncers are not the only 
members of staff capable of selling drugs. I have known DJs, promoters, bar staff, managers 
and even chefs to sell drugs in clubs, as well as pilfering money from the tills where there are 
cash payments for things like cloakrooms and entry fees. Additionally, night clubs are still 
subject to extortion, although this is less common. A discussion with Ade’s brother Kamin 
revealed that Wyatt Douglas had been receiving protection money from a few venues in the 
city in recent years. Wyatt took a step back in providing security in the form of bouncers and 
concentrated on making money through other means. The police finally caught up with him, 
however, and he is now serving a life sentence for his crimes. The remainder of the chapter 
takes a more detailed look at how dealers operate in the club scene today, drawing on fieldwork 
with Ryan (one of the lads) who now operates as an independent dealer.  
 
 
Vibes 
 
It was a crisp winter’s evening, and the frost had just begun to set. I exhaled a misted breath as 
I put down the phone to Ryan. There was a big night at Vibes, it was a Liquid Drum and Bass, 
which is very popular with the student crowd. Liquid had become mainstream as it was a little 
softer on the ears due to its smooth melodies than the Jump Up variety that is more common in 
the ‘underground’ rave scene. Vibes is a large venue that can hold thousands of people, but the 
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night was a complete sell out. I did not have a ticket, and the security was tight on the door, 
but I knew I could get in if I was smart about it. I donned my security gear and headed out to 
the club. It was just after 12 midnight when I arrived (a plausible time to have finished a night 
shift at an early bar). The bass rumbled up through the pavement in waves. The top end of the 
sound system had been filtered off by the club’s thick walls replaced by the white noise of 
hundreds of eager punters all gabbling at once. The queue seemed endless and bulged out, 
stretching the temporary barriers like an angry python trying to digest a live meal. I strolled 
right past it and approached the main entrance. There were at least 12 security guards managing 
the area, a sniffer dog was happily doing its job as a one of the team carried out body searches. 
Ethical dilemmas in the field relate to the amount of deception used to acquire the data (Adler 
1990). Considering the legal issues of observing illicit activity, gaining free access to a 
nightclub was the least of my concerns that evening. 
 
Mark: Alright, uh I’ve just finished work and I’m am trying to get hold of my mate do you 
mind if I come in?” (it was a lie). 
 
The doorman was an overweight Hells Angel with a stomach that protruded farther than his 
jawline. A faded dragon tattoo clawed its way from beneath his biker jacket as if somehow 
struggling for air. He looked me up and down and considered my request before another 
member of staff recognised me. I got the all clear but not before a search. The female bouncer 
crucified me over a loose multivitamin she found in my pocket “what’s this?” she barked. I 
would not have made a very good drug dealer.  “I like to keep healthy” I replied jokily “have 
you seen these abs?”. She was not amused but let me go. I popped my SIA licence into my 
pocket, pulled off my black hoody and wrapped it around my waist, revealing a light blue 
superhero t-shirt underneath. It would not have been much good hanging around with a drug 
dealer for the night if I looked like a doorman on shift.  
 
I made my way to the main room to be greeted by a wall of noise and a spectrum of strobes 
that cut through the darkened hall like razor blades. Two thousand clubbers raised their hands 
at the crescendo of the tune; there was a moment of silence before it dropped down into a heavy 
bassline that hit me in the chest like a pneumatic drill. The party was electric, and by the looks 
of it, half the people there were high on something. I peeled my way through the crowd and 
found Ryan at the ‘nos’ bar on the first floor. He was in fits of laughter after just inhaling a 
large nitrous oxide balloon, but it did not last long. The club had taken advantage of the 
loopholes in the law that enabled them to sell the drug without penalty. Nos canisters are cheap 
and can be bought for less than 50 pence each, the club was selling them on for £2 and was 
making a fortune. There were at least 10 bar staff vending the drug on a continual basis and 
even they could not keep up with the demand. There were more balloons in that room then I 
had ever seen at any birthday party.   
 
Nos can be sold legally for catering purposes, but dispensing the drug for human consumption 
requires a medical licence.  The argument that vendors use in this case is that they only sell the 
nos, they have no control over what people do with it after that. The fact that the club was 
readily dispensing nos into balloons might make one think differently. This was early 2016 
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before the Psychoactive Substance Act 2016 was introduced, but as I have witnessed, the club 
still sells it. A number of cases that have reached court since the act came into force have been 
dropped on the grounds that medical products are exempt from the bill, although, the UK 
government still asserts that this practice is illegal (Independent 2017). The selling of nitrous 
oxide is difficult to prosecute and when drug dealers have immunity, they become more brazen 
and will sell openly in public spaces. This is the perfect example of an open drug market: the 
only barrier to access was the entry to the club itself. Illicit enterprises operate across a 
spectrum of legitimacy; those closest to legality begin to operate much like legitimate 
businesses (Smith 1980). The single difference between the nos bar and the alcohol bar was 
the product on sale. 
 
Ryan is now in his 30s and has been selling drugs consistently since we had left Summer Park 
School. He wore a basketball vest that clung tightly to his muscular physique; it was evident 
that he had been spending a lot of time in the gym. Ryan was fully pumped from anabolic 
steroids with a little water retention in the face, a common side effect of the drugs (Evans 
1997). With a gold chain that glistened over his light brown skin, he looked as if he belonged 
in a hip-hop video and he embraced it. Like Max in the previous chapter, Ryan was very 
popular and pulled people in like gravity. The difference being is Ryan had a lot of respect 
from some unpleasant characters in the rave scene who would have robbed an easy target like 
Max if he crossed their path. Ryan was physically impressive and hyper-aggressive, making 
him a force to be contended with on the street. His chaotic personality that gave him his street 
capital was a significant barrier in other aspects of his life, however. Street capital does not 
translate well into the legitimate world of work (Sandberg and Pedersen 2011).  “You want a 
drink mate?” I asked. 
 
We took a stroll to the bar on the ground floor, and it was here that he was first approached for 
drugs. As we walked down the steps from the balcony, Ryan was spotted by a group of girls in 
their late teens. A confident brunette of skimpy dress scanned him over and figured he might 
be the kind of guy who could get them some drugs. As we passed, the two caught eyes and she 
beckoned him over with a wry smile and a tilt of the head. 
 
Girl: Hey, you know where we can get some Mandy? (MDMA). 
 
Ryan smiled back at her and paused for a moment before answering. I could tell he was flirting.  
 
Ryan: You can get it from me. What do you want? 
 
The girl turns to her friends and they take a moment to decide. 
 
Girl: Can you do us a gram in two halves? 
 
Ryan: Yeah I got that, it’s forty on the gram. 
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Ryan moves his body to the side putting his back towards the balcony to block the view of a 
bouncer who is overlooking the crowd. He nods his head as if he is enjoying the music and 
looks up to the main stage taking the attention away from his hands that move to a small pouch 
in his groin. He pulls out two small bags of crystalline powder and exchanges them for the 
money in a swift, single handshake. The deal is done.  
 
The main entrance to a club is the primary point of control for security staff, by minimising the 
number of potential troublemakers from entering, door supervisors can reduce the likelihood 
that problems will occur inside (Cozens and Grieve 2014). Door supervisors look out for 
customers displaying potential signs that they may cause trouble, or be in possession of drugs, 
whilst employing their ‘local knowledge’ of regular clientele that is built up over time (Hobbs 
et al. 2003, p. 127). It is much easier having to deal with someone on the door than having to 
evict them from the premises later on. Furthermore, the screening process is an opportunity to 
control the flow of illicit goods as people try to smuggle them in. If dealers cannot be caught 
at the entrance, the security will need to look out for signs that people are dealing inside. The 
sleight of hand and bodily positioning that Ryan employed is a form of risk minimisation 
known as ‘transactional mediation’: this is designed to camouflage the exchange of drugs from 
outsiders (Jacobs 1996). Drug dealing is a social performance that involves putting on visible 
fronts to influence observers (Goffman 1956). Whilst they may wish to hide their activities 
from some, dealers can intentionally display characteristics to send messages to others. The 
signal is sent with the hope that the receiver will attribute it correctly, although there is always 
the risk they may not (Gambetta 2009). The following account is taken from Max. After selling 
cannabis in his youth, he began to distribute MDMA and cocaine in clubs and on the street:  
 
Max: I always had an image a distinctive image so people would know who I was when I was 
out in the club, people would be like, “yeah that guy the one who wears the purple 
tracksuit with a flat peak baseball cap”, but then when too many people started to know 
about me I would change my style. I always had a definitive feature, a bit like a brand.  
 
To be competitive in the marketplace, distributors must be distinguishable from others. This 
allows customers to identify them as providing a particular service, which is useful for building 
a reputation (Aspers 2011). Max learned this early on and was key to his success. I was unsure 
whether Ryan had dressed with the intention of being seen as someone who had access to drugs, 
but clearly, people perceived him that way. Signs are different from signals because they are 
observable features that have no purposeful intention. They may be accidental or an 
unconscious characteristic of the agent (Densley 2012). The role of context is also important: 
if Ryan had been wearing the same clothes on a basketball court, there would have been little 
signs that he was a dealer. People build knowledge of their local environments and begin to 
trust that those within them will act in certain ways (Von Lampe and Johansen 2003).  
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The Stash 
 
To get drugs inside clubs that have a high level of security, distributors need to conceal them 
effectively. The stashing of drugs is an essential risk management technique, regardless of 
where drugs are sold. If a dealer is stopped and frisked, they need to ensure that the drugs 
cannot be found. Street level dealers who sell heroin and crack, for example, have been known 
to store their drugs in their mouth and will swallow them if approached by the police. The drugs 
pass through the body and can be recovered at a later time. When making transactions, the 
dealers will pass the drugs from their mouths to the customer who will follow the same 
procedure (Jacobs 1996). During my fieldwork, I found that this technique was restricted to 
crack and heroin retail. Drug addicts may not be as concerned by the fact that they will have to 
share saliva with their dealer and have little choice but to accept it because the technique is so 
common. For those who do not want to use this technique, they can stash the drugs on their 
body or have others conceal them and take the risk. The difference between nightclubs and 
other settings in this thesis is that searches in clubs can be predetermined. I asked Ryan how 
he got the drugs past the security on the front door. He said he had stashed the drugs in his 
pants, knowing the security would not search there. Apparently, the sniffer dog stopped him, 
but the drugs were too well hidden to be found. He told the door staff he had just come from a 
friend’s house who smoked a lot of weed so the dog must have caught the scent of it. It was a 
plausible explanation, so they let him in. Max, however, employed more sophisticated 
techniques: 
 
Max – I would modify my jackets so I could stash weed in the lining of my coat. I’d be stinking 
going into clubs and the bouncers would pat me down, but they couldn’t feel anything 
because I would put it right around at the back of my coat… It protected me from getting 
robbed. I had a hole cut in the side of near my inner pocket so it would look like my 
hand was going into my pocket to get it, but I was actually reaching around the back of 
the coat. When I was living in foster care, I would have to hide the weed from my 
parents and put it somewhere where it would mask the smell, so I chucked it in the bin 
under the bin liner and chuck a load of smelly trash on top of it. I figured the last place 
they would look for it was in the bin. When I was driving, I had a stash inside the car, 
I’m a meticulous planner, I like to be prepared for all possible outcomes. It was 
paramount that if I got stopped by the police and it was searched a copper wouldn’t find 
anything unless they had a search dog obviously. So, I modified a part of the car, I made 
a cubby hole. I had a secret stash. I modified the gaiter the soft bit around the gearbox. 
In another car I had, I modified a door panel so you could lift a bit of it up and stash it 
in the door. I loved doing this stuff and I would only show people who I really trusted, 
people talk. The more information people have about you the more at risk you become.  
 
Max relayed his methods with a broad smile and a glint in his eye. There is a creative element 
to selling drugs that is seldom talked about in academic literature. Devising clever strategies to 
hide drugs by manipulating the bodily and physical environment is an art form that Max clearly 
enjoyed. The stashing of drugs in vehicles is common at all levels of the supply chain. 
Nonetheless, by creating a hidden section in his coat, Max was able to stash his drugs whilst 
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maintaining easy access to them. For retail dealers making regular transactions, easy access is 
essential. His stash would not have survived a more thorough search, but door supervisors are 
limited in their powers and may have to search many customers during an evening. Thorough 
searches would slow down access to the venue, causing a loss of revenue for the club. In many 
clubs, the consumption and distribution of drugs is normalised (Sanders 2005), and an essential 
part of a customer’s evening (O’Brien et al. 2008). ‘Illegal drugs are then a central dynamic of 
the contemporary night-time economy with cultural products being moulded to complement 
their use, and the commercial viability of some dance-orientated venues being dependant on 
upon their chemically induced ambience’ (Hobbs et al. 2003, p. 227). This is a conversation 
taken from a doorman called Lenny who has worked in the industry for around ten years:  
 
Mark: How do you deal with the drug problems here at your club? 
 
Lenny: It depends on the venue. If you're in a small bar where it's an older crowd it's more 
about ensuring that you're following the regulations and there's no trouble. The main 
thing is there's no trouble in your bar and appear to be vigilant on drugs. In reality 
people still do it but as long as they're discrete and not causing problems, then it's not 
an issue for the individual at the bar as such. Whereas if you have some of the bigger 
clubs with the younger crowd, there's a lot more strict searching policy because they 
tend to not know how to handle the drugs (the users) and doing lots of different stuff, 
and then you get problems with dealers and trouble, so you're a lot more vigilant on 
that. There's a lot more potential trouble from it. 
 
Mark: Do you think the type of crowd maybe relates to the type of drugs they're taking or is 
that not necessarily the case? 
 
Lenny: I'd say if you're talking about small cocktail bars, cocaine use would be very high, but 
they're more discrete. They might be there drinking all night and not cause no trouble 
but drink away because they've used cocaine to stabilize them. If you go to big raves, 
you've got young people hitting it hard on all sorts of different types of drugs. Then if 
you go to the House (music) scene used to be a lot of people be more MDMA and then 
happier vibe, but then you might get people, certain bars or certain areas like Drayton 
smoking weed causing no trouble and being quite chilled. Obviously, they're less 
regulated because you won't be able to get away with that in a bar or club in the centre. 
 
There is a relationship between the use of particular drugs and different forms of music. 
MDMA is the drug of choice in the rave scene; it enhances the music whilst bringing on 
feelings of euphoria and promotes wakefulness, enabling clubbers to dance until the early hours 
of the morning (Ter Bogt and Engels 2005). The psychopharmacological effects of drugs are 
employed instrumentally to meet certain ends affecting patterns of distribution across the city 
and the clubs within it. The price of the drugs also has a relationship in this; high-quality 
cocaine is more expensive and consumed more readily by the middle classes who frequent the 
cocktail bars that Lenny was referring to. Bouncers differentially control drugs depending on 
the venue they are working in, the music that they play and the geographical location of the 
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club within the city. Indeed, knowing the ‘score on the door’ is essential to how bouncers 
manage drugs in places they are working; this includes ‘recognising and not stopping certain 
dealers endorsed by a certain gang affiliation’ (Calvey 2017, p. 136). In Red City, the city 
centre has the highest police presence at night due to the concentration of violence leading door 
supervisors to be stricter in their role. The consumption of drugs is relatively high in Drayton 
(inner city), and there are few officers on the street, so bouncers tend to give more discretion 
in clubs near this area. In one club that has a significant reputation for drug use (The Pit), 
dealing was actively encouraged. Wolf was a designated nos dealer who was allowed to 
distribute drugs of his choosing for a fee of £50 per night to the owner of the club. He was 
making thousands of pounds and was able to purchase his own property at the age of 24. He 
lost the house after being sent to prison for grievous bodily harm. He had got into an altercation 
in a nightclub and bit the guy’s ear off: 
 
Wolf: So, I went up and knocked on the door upstairs, on Jermaine’s office, massive, he’s like 
the black hulk, he looked across the table at my man and he was like, “what do you 
want”. I said, “uh you see the balloons, do you think I could come in and do the 
balloons”, he said “nah I got someone else doing it”. I said, “what is it the guy 
downstairs cos he’s not coming back next week, he’s done with it”, he took his glasses 
off and looked at me. “I tell you what yeah, get here next Friday at nine o’clock, give 
me fifty quid and sell what you want”. So, from where I was before to that moment 
there, that’s kinda like where it. 
 
Mark: Progressed? 
 
Wolf: That’s where it progressed, that where it went turbo. Having the green light to shot in 
the busiest club in Red City, to shot with security watching your back for fifty quid a 
night. And that’s balloons (nitrous oxide), Mandy (MDMA), Charley (cocaine), 
whatever everything and the balloons were the best seller. That’s when I started making 
thousands of pounds in a day. 
 
 
Discussion & Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the extent to which illicit drug dealing and extra-legal governance is 
present in the night economy, particularly since the sector has become heavily regulated. 
Secondly, it outlined how criminal actors from both within and outside of the security industry 
operate and interact. The introduction of SIA licences was aimed primarily at reducing the 
number of criminal actors working in the security services. Door supervisors have significant 
control in nightclubs, which can facilitate crimes if they originate from criminal backgrounds. 
The study found that since the licences were introduced, the hold that criminals have on the 
security industry has reduced. However, the illicit drug market is still thriving. Nightclubs have 
particular organisational features that enable and constrain criminal activity.  The most obvious 
fact is that they are confined spaces, controlled by private security, where people come 
specifically to get intoxicated. It is a setting where drugs are in high demand, which can be 
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easily capitalised upon by criminal groups, lone suppliers and also security staff. The divide 
between the criminal and non-criminal is less clear in the night economy as many legitimate 
actors benefit from the supply of illicit goods including the clubs themselves.  
 
The objective of both legitimate and criminal enterprise is to extract as much money as possible 
from these nights whilst ensuring they can continue to operate in the long term. For nightclubs, 
this means sticking to regulations, licensing requirements, ensuring the safety of their clientele, 
and maintaining a semblance of legality, even if drugs are widely consumed inside. There is a 
discretionary element in which certain venues will accommodate more drug use than others. 
This often depends on the type of nights they are hosting. The security in Vibes is extensive 
but their takings would be significantly curtailed if their customers were not able to consume 
drugs there. The fact that they have a nos bar indicates their stance on illicit drugs, even if they 
have sniffer dogs and bouncers conducting body searches on the way in. This informal 
acceptance of illicit drug use is a common feature of the night-time economy. Many door staff 
are not concerned if people use drugs, as long as they do not catch them doing it. The same can 
be said of people who are selling them, although dealing is less tolerated in most clubs in the 
city. If drug dealers can build close relationships with the door staff or the club owners, they 
are more likely to turn a blind eye. Bouncers who actively engage in the drug market, benefit 
directly from this and can gain a share of the profits that are made. Before the introduction of 
the SIA licences, the security industry was proliferated with criminal groups who orchestrated 
the supply of drugs. These groups have been replaced, to some extent, by a number of sole 
suppliers like Ryan, who do their best to distribute undercover. In this respect drug dealing has 
become more decentralised in this sector. Nonetheless, there are a number of bouncers who 
sell drugs in the city, but this does not mean they will do it on the job (although there are some 
that do). Those with active criminal records can still operate in the guise of stewards and there 
is little to stop security companies being set up in other peoples’ names. Others may have 
simply slipped under the radar and not been caught for their crimes. Drug money is still 
laundered into clubs on a regular basis by a variety of actors (promoters and club owners). 
 
Violence has generally declined in the night-time economy, falling in line with the western 
crime drop since the 1990s onwards. Whilst it is not possible to know the exact reasons for this 
change, it has been argued that security is largely responsible (Clarke and Newman 2006, p. 
220). Reductions in crime are a consequence of technological developments that harden crime 
targets, whilst improving the ability to catch offenders. Target hardening is argued to be the 
most significant factor of the two (Farrell et al. 2014). Ade’s discussion of surveillance 
validates this claim; however, he states that licencing requirements were also key. 
Administrative measures work symbiotically with technical developments to reduce crime 
rates. Nonetheless, these changes did not reduce the supply of drugs, although the market has 
changed. As extreme violence falls, the market is somewhat more civilised than it used to be; 
the territorial disputes between security firms are a thing of the past. However, the larger 
companies in Red City have long established reputations, which may have some explanation 
as to why no one has challenged their contracts through force. That is not to say that violence 
does not exist in the night-time economy, far from it. Over the last few years, there have been 
a number of drug-related stabbings in Red City, mirroring similar outbreaks in London 
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(Telegraph 2018). One of these resulted in the killing of a drug dealer leaving a club that was 
hosting a UK Hip Hop event. A genre which is popular with the urban poor. Target hardening 
has done little to address the structural inequalities that fuel violence within the sector. 
 
Lastly, formal social hierarchies are easily seen in this sector. Uniformed door supervisors are 
highly visible as well as other staff members who work within their allocated roles. Bouncers 
have a monopoly on violence and are responsible for controlling who is allowed into the 
premises, and in some places, who is allowed to sell drugs. Nonetheless, door supervisors are 
not autonomous and will work within the remit that is assigned to them by the managers and 
owners of the establishments. The informal structures of the underworld are less easily seen. 
They reveal themselves when people try to take up positions that are already established by 
somebody else. Newcomers trying to sell drugs within an establishment may cross paths with 
other crews leading to violent disputes as demonstrated in Ade’s accounts earlier in the chapter. 
The fact that these offenders are confined in these settings rather than when they operate on 
the street, makes conflict all the more likely. Ade’s crew’s power came from their capacity and 
willingness to fight. There were some incidents in which people could have died at their hands. 
It was only good fortune that had saved them. The reputation they culminated from this gave 
them considerable social status, which translated into economic gain. There are still those who 
seek out characters with this level of respect to run the security within nightclubs, particularly 
clubs that experience pressure from criminal groups and may be subject to extortion from 
gangsters like Wyatt Douglas. Even if people do have a criminal record, given time they can 
apply for a licence again bringing the status they accrued with them.  
 
  
 114 
7) Dealing in the ‘Virtual’:  
Emergent Technology, Drugs and the Internet 
 
Well the more branches you got of the tree I guess… The websites, all the IP addresses they 
are all like covert like the silk road… They have the servers in other countries so they can’t 
be traced… You know the people who run the website the people whose name it's in, is 
somebody that's nothing to do with us, they get paid they get a percentage, so that person 
gets a percentage off the sales and because obviously they are taking the risk. You know it's 
the same as what you'd do if you gave someone a cut off a crop of weed that you grow in their 
house… 
 
Introduction 
 
Having demonstrated how drug markets function in the physical world, the following chapter 
moves on to discuss the final setting of the thesis in which drugs are sold, the internet. ICT 
provides new modes of communication and buying platforms in which drugs can be bought 
and sold. It enables suppliers of illicit goods to conduct their business in ways that were not 
previously possible. Nonetheless, digital technologies can constrain human actions as much as 
they enable them. ICT leaves digital traces that can be monitored by the state. It is within these 
conditions of heavy digital surveillance that drug markets emerge. Indeed, contemporary drug 
markets are part of a long history of socio-technological developments that have reconfigured 
patterns of distribution in the city. It is this continuum that this chapter maps out. Whilst drug 
dealers may communicate online, they will still be present offline and will have to use the cities 
infrastructure to distribute their products. To adequately explain the ‘virtual’ requires equal 
attention to the physical world as well as the process in which these markets have emerged. It 
is through this attendance that future developments in the illicit drug trade can be anticipated.  
 
Indeed, the illicit drug trade is evolving quickly, with advances in chemistry creating a barrage 
of new psychoactive substances, whilst ICT provides means in which buyers and sellers can 
communicate and coordinate their transactions with relative anonymity over vast geographical 
distances. This evolution has been driven by the combination of evolving technologies and the 
need for protection and concealment from the law. Questions remain as to how vendors and 
actual or potential purchasers conduct their activities and communicate with each other within 
these circumstances. A central argument of this thesis is that rather than replacing traditional 
drug markets, ICT extends them (Lawson 2010; Brey 2017) into virtual domains, creating 
communication channels and buying platforms that alter power relations between stakeholders. 
Whilst also retaining elements of market territoriality. Studies of online drug markets are 
growing but largely due to their methodologies, tend to ignore the offline life-worlds of 
criminal actors who engage in them. By restricting the source of their data and analysis to the 
internet itself, criminologists provide a limited picture of the impact of emergent technologies 
in this field. The virtual does not replace the real (Woolgar 2002). This chapter aims to augment 
but also challenge this treatment of emergent technology, by shifting the analytical focus upon 
the principal actors and technologies that constitute these markets. It utilises ethnographic 
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fieldwork of manufacturers and distributors of illicit drugs operating in physical as well as 
virtual environments. 
 
 
The Digital Extension of Organised Crime 
 
The following section begins with a brief introduction of the impact of ICT on the illicit drug 
market over time. It draws upon the experience of criminal actors working with emergent 
technologies to demonstrate how they manage the associated risks of their activities whilst 
responding to the demand for their products.  
 
Organised crime is a market-based activity in which buyers and sellers interact to purchase and 
distribute illicit goods and services. Illicit drug markets have been variously characterised as 
being open, semi-open, or closed. In open markets, distributors usually operate from a fixed 
location, such as a street corner, and sell openly to most people wishing to buy their goods. In 
closed markets, distributors will only sell to trusted individuals who have been previously 
vetted. Semi-open markets fall somewhere between the two and relate to spaces such as 
nightclubs, bars or cryptomarkets. Before the emergence of ICT, transactions were made face 
to face through spoken communication. In this respect, it was important for drug dealers to be 
in an area where customers knew they would be. This mode of working was significantly risky 
as being in a fixed location made dealers easy targets for the police. With the advent of the 
mobile phone, distributors could be more mobile and arrange transactions in advance, leading 
to a more closed networked economy (May and Hough 2004; Wainwright 2016).  
 
As a conduit for communication, the mobile phone is an obligatory passage point (Callon 
1986), which restructured the drug market and shifted it into a less visible and less risky form. 
As Callon explains, technologies ‘transform the spatial and temporal settings in which 
collectives exist and act’ (Callon 2004, p. 5). Yet, whilst technologies can enable and enhance 
human capacities, they can disable and diminish others (McLuhan and Fiore 1967; McLuhan 
and McLuhan 1992). ICT leaves digital traces which may be accessible to the police, thus 
frustrating attempts for dealers to remain concealed. As digital technologies take a more central 
position in the illicit drug trade, then it is these technologies and their ‘trace data’ that become 
as, if not more, important sources of intelligence than their human counterparts. In this sense, 
the police have delegated tasks (Latour 1994) that were traditionally assigned to human 
informants to the technologies within these networks. To counteract these efforts, distributors 
must protect and stabilise their networks or risk prosecution.  
 
According to Hilgartner, risk is composed of socio-technical networks that link objects within 
them to harm. It is the relationship between elements within the network that lead to the 
construction of risk. Through such relationships, risks can be embedded in people, materials, 
technology or tasks.  These ‘risk objects’ must be contained or displaced from the network to 
avoid harms associated with the linkage (Hilgartner 1992). The following account is taken from 
an interview with Max, who has an extensive history distributing illicit drugs at the retail level. 
The discussion relates to issues in using mobile phones to coordinate drug sales:  
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Max: When I started back up again I was more clued up about surveillance, buying a sim card 
isn’t enough if you’re stupid enough to put your sim card from your burner in your 
contract phone the IMEI number would match up with it, so just being aware of the 
trail how a phone number can lead back to you. If you carry your contract phone around 
with you as well as your burner, they can trace it back to the cell sites, and they can 
show that both phones took exactly the same path, and it’s very hard to dispute you 
aren’t the same person. I always had two phones one phone for selling drugs and 
contacting my mates and another for contacting family and paying bills things like that. 
I had a clean phone for that stuff. I was always very careful about how I used the burner.  
 
‘Burners’ are temporary mobile phones which have sim cards registered with false names and 
addresses, making it difficult for police to link to a particular person (Salinas 2013). Drug 
dealers frequently swap their burners to evade wiretaps and the geo-location trails that can 
establish their involvement in crime and support successful criminal prosecutions. The 
international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) numbers that Max refers to are unique codes 
that are assigned to all cellular mobile devices to identify them. These codes allow signal 
towers to recognise devices in the service network and establish their geographical location. 
This information can help the police track criminals and prove their whereabouts in court 
(Bennett 2012). If distributors make the mistake of putting a sim card that is registered in their 
name in a phone they were using to sell drugs, the police can tie the sim to that particular 
device. Nonetheless, the monitoring of cellular devices can actually benefit criminals if they 
use them intelligently. Teeth created digital alibis by leaving his registered phone turned on at 
his home address whilst he went out about his business in the city. By using these methods, 
drug dealers are essentially blocking and subverting the process in which criminogenic 
information is digitised and monitored. 
 
The burner phones used by the offenders in this study were often first-generation mobile 
phones as they generate less data than the newer smartphones. Nonetheless, a number of dealers 
also used smartphones because they can provide an additional layer of anonymity through 
encryption. Smartphone apps that employ end-to-end encryption cannot be remotely accessed 
by the police. This will mean the police will have to get hold of the device and unlock it to read 
its messages. If a smartphone is locked with a password, it will need a specialist computer 
technician to gain access to it. According to Peter, the senior police officer in this study, it can 
cost the police around £1000 to unlock a single mobile phone, so they have to be selective 
about the devices they choose to access. If an offender has multiple mobile phones on them, 
the police will usually unlock the number of devices necessary to secure a conviction. This 
leaves a considerable amount of information unavailable. Facebook is also another platform 
that the police have issues accessing. Even if the police get hold of a mobile phone, offenders 
can simply log into their Facebook account from another device and delete all their messages. 
Facebook Messenger does not employ end-to-end encryption for text messages unless it is 
activated, however (CNet 2016). Charley, the steroid supplier in this study, makes all of his 
phone calls through Facebook to avoid the potential wiretapping issues of standard phone calls. 
Facebook does not record phone calls, and they are also encrypted so cannot be accessed from 
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their servers (Security Today 2018). According to Moyle et al (2019), communication via 
smartphone apps is now common in the drug trade. They are often less secure than drug dealers 
presume, however, which can lead them to share more information than they would have 
previously, inadvertently increasing risks. 
 
The police are not the only threats to distributors of illicit goods. The absence of formal 
regulation from the state creates a hostile environment which leaves vendors open to attack 
from other criminals on the street. Competitors may seek to gain control over access to goods 
and services, making business difficult to establish. Technologies can become targeted by other 
criminals who wish to dominate territories in which drugs are sold. The following example is 
taken from a distributor called Rocco describing his experiences retailing heroin and crack 
cocaine: 
 
Rocco: At the time we had it like, one area, literally lock down me and my mate, and then our 
other two mates had the other side on sort of like lock down as well, so if anything 
happened we'd go sort it. Literally there was a group of like ten-twelve of us all done 
little bit different bits and pieces but if something happened to one of our mates or 
whatever, you'd all be there and get it sorted so no one would fuck about. But I can 
remember one time the phone was going quiet and I was like “what the fuck how can 
it be that quiet” and he was like "oh yeah this kiddy” like's basically saying “fuck you" 
on about me, “he's gonna be taking over”. 
 
Mark: Your patch? 
 
Rocco: Yeah, that sort of side so, I said "oh right we will see about that". I tried stopping him 
in the car and he sprinted off and carried on doing his thing but we knew where he was 
doing it to. So I went round with a couple of mates went through the door with a fire 
extinguisher, I had a door brace, went in with the fire extinguisher, he's come running 
down the stairs just by the door in case anyone come. As he's come running down, 
smashed him on the head with the fire extinguisher and knocked him out. With that the 
two mates who I was with grabbed what he had there and a bit of cash and the most 
important thing I wanted was his phone. 
 
Mark: Yeah? 
 
Rocco: Cos obviously that's their line so they would have to set up and go round again. 
 
Distributors require significant social and material resources to control a drug market in an area 
at a given time. As Rocco explains, he was connected to ten-twelve criminal associates who 
could be mobilised when needed. This critical mass worked together to govern the local market 
to ensure their positions were upheld. By taking the dealers drugs and money he was able to 
recoup some of his losses, the physical violence was a further punishment and is one that sends 
out a message to deter others. By taking his phone, however, Rocco gained control over the 
network which would enable him to redirect the custom base within that geographical area. By 
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controlling the network, he was able to control the territory. As Graham (1998) asserts, “every 
social and economic activity is necessarily geographical” (Graham 1998, p. 175). It was the 
combination of actions that led to the maximum disruption of his operations. 
 
Rocco’s discussion demonstrates the growing importance of phone lines in the drug trade. 
Indeed, there are a number of cases in this study of active lines being passed onto other dealers 
to set them up and put them in business. In some cases, the entire business is passed on as the 
dealer moves out of the game, in others those higher up the chain may need new runners to 
take over the deliveries and will provide them with active phone lines to do this. The latter 
example is said to be common in the phenomenon of county lines: where drug gangs expand 
their operations into rural areas preying on vulnerable people as they go (National Crime 
Agency 2019). In a certain sense, it is the lines themselves that are as, if not more, important 
in holding the market together than the actors who operate them. When lines take precedence, 
the relationships around trust may begin to change, especially if a number of different people 
run a single drug line (or collection of lines) between them. In Red City, a group of Albanian 
cocaine dealers have begun to operate in this way. They will meet new and unverified 
customers on demand in the city centre within half an hour. To arrange a collection, the 
customer simply has to acquire the number, text their postcode, and the amount they require. 
The dealers respond by texting their estimated time of arrival and the type of car their runner 
will be driving “20 mins blue ford”. Texts are often returned to the customer from different 
phones lines signalling possible coordination between group members. Many drug dealers do, 
however, swap their sims and turn off their old lines regularly in an effort to disassociate 
themselves from the data they procure. They will send out messages to their network of 
customers on their new line to inform them of the change “new number Teeth”. If multiple 
lines are active and the crime group has a number of runners passing them between them, this 
may signal coordination rather than disassociation. It is possible that more sophisticated 
criminal groups will use both methods. The customer will still want to be sure that the person 
they are buying from is providing a genuine product, but do not need to know who that person 
is other than them being a delivery driver for that trusted phone line.  
 
From the buyers’ position, there is a shift away from individualised/interpersonal trust towards 
‘trust based on reputations’. Due to the stereotypical depictions of Albanian crime groups, there 
may also be an element of ‘trust based on generalisations’, which are commonly held 
perspectives on particular social groups (Von Lampe and Johansen 2004b). The seller, 
however, has no means by which to identify the intentions of the buyer; there is a complete 
absence of trust. In these cases, ‘the risks of co-operation are minimised by functional 
alternatives to trust in the form of precautionary measures such as anonymity and 
segmentation’  (Von Lampe and Johansen 2004a, p. 110). Overall this example demonstrates 
that trust between the buyer and seller is changing in contemporary urban environments due to 
the interrelationships between technological innovation, market opportunities, and policing 
pressures. 
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Surveillance & CCTV 
 
Coordinating drug sales via ICT is only one half of the process. Drugs need to be delivered to 
the customer, and this can be risky if done in public. It is also important to consider how drug 
dealers mitigate the risks of surveillance in the city from police officers and technologies such 
as CCTV. In the following example, Max discusses the techniques he used to conceal his 
movements in the city: 
 
Max: When meeting people either they jump in my car or I’d go into their house. I would 
always sell in a discrete place away from CCTV and somewhere no-one’s listening. If 
someone jumps in a car and they drive off it doesn’t look dodgy, but if they get in and 
get straight out again it looks dodgy as fuck. The same thing if people meet and they 
suddenly part ways like going into a house.  
 
To remain ‘invisible’ from surveillance organised criminals can operate under the cover of 
activity that replicates the activities of something or someone else. Drug dealers carry out their 
movements in ways that blend into the flows of city life (see chapter 6).  In this sense, there is 
a reflexive relation of ‘training’ (Goffman 1956; Foucault 1977) between the surveillant and 
the surveilled, between the human and the algorithm (Berry 2018). This reflexive 
responsibilisation of risk is an integral characteristic of ‘reflexive modernisation’ (Beck et al. 
1994; Lyng 2016) that has been transposed within the digital frontiers of the cities surveillance 
systems. As Amoore and Raley argue, “human and non-human beings are constantly attuned 
to novel events and features in their data environment, becoming perennially creatively alert” 
(Amoore and Raley 2017, p. 3).  
 
Indeed, the digital city is bound up in fine-grained monitoring and the predictive modelling of 
the actions and movements of its ‘citizens’. It is not the case that it is an ‘individual’, as in a 
single person, that is ‘targeted’ through various techniques and technologies in the Foucauldian 
sense (Foucault 1977, 2009). Rather, that what a citizen ‘is’ is the product of algorithmic neural 
network modelling and aggregation from which new indices of normality, deviance, and risk 
arise. These are then reapplied or ‘folded back’ onto, and into, the everyday lives of people. 
The ‘normal’ way to talk and walk, for example, is being built through digital modelling 
(Amoore and Raley 2017). These algorithmic calculations and statistical representations feed 
into policing techniques on the ground (Sanders and Sheptycki 2017). Following the positivist 
logic of evidence led policy, data is assumed to have value neutrality. Yet, techniques such as 
predictive policing target the usual suspects in poverty-stricken areas creating a self-confirming 
algorithmic bias (Hannah-Moffat 2018). Nonetheless, criminals are not passive to these new 
forms of digital monitoring and may seek to evade them. 
 
Max’s example demonstrates how offenders can subvert surveillance systems by either 
avoiding them completely or by masking their activities by copying the behaviour of other 
legitimate actors. Nonetheless, surveillance technologies are not restricted to the state and can 
be employed by criminal actors themselves. Perhaps the most extreme example of this in recent 
times is in the Guzman case, or ‘El Chapo’ as he is known. Joaquín Guzman Loera is a Mexican 
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‘kingpin’ who employed a computer technician to hack and monitor a range of digital devices 
that his associates were using (New York Times 2019). Without these technical skills (or 
contacts) it is unlikely that offenders would be able to monitor other people to this extent. 
Nonetheless, criminals can employ low tech strategies that do not require significant training 
to undertake (Berry 2019). The following example is taken from an interview with Liam: a 
licenced door supervisor who was providing private security for a small family firm. The 
family runs a number of brothels in a neighbouring city: 
 
Liam: We were looking after the house as in when people came we opened the gates, locked 
the gates, watched the CCTV, logged cars coming down the drive, because people had 
been there and tried to break down the door, like gangs of people and some people had 
been there with a gun before outside. They had been attacked ten times… Doors had to 
be locked at all times unless a member of security was there, cameras had to be 
monitored before doors were opened. If people, sort of, accidentally drove up the wrong 
cul-de-sac, the bloke would have a melt-down and think that he was about to get 
attacked. 
 
Mark: So you said they had about five brothels?  
 
Liam: Yeah, they had about five brothels, they had this mansion that had loads of prostitutes 
who were working there. 
 
Mark: So how come then all these people were pissed off with him? 
  
Liam: Because he is a complete asshole. He would tell everyone everything as well which was 
mainly his downfall. He told me on the first day that they had made seven million 
pounds in 3 years in cash... Well the first thing that happened that kicked it all off was 
a social media dispute between his wife and someone who owns another brothel. Two 
days later two black guys came around and beat them up, hit them with hammers and 
cable tied them up, stole their jewellery and the takings from one of the brothels, and 
said “if you ever say anything to so and so again, you're fucking dead”. 
 
The sex trade operates much in the same way as the illicit drug trade, although, the product on 
sale is different. Prostitution is illegal, as is pimping, leaving the market to regulate itself 
(Colosi 2010). Actors within the sex trade can come under attack from competitors or other 
criminal predators wishing to rob them of their assets. It is a highly lucrative profession, and 
significant amounts of money can be made from it. In the UK, the annual revenue produced by 
one female sex worker is estimated at £48,000 (HM Government 2013).  As the family could 
not rely on protection from the police, they hired private security staff to protect them. The fact 
that they lived on a council estate with high crime rates further exasperated the issue. CCTV 
was a significant tool in protecting the family. It allowed their establishments to be monitored 
at all times and worked as a screening device for people trying to enter their buildings. CCTV 
is a form of situational prevention that hardens targets and acts as a deterrent (Hayes and Downs 
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2011). Nonetheless, surveillance does not only benefit those wishing to protect themselves, it 
can also be used to provide information on the very targets themselves: 
 
Mark: So did you have any issues when you were there looking after the house, were there any 
incidents?  
 
Liam: Yeah there was a drone flying above the house, which to me and the other guy, meant 
was people looking at the house to see if they had money there. They are gonna be 
parked in a car around the corner, they are going to see if there are security here to 
break in. I found out that the drone belonged to one of the stepson's ‘friends’, and it was 
kinda weird because the stepson had high functioning autism, and it felt like his friends 
were using him, because he would always have brand new Mercedes and motorbikes 
you know. Because his parents (brothel owners) gave him everything he wanted 
because they had so much ready cash. 
 
Mark: Sure. 
 
Liam: The guy who was doing the security beforehand, they hired this guy who was full of 
shit, he was big fat bloke and he had the local thugs looking after him. He's like an ex-
marine but I've spoken to a lot of my friends who are proper close protection guys, ex-
forces, and he's a joke to them. But he talks the talk. But he was like, heating up the 
situation and scaring them, and he said that he had information from his informants that 
some people were gonna come and rob them. 
 
Mark: Oh right. 
 
Liam: And they were like, “what do you mean? We need to know who the informant is” and 
the informant ended up being someone who was working for them as security anyway, 
cos they have security in the brothels and this bloke had been fired because he had gone 
to collect five grand and apparently his car got nicked so they fired him. Anyway, the 
police came round and they found a car full of people, balaclavas and baseball bats just 
around the corner. So they were obviously gonna come in and try and rob them. But it 
also could've been that this bloke was setting things up like that, because these people 
in their house were scared, they were such cash cows for him. I honestly believe it was 
that. He had got the local scallys to come round with baseball bats and balaclavas. 
Because he was charging about £250 per man, maybe more than that a day. But this 
guy was paying his guys £120, so if he had two blokes round there he was making £260 
per day, 7 days a week. Plus he had people doing cash collections that were paid £80 
pounds a collection. So he was probably paying them £50 and taking £30, and other 
services. He also had people working in the brothels as doormen, they were getting 
paid. 
 
Mark: Ah, he was getting a lot of money for it. 
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Liam: Cash money, yeah. So it served him well to have those people shit scared. 
 
Mark: So you think that maybe it was some of the thugs he knew that were flying the drone 
maybe? 
 
Liam: I know it was the thugs, I know it was some local drug dealer. 
 
Criminal groups provide services that are in high demand and often cannot be found elsewhere. 
Protection services are needed where state control is absent and where people are at risk of 
attack. In some cases, however, criminal groups can create the conditions for which their 
services are required by creating the demand themselves. The Italian Mafia, for example, have 
been known to extort local businesses through blackmail (Sergi 2017). If their protection fee 
is not paid, business owners would risk having their premises burned down by the very people 
said to protect them. This type of extortion is much more overt as the clients know they are 
being exploited. A more sophisticated way to do this is to create conditions of demand without 
the targets knowing who is responsible. In this respect, criminals can maintain a positive profile 
and be seen as helpfully providing a useful service for their clients.  
 
Unmanned vehicles create a layer of anonymity as the people controlling them can hide from 
view whilst ensuring they stay within an operable range. This has enabled drugs to be smuggled 
into prison without having to rely on human actors to get them past the perimeters (Ralphs et 
al. 2017). Drones may also have cameras installed, which criminals can be used to survey 
properties if they are planning a robbery. The previous security member that the family had 
employed was well connected with criminal actors in the area. It would not have been difficult 
for him to create the conditions in which his services were required. By paying someone to fly 
drones over the property, a high level of fear could be generated, with very little effort or risk 
of being caught. 
 
Counter-Surveillance 
 
With the proliferation of digital cameras being installed into many mobile devices, taking 
photos and recording videos has become a normal part of daily contemporary life. Videos and 
pictures posted to social media can also go ‘viral’ as they catch the attention of other users who 
repost them. This can create problems for official actors if they are caught on camera acting 
nefariously. Indeed, the public can use digital cameras to record the police to make them 
accountable for their actions (Wilson and Serisier 2010). This is known as ‘counter-
surveillance’ and is a form of resistance to state control (Monahan 2006). There were a number 
of cases of CCTV cameras being employed by the offenders in this study to monitor the police, 
although, for them, counter-surveillance was primarily about reducing risk. Criminal actors can 
employ surveillance technologies to monitor their associates, the police, or anyone else for that 
matter. The following example is taken from my fieldwork with Mat, an ex-doorman who has 
an extensive history distributing a range of illicit substances:  
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I first met Mat when I was working on the door in Space (night club) as a bouncer. The firm 
who employed us would put certain members of staff on rotation and post them at different 
venues throughout the week. Some doormen are better suited to certain clubs, so this enabled 
our boss to find suitable venues for his staff. On the weekdays Mat was on rotation but on the 
weekend, he worked at Sensation: a lap dancing club that paid protection money to Wyatt 
Douglas who would be seen frequenting with his crew on a regular basis. I had worked their 
myself and hated it as they only had one member of security on shift at all times. This would 
mean spending long boring nights on the front door letting in groups of guys who caused a 
nuisance by touching up the girls. Touching was not formally allowed, although, for the right 
price, the girls would cater to their requests. Working a ‘one-man door’ is also considerably 
risky when it comes to dealing with violence. Mat, however, was infatuated with the girls and 
started a romantic relationship with a stripper called Eve. The money he made from being a 
doorman was not enough to meet her lifestyle, so he started dealing M-Cat after the drug had 
been classified. The two broke up after Mat found out that she was working as a high-class 
escort on her days off and was having sex with her clients. To get this information, he installed 
key-logging software on her laptop that recorded everything that she typed. He gained access 
to her email accounts and social media, where he acquired proof of her activities.  
 
One night I decided to pay Mat a visit after I had finished my shift at Space: he was working 
at a hotel lobby until early morning. Mat was going through a bad time and needed to talk. 
Unfortunately, Eve had finished her shift at the same time and was on a warpath. She stormed 
into the lobby and started screaming about some private pornography he had filmed of her. She 
was concerned that he would post it onto social media in revenge: a phenomenon known as 
‘revenge porn’ (Kamal and Newman 2016). Eve picked up Mat’s brand-new £1000 laptop from 
the front desk and smashed it hard onto the floor. Her dainty stilettoed shoes stomped it into 
the ground with pure rage as the keys flew off like shattered teeth. Mat picked up the dying 
machine and cradled it in his arms, tears streaming from his eyes, “Bitch! You broke my 
fucking laptop”. With that, Eve lunged towards his face with her long sharp ruby red 
fingernails. Mat lifted the machine in defence and brought it down hard across her skull. 
Computer-based shrapnel filled the room as the laptop exploded like a hand grenade. I realised 
I needed to step in as someone was going to get seriously hurt. I pulled the two apart as he 
dragged her into the bathroom to flush her head down the toilet. Fortunately, the lobby was 
empty.  
 
After the break-up with Eve, Mat got heavily into drugs and eventually got caught leading to a 
spell in prison. When he was released, he had few legitimate opportunities available to him. 
He began selling drugs again but put a number of measures in place to reduce the risks of 
getting caught. One of which was CCTV. The following example is taken from an interview at 
his home: 
 
Mat: All the cameras here, basically have them set up. So they're on motion detection. If 
someone comes to that front door knob I'll see. If the police knock the front door, if 
there's one or two coppers, they're probably just out to chat to you about something. If 
the one that you've got stood at the door by himself and the other one he was down in 
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the car, they just come to ask you a question, “mate have you done this?” or “do you 
know so and so?”. Like fucking, in the case of like, you might’ve threatened someone, 
“can you leave them alone”. Just to give me a polite warning. If they show up and 
there's four of them, and there's a van outside, you know they're pretty much coming to 
arrest you for something. So when they're coming to arrest you for something, you gotta 
be careful. You gotta make sure there's nothing around you. Because you don't wanna 
get pulled in for threatening to punch someone's head in and then fucking got a load of 
drugs on you. And then you end up on a drugs charge. The same as anything else. 
 
Mat used the cameras in his property to buy time if the police came to knock at his front door. 
This would enable him to dispose of any drugs he had or escape through the back of the house 
if he wanted. On one occasion five police officers came to his address looking for one of his 
associates who had a warrant out for his arrest. Mat turned the police away and posted a video 
of the incident to his social media account. A whole discussion broke out online from a number 
of his peers who joined in to mock the police. Virtual environments provide a space in which 
criminal communities can come together to share information, symbolically resist police 
control or get vengeance on their peers through posting personal details (or videos). Digital 
cameras form part of an assemblage of surveillance technologies (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) 
that can be appropriated in these virtual environments. The downside for criminals is that the 
police can use social media to gather intelligence for themselves. It is in this digital arms race 
(Ekblom 2017) between the police, offenders and other offenders that the drug market evolves 
and takes its form. 
 
In the above example, we saw how Mat was able to hack into his girlfriend’s computer using 
keylogging software to gain information on her whereabouts. Counter-surveillance is not 
restricted solely to visual monitoring and can also be employed through ICT. If offenders can 
tap into the communication networks of the police, they can gain information which can enable 
them to avoid the law on a more long-term basis. Hacking into policing networks may require 
significant technical skills to achieve, although, offenders could employ more low-tech 
strategies to do this. The following example is taken from an interview with Teeth who 
discusses his techniques whilst operating as a car thief: 
 
Mark: Can you tell me a bit about the technology, I remember seeing you using the police 
scanner before, how did you get the radio frequency? 
 
Teeth: It was different back then. This was when the police were using analogue radios. Now 
it’s all digital so you can’t do it. We used CB radios and you could leave them on to 
scan and they would find the police frequency. The police would change the frequencies 
all the time, so this was the only way to do it. But the scanners didn’t play a big part in 
the drugs, we used them mainly when we were stealing cars. So what we would do is 
when we were doing a job we would leave them scanning and when the police would 
come into the area we would pick them up. I would have someone on a lookout and if 
he heard any reports for cars come in at the address we was at we would know about it. 
The police didn’t know that we had scanners see. So we’d get on the phone and call 
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them, we tell them we’ve seen this big black bloke whose beating the shit out of this 
poor white lady a few blocks up. We make it sound really bad. Soon as they hear that 
the police get diverted and it gives us enough time to finish the job and get away. I 
knew this yardie fella, I would put the parts through him to be sold out of the country. 
 
Not only was Teeth gathering information about the whereabouts of the police, but also 
provided disinformation about bogus crimes to draw them away from the crime scene. 
Someone who is being seriously physically assaulted would likely make a greater police 
priority than car theft. Teeth’s misinformation also drew upon racial and gendered police 
prejudices to further increase the priority of the call. The response is structural in that the police 
follow clear guidelines on how to prioritise their resources, and cultural whereby motives to 
respond are also guided by institutional norms and values (Bacon 2017). When actors 
understand how social institutions and their systems work, they can attempt to influence the 
behaviour of the people within them to secure desired outcomes. In an era of ‘fake news’ 
disinformation and propaganda, this process is becoming more fine-grained as citizens leave 
digital traces of their lives on the internet which become targeted by interest groups aiming to 
control their decisions (Lazer et al. 2018). Without straying too far from the point, we can see 
how offenders could influence state actors by providing misinformation and monitoring their 
networks. The police, however, now use encrypted digital radios to resolve issues of 
eavesdropping and stop offenders from illegally accessing their networks. Journalists have 
suffered in this respect and have to rely on insider information or monitor social media to find 
the whereabouts of police raids and crime scenes (Ellis and McGovern 2016). 
 
 
Virtual Markets 
 
As drug markets move online, they become reconfigured once more. The most significant 
change is that suppliers and customers do not meet face to face (in most cases). Transactions 
are made online using digital currencies, and the drugs are sent in the post (Hillebrand et al. 
2010). This means that controlling and building a local custom base becomes less important 
for suppliers as drugs can be delivered to people across large geographical distances, from a 
single fixed location. Cryptomarkets anonymise stakeholder activity through the TOR browser 
which bounces digital communications through various relays across the world. Online drug 
markets are generally less violent as distributors identities can be concealed (Aldridge and 
Décary-Hétu 2014). It is not always necessary to use the darknet to distribute drugs 
anonymously online, however. Various techniques can be employed to anonymise the identity 
of distributors whilst allowing them to operate websites openly on the clear net that can be 
accessed by anybody. Charley, for example, works for a small illicit company that distributes 
steroids in this manner. Pharma-Labs distribute their products internationally and take around 
a million pounds in sales per year: 
 
Mark: Do you think there's more risk going online, does that create more risk or do you think 
it's less risky for getting nicked? 
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Charley: Well the more branches you got of the tree I guess… The websites, all the IP addresses 
they are all like covert like the silk road… They have the servers in other countries so 
they can’t be traced… You know the people who run the website the people whose 
name it's in is somebody that's nothing to do with us.They get paid they get a 
percentage, so that person gets a percentage off the sales and because obviously they 
are taking the risk. You know it's the same as what you'd do if you gave someone a cut 
off a crop of weed that you grow in their house… 
 
Mark: So with your mates or whatever, you notice any violence or any disputes with any other 
people?  
 
Charley: Uh no, I mean there's people I know, on social media, you know sort of slagging the 
products off, because they are selling other products there's a lot of forums, people go 
on and slate certain things. 
 
Mark: So is it like a rating system or? 
 
Charley: Well there’s certain labels, pay people to do social media to go on forums yeah, I 
know people who get paid a thousand pound a month. 
 
Mark: To like slag people off and stuff? 
 
Charley: Yeah to slag off all the other products and rate theirs, yeah don't take this that's fucking 
shit, I made some really good gains with this one blah blah, and get a thousand pound 
a month what they do is they get people who are known in the industry to do it, like 
good bodybuilders you know, I'll give you a grand a month just go on this website and 
tell them our product is mint. They do that with you know you put David Beckham on 
a Pepsi advert it's the same principle. 
 
Steroids carry softer legal penalties for distribution and can be acquired for personal use in the 
UK making sales difficult to prosecute against. Operating on the clear net widens the potential 
scope of sales, as more people can access the website. Measures were, however, put in place 
to protect the identity of the core members of the group by hiring a technical specialist who 
runs the website on their behalf. Even if it was possible to get through the digital layering 
process employed by the specialist and identify who was running the site, the core members of 
the group would remain protected. Unless, of course, their facilitator chose to give up their 
information (Dorn et al. 1998).  
 
The anonymity of the internet creates new problems for distributors as it allows others to 
compete in the virtual space without fear of violent reprisals. In this environment, distributors 
compete for customers by providing a superior service (at least as their customers see it) and 
building their brand (Aspers 2011; Aldridge and Décary-Hétu 2014). Websites on the clear net 
are different from cryptomarkets as they do not usually have the same ranking systems in place. 
Instead, suppliers rely on written feedback on user forums to build positive reputations. Those 
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with greater resources can employ well known respected actors in their field to promote their 
goods. In this respect, the illicit market begins to resemble the licit one; the major difference is 
that these sites are illegal and cannot go to the courts for dispute adjudication. This creates 
further issues if customers do not pay for their goods or competitors copy and counterfeit their 
brand.  
 
A common scam which customers can employ to get free products is a credit card chargeback. 
Once the goods arrive, the customer contacts their credit card company and states that they 
have not received an item they paid for; it is then down to the company to prove otherwise. 
Illicit enterprises may encounter additional risks from refuting this claim as they are forced into 
contact with legitimate actors who may question their line of business. Furthermore, if the 
customer is not in the local area, tracking them down in person may not be easily achieved. 
Even if it were, online distributors have other options available to them. Customers give up 
some form of personal information to buy the drugs and have them sent in the post. Distributors 
can use this data and post it to online forums to name and shame the transgressor. The following 
example is taken from a ‘scammers list’ on Pharma-labs forum: 
 
 
Bryan Renolds Scammer from Brighton 
 
Package was sent 06/03/18 but could not be delivered as no one was at address, royal mail left 
collection card. This scammer immediately issues a charge back from his credit card and has 
the cheek to slag us off online saying his products were not sent. 
 
Bryan could have emailed us for the tracking number instead he is BANNED and is indexed 
online as a steroid scammer. Well done Bryan… 
 
Bryan Renolds  
13 Grenfell Street 
Woodingdean 
Brighton 
BN2 8TL 
bryanrenolds@emailme.com 
https://www.facepageuser.com/bryanrenolds84 
 
 
Image by Gujjar (2016), (all data has been anonymised following ethical protocol) . 
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In the example above, it is possible that the collection card went missing leading the customer 
to assume it had not been sent. If that was the case, he could have avoided being listed if he 
had contacted Pharma-labs for the tracking details of the parcel. A more likely explanation is 
that he received the collection card and issued the chargeback with the plan of picking up the 
goods without having paid for them. With his details listed online, anyone who searched for 
him would have been able to find where he lived, what he looked like, and that he was a user 
of steroids. This could be devastating if a vigilante took it upon himself to take action against 
him; it could also deter prospective employers who undertake background searches on potential 
employees. In this respect, distributors attempt to erode the reputational trust of actors to 
dissuade people working with them in the future (in both criminal and non-criminal networks). 
Here we can see that the anonymity of the internet changes the power relationship between 
buyers and sellers, largely in favour of the latter group. Having personal details placed online 
is a powerful deterrent that identifies transgressors in their very homes. Technologies create 
folds between time and space that redistribute presence and absence (Callon 2004). Whilst 
Charley’s team was not physically present in Bryan’s local territory, they had, nonetheless, 
been able to penetrate these boundaries through this virtual form of panoptic surveillance 
(Bentham 1798).  
 
 
Distribution 
 
Online distributors typically use postal services as this enables them to get goods to customers 
at a distance without having to meet them in person. In virtual markets, transactions are carried 
out online, but the drugs and the customers exist in the physical world. Getting products to 
their destination can create problems for vendors as they are forced to use the physical 
infrastructure of the city and interact with members of the public. The following example 
demonstrates some issues relating to using postal services to distribute illegal goods: 
 
Mark: How’s business? 
 
Charley: Things are hot at the minute there’s a month long internal investigation going on at 
royal mail, they are looking for drugs so we can’t send anything out. It’s cost me a 
fortune.  
 
Mark: How did your mates (bosses) find out about this? 
 
Charley: Another online distributor told them and gave them the heads up they know people in 
royal mail so passed on the information. Well, they actually bought an entire post office 
to stop people asking questions.  
 
Mark: Wow. 
 
Charley: Obviously it’s a big risk if I post stuff with this is all happening so I don’t know what 
we’re gonna to do about it. 
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Mark: So have you put it up on you website that you are closed for the moment? 
 
Charley: I don’t know what’s going on with that, the guy in China who runs the website doesn’t 
like to close it because, if he does that, he won’t be making any money and he’ll lose 
out. I can’t use Royal Mail and using a different courier is too risky, I’ll have to wait it 
out. (Looks distressed). 
 
Distributing drugs by post creates risks, as postal workers may ask questions if people are 
sending suspicious packages or are using their service on a regular basis. To resolve this, they 
can be paid off and corrupted. Indeed, there have been a number of cases of drug-related 
corruption in Royal Mail over the years (Independent 2015). Charley informed me that he used 
a small local post office and paid them additional money to stop them from notifying the 
authorities. The example of the online distributor who bought an entire post office branch 
demonstrates the lengths that suppliers will go to protect themselves and the amount of money 
that this type of business can generate. Criminal agents mobilise actants into allegiances, 
extending their relational networks, to achieve their aims (Callon 1986). As the business grows, 
it becomes more integrated with the legitimate economy as it becomes more reliant on its 
services (Von Lampe 2015). Most significantly, this example demonstrates that the local 
dimension of organised crime is as important as ever. Virtual platforms may extend the 
geographical boundaries of illicit markets but the actors within them still operate in a local 
manner. Making allegiances with local service providers is no less important than the virtual 
markets themselves.  
 
 
Manufacture 
 
There is a growing trend for domestically produced drugs in the UK. Advances in technology 
shrink supply chains by making it possible to localise the production process. Domestic 
production reduces the costs of distribution and the risks of being caught, as drugs are 
manufactured much closer to their consumers. Indeed, technology provides both the knowledge 
and tools to produce illicit goods. The internet is a vast repository where people can find 
information on almost anything. Anyone looking to grow cannabis, for example, can find 
everything they need online to successfully cultivate the drug (Wax 2002). This also applies to 
other drugs as is demonstrated in the example below, Sam is a bodybuilder who frequented 
bodybuilding forums on a regular basis: 
 
Sam: I became a member, an active member, a very active member in fact. After a while, after 
sort of a few thousand posts, I sort of built up trust with the members there even though 
I had never met them. I was approached by the owner of the forum and he asked me to 
do some administrative duties for him, moderating the forum. Uh and I got promoted, 
when I was promoted I got access to a secret area of the forum. The secret area of the 
forum was where all the suppliers would discuss business. I got put in touch with a 
source from China who, had a range of steroid products for sale. It was the raw 
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testosterone powders which would need to be synthesised into the final product. On the 
website there was complete guides and tutorials on how to make it yourself, so it’s safe, 
sterile, pure… you need a few precursors, grape seed oil, benzyl alcohol, benzyl 
benzoate... I used the anabolic steroids on myself that I had made, I injected them and 
I had good results. 
 
Trust is an essential requirement in the illicit drug market (as it is in most markets for that 
matter). There is little to stop actors from passing on information to the police, or the police 
posing as criminals themselves. This is not to mention the difficulties distributors have in 
protecting themselves from robbery or ensuring debts are repaid. In such a high-risk 
environment, stakeholders must build levels of trust to ensure that co-offenders are reputable 
(Von Lampe and Johansen 2004b). Trust facilitates social ordering by ‘providing the cognitive 
and moral expectational maps for actors and systems as they continuously interact’ (Barber 
1983, p. 19). What is interesting about Sam’s case is that he was able to build trust with 
members of the forum without having met them in person. Sam informed me that he had 
purchased steroids from other members who sent them to his home; he also invested many 
hours talking on the forum about his personal life and training protocol. In this respect, he was 
building a digital representation of his life that influenced the other members. Having invested 
his time there, the owner approached Sam directly and asked him for his help. This 
demonstrates that trust on internet forums follows much of the same social conditions as it does 
offline when people interact face to face. Connected co-presence (Pellegrino 2011) can be 
enough to establish criminal cooperation in virtual environments.  
 
Having gained the trust of the owner, Sam was invited into a private area of the forum where 
he gained the contact details of individuals who sold high-quality precursors at a relatively low 
price. This sensitive information was kept secret from other members of the forum who were 
not trusted enough to be given clearance. It may also have been used to stop competitors from 
gaining access to their suppliers in order to maintain a comparative advantage. The secret area 
can be described as a spatial mechanism for controlling access to certain aspects of the 
distribution network as market territories are re-established online, “Rather than simply 
substituting or revolutionizing the city… the evidence suggests that new technologies actually 
diffuse into the older urban fabric offering potential for doing old things in new ways” (Graham 
1998, p. 173). With the correct access, the forum provided all the information that Sam required 
to manufacture anabolic steroids for himself. He had complete control over the production 
process, which enabled him to ensure the drugs were not adulterated and were correctly dosed.  
 
If illicit drugs become easier to produce for personal use this could benefit society by reducing 
the number of criminal actors in the supply chain; it would also mean that drugs would be safer 
for consumers reducing the risk of adulteration and drug-related deaths from overdose. Such a 
scenario could become a reality with advances in technology, such as 3D printers (Schubert et 
al. 2014). Scientists have also found ways to synthesise opium from yeast (Galanie et al. 2015), 
which could one day replace the international trafficking chains that are common today. Local 
manufacturers would need to access other precursors, however, which could pose problems if 
they are tightly regulated. ‘Economics does not begin with the allocation of scarce resources, 
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but rather with their localisation’ (Callon 1990, p. 152). If illicit drugs do become readily 
available at low costs, it may lead to higher levels of problematic drug use.  
 
 
Discussion & Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter, as outlined in the introduction, is to examine the relationship 
between technology and organised crime. It questioned how buyers and sellers of illicit goods 
coordinate transactions within conditions of heavy digital surveillance. Having examined these 
accounts, the chapter demonstrated how security problems have evolved with emergent 
technology rather than being made obsolete. Organised criminals are learning to subvert 
surveillance systems and use these data sources for their own ends. Moreover, as technologies 
take a more central position in criminal networks, they too can become targeted by predators 
who wish to gain control of the networks they occupy. This process has reshaped the structure 
of the illicit drug trade, amplifying its associated harms in some cases and diminishing them in 
others.  
 
There exists a continuum between the analogue and the digital in which traditional forms of 
organised crime are enhanced by emergent technologies but also reconfigured through their 
application. Rather than replacing the physical territories of the terrestrial city, ICT extends 
them with the effect of re-orientating the geographical movements of human actors as they 
interact with and within them. In the UK, Media attention has recently focused on a spate of 
knife attacks that were carried out in London between rival gangs. It is said that these attacks 
took place after arguments broke out on social media (Telegraph 2018). The brothel owner in 
this study who had a dispute with another madam provides a similar example. ICT enables 
criminal actors to communicate in new ways which can compound disputes as rivals seek to 
gain dominance over both virtual and physical territories (as well as the technologies within 
them). Smart-phones provide the most significant development in ICT due to their ability to 
communicate through a variety of applications and internet platforms. 
 
Relationships around trust are beginning to change as digital networks, and online 
environments take precedence over the human actors who operate them. At the street level, 
phone lines are a glue that holds the market together and have the potential to generate 
considerable amounts of money for whoever owns them at a particular time. Customers aim to 
ensure that the products they buy are of a certain standard and a reasonable price. This does 
not mean they need to know the identity of the person distributing them. In this sense, trust is 
placed in the reputations of the business (phone line or website) rather than the individual. 
These new relationships around trust relate to a change of practice driven by technological 
developments, in which distributors attempt to conceal particular elements of the enterprise 
whilst broadening the custom base. Such ‘anonymous’ markets have not replaced traditional 
ones but operate alongside them and may depend on where in the distribution chain they are 
located. Buyers purchasing small amounts of drugs for personal use may not be concerned if 
they do not know the personal identity of their supplier. Those purchasing wholesale amounts 
may want more assurances than a good reputation. 
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The internet has created a virtual space in which illicit goods can be bought and sold but this 
development is far from over. Virtual reality (VR) technologies further transform our 
relationship with time and space and are becoming more affordable. Questions remain as to 
how buyers and sellers of illicit goods will respond to and interact within these new virtual 
worlds. It is possible that dedicated marketplaces will emerge like those currently seen on the 
darknet. Alternatively, suppliers may seek out virtual environments where potential customers 
are likely to visit, such as in virtual nightclubs. There are already cases of people consuming 
drugs in VR (Techradar 2016), which may have serious consequences if they overdose in an 
isolated location. People may be connected in the virtual but absent in the real. Nonetheless, 
offenders who make use of these virtual environments will still have to use the cities 
infrastructure and forge links with local actors, which is important to recognise.  
 
Whilst technology has significantly altered the drug market, it is not the only factor in this 
change. A closer inspection is also required of the institutional effects of policy and policing. 
Policy differentially affects forms of organised crime, as is evident in the more open nature of 
the anabolic steroid trade. By legalising or decriminalising certain substances, the arms race 
may begin to slow as criminal opportunities are removed. The government can regulate illicit 
drug markets before they spiral further out of control, especially as technologies such as 3D 
printers which can manufacture drugs and weapons become readily available. Ultimately, 
efforts to resolves these issues must span across both virtual and physical dimensions to be 
effective.  
 
The chapter contributes to the growing embryonic of research on emergent technologies, which 
are present in the broader ‘STS turn in criminology’. In doing so, it demonstrated how territorial 
space can no longer be conceptualised solely in terms of the physical built environment. 
Criminologists must consider the interdependencies between physical territory and digital ether 
to understand how it is that illicit markets now function. Technology both shapes and is shaped 
by human action in ways that cannot always be predetermined. Simple technological fixes are 
not likely to resolve vulnerabilities in the city considering this fact. Criminal entrepreneurs will 
continue to innovate in response to technological change. This thesis strongly argues for greater 
use of traditional ethnographic methodologies to bolster research in this field. Methodological 
innovations in online social research cannot replace conventional offline methods but can 
complement them. This chapter is a step in this direction but has only touched upon the crest 
of these technological developments. It is hoped that such work will be taken up in the next 
wave of science, crime and technology studies (SCTS), as far more research in this field is 
required. 
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8) Exit: Kill My Name; The Road to Desistance 
 
I haven't seen anyone for the past ten years as I completely detached myself, but these guys 
were older and young and fit and strong. I was a little kid and they were putting it on me. So, 
when they putting it on me, it wasn't a case “oh I'm going to come past here tomorrow with 
fear”, I'm going to go deal with it. So, I would come back with my dad and my brother, everyone 
else would come. Every time problems got solved. You are rewarding your brain with success 
from removing the problems then you building a character. Once your character gets big then 
you gonna have to continue with that and there is a sense of anxiety “if I don't deal with this 
they think such and such of me”, so you are living with other people’s perception. That’s why 
I think for myself personally, to kill my name was one of the most important parts of change. 
 
Introduction 
 
The final analysis chapter returns to the topic of the life-course to discuss the exit stage of the 
journey: desistance. Desistance from crime has become a particular topic of interest to 
criminologists, the police and policymakers, due to the significant social and financial gains 
that can be made from it. For effective programmes to be put into place requires an 
understanding of the processes and mechanisms in which change occurs. Yet, research on 
desistance in organised criminals is relatively limited. Furthermore, as offenders become more 
proficient at crime, they can avoid arrest creating inaccuracies in studies that rely on official 
data sources. This chapter aims to remedy these issues by examining the desistance accounts 
of the criminal actors in this study, some of whom do not have criminal records. It demonstrates 
how offenders strategically select market opportunities, position themselves within their 
networks, or desist entirely, to reduce the risk of prosecution. It examines the relationship 
between settings, social networks and group dynamics, providing an important contribution to 
the knowledge base. 
 
Engaging in criminal activities on a long-term basis can create significant problems in life, 
whether or not offenders are prosecuted for them. The majority of the participants in this study 
expressed a wish to leave their criminal careers behind and partake in a ‘normal life’. A life in 
which they can have a well-paid legitimate income, be a responsible citizen and settle down 
with a family. The dream of the ‘good life’ is an ever-present object that sadly is not often 
realised for many within this study. Structural inequalities can bar even the most good-willed 
citizen from ever achieving their goals, and for those with a criminal record (or a bad 
reputation), finding a good career can be all the more difficult (Denver et al. 2017). Crime can 
come at a cost to offenders that at times, may never fully be repaid, but there are some who 
come out the other side with significant financial gains. The proceeds of crime can be 
reinvested into legitimate pursuits which, if successful, can provide a clean source of income 
and a way out if their origins are undetected. In some cases, the life of crime is sustained for 
many years, as actors find more efficient and less risky ways of working the game (Ouellet and 
Bouchard 2017; Gundur 2019). 
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Studies into the criminal career suffer from an actor orientated approach in that they do not 
consider the life course of criminal organisations themselves (to the extent that such 
organisations exist). Does organisational breakdown affect the criminal life-course of the 
people within in it? Do they desist from crime or seek out other criminal associates to continue 
their work? Developmental and life-course studies, in general, do not consider the effects that 
close criminal ties have on the life-course when actors within the group decide to desist. It is 
possible that desistance can have a ripple effect leading to chains of desistance, as pro-social, 
anti-criminal behaviours are adopted. Research has demonstrated that distancing oneself from 
pro-criminal peers facilitates desistance (Bersani and Doherty 2018), but what happens when 
peers decide to desist but do not leave the group? The chapter proceeds by examining the 
narrative accounts of offenders who have desisted from crime, as well as those who have honed 
their skills to reduce risks. It outlines the pressures that criminal groups have on offender’s 
ability to desist, as well the structural, social and situational effects, that restrain their choices.  
 
 
The Iranian ‘Mafia’ 
 
At the time of writing, Ade and his brother Kamin are fully reformed. They no longer engage 
in any violent activity, nor do they willingly associate with any active criminals. Some of their 
old criminal associates are still active, whilst others have moved on and away from crime, or 
out of the city. A few of their old contacts are no longer living, having been shot dead by rival 
gangsters due to drug-related disputes. Perhaps the most prolific criminal associate from their 
past who is still active to this day is Wyatt Douglas, the gangster from London who muscled 
in on Red City’s night economy. Wyatt is responsible for the extortion of local businesses, has 
ties to illicit drug trafficking, and collects money from over half of the brothels in the city. Ade 
and Kamin are no longer in contact with Wyatt but are aware of his activities through their 
social networks. 
 
The brothers’ path to desistance from their life of organised, instrumental violence, was not 
straightforward and evolved slowly over time. Perhaps one of the most significant events that 
led to the brothers changing their lifestyles was the dissolution of their crew. In an unexpected 
turn of events, their father travelled home to Iran and did not return. Wyatt Douglas had been 
paying the family protection money for his part in the event that got Ade shot (see chapter 6). 
Now that their father had left, he decided to stop making payments:  
 
Ade: The guy was paying the money starts missing the weeks, and from one week to two 
weeks, then pay a little here little bit there. I just thought I can't let this happen cos now 
this guy is actually waiting for the opportunity to see if you are acting weaker. So, I 
knew I want to get paid, but I don't wanna start a war cos now this is very, very 
dangerous. This is the time now that I was with my wife and my mum, she's not well. 
Not dealing with my dad's leaving she's really down, she's got depression. So what 
happened I said to the middle-man “look he promised me and my dad, to pay this money 
because we couldn't find the other guy” (Wyatt’s henchman who fired the shot) “he put 
his hand up, he said to settle the score “I'm gonna do this”, “but now he thinks he can 
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get away with this, because my dad's not here, but it's nothing to do with dad. When I 
was there, fighting against him, when I got shot my dad wasn't there. I went there on 
my own… But, if the last thing I'm gonna do that's him. I'm gonna change the story, 
and I will go against him because it doesn't matter how many people he's got, he's gonna 
bleed just like me. He's breathing the same air as me. There's no ‘S’ on his chest, so 
therefore he's gonna get it. It doesn't matter”. So, he passed it on he said “look, you 
promised” and he's a nice honest guy he's an old dude (the middle-man) and he just 
went to him and said “look you said you were gonna pay, I don't know what he's gonna 
do. That's what he's saying” so the guy he come back one night, two, three weeks after, 
he come up and said “he wants to come up and to pay, to pay it all”. 
 
Mark: Right. 
 
Ade: Pay the whole thing off, shake hands and we move on, and I was like “ok fine”. So, he 
came up and he actually paid me the money and he said “you know, shake hands and 
this is what I promised so I deliver it”, so I was like “yep thank you very much it's all 
forgotten, this is what happens on the street, it stays on the street. Well thank you”. 
 
The loss of a leader can be one of the most significant threats to a criminal organisation. With 
the leader removed, the level of social control and influence the group has over criminal 
networks within their area can decline (Tafoya 2014). Competing criminal actors may try to 
capitalise upon the loss by attacking and dismantling the remainder of the group. When news 
began to spread that their father would not be returning to the city, Wyatt had assumed that 
Ade’s crew had been weakened to the extent he could stop making payments. Yet, Ade and 
Kamin embodied the same values as their father and had enough respect and violent capital to 
ensure their positions were upheld. As Winlow argues: 
 
“the cultural importance of violence, reputation and violent reputation are 
exceptionally strong among active criminals and ‘hard’ men alike. In some 
instances, the maintenance of honour supplants all other concerns” (Winlow 2001, 
pp. 44-45).  
 
If they had not risen to the occasion, it could have led to further disputes with Wyatt and others 
later on, as their credibility would have been diminished. Nonetheless, Ade explains that this 
was an important time in his life as he had recently been married, with his mother also in need 
of care. Ade began to take family matters more seriously and decided to move away from the 
life of violent crime. The police had also put significant pressure on him regarding the shooting, 
and he feared he might end up in prison. They attempted to turn Ade informant but had little 
success as he abided by the ‘code of silence’ (Bacon 2017, p. 165), “what happens on the street, 
it stays on the street...”. His brother Kamin, was much slower to change, and pulled Ade back 
into disputes on a regular basis: 
 
Ade: Kamin’s behaviour, because Kamin going out and getting drunk and having a party, 
fucking around with the girls, continuously on a weekly basis, fall out with people and 
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if he couldn't handle it and beat them up. He was doing it left right and centre, and then 
you would get stuck or you would want to push it even further. So, he'd call me and the 
people that were around me three or four guys they like, totally loyal and you know 
stand next to me no matter what, they would come with me… It got to the point, 
overtime you would see my truck would pull up. I had one of these big trucks, American 
truck, I had one of these all tinted out windows with big wheels pulling out, jumping 
out with baseball bats and beating people up on the dance floor, whilst other people’s 
watching. This was like it could blow up like a bomb, so you see that truck's anywhere 
that means there's a fight, someone’s gonna get beat up. It got to that point, so I was 
like “Kamin this is madness, you cannot do this in England”. 
 
Ade and Kamin’s crew is defined here as a small family firm. They had a number of blood 
relatives, associates of Iranian and Caribbean decent, and local English hardmen in their group. 
According to Lester (2003), organisational breakdown is the consequence of the politics of 
power. Organisations go into decline when actors within them become more interested in 
pursuing their own goals rather than the goals of the group. The first step in this process for 
Ade and Kamin was the loss of their leader, their father leaving. Secondly, Ade began to 
dissociate from the firm’s mission - to help the community, beat the ‘bullies’ and ‘squash’ 
people who challenged them through force. Kamin began to take the violence aspect of their 
mission too far and lost sight of the core values of the group. Ade saw that there was no positive 
purpose in his brother’s actions, so set about getting him to change. Desistance, however, 
involves both internal subjective change as well as situational, contextual change (Bersani and 
Doherty 2018). The people in their social networks saw them in a particular light and associated 
them with their actions. They had developed an identity that was restricting their ability to 
move on, and it was this that needed to be reconciled: 
 
Mark: Were these disputes always in clubs? 
 
Kamin: Anywhere it could've been anywhere, I mean initially it was tough the areas we were 
in, but I can remember up by my street these guys they standing, older guys sixteen 
seventeen. They grown up, I'm like "man"… I haven't seen anyone for the past ten years 
as I completely detached myself, but these guys were older and young and fit and 
strong, I was a little kid and they were putting it on me. So, when they putting it on me 
it wasn't a case “oh I'm going to come past here tomorrow with fear”, I'm going to go 
deal with it. So, I would come back with my dad and my brother, so everyone else 
would come, so every time problems got solved. You are rewarding your brain with 
success from removing the problems then you building a character, once your character 
gets big then you gonna have to continue with that and there is sense of anxiety “if I 
don't deal with this they think such and such of me”, so you are living with other 
people’s perception. That’s why I think for myself personally to kill my name was one 
of the most important parts of change… 
 
Mark: How do you think being like that benefited you, what did it do for you if anything, what 
were you getting out of it? 
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Kamin: I think generally life makes and breaks itself, I think you get attachments and 
detachments, sorry connections and disconnections. Coming from Iran suddenly from 
a good sort of childhood, although, I was exposed to seeing fights and how to deal with 
things, I had a big disconnection that was a start of a big problem in a vulnerable age 
thirteen, so disconnection. Gave me identity that’s an answer, power gave me identity 
and you can see it in a winner’s society. Powerful guys they getting certain type of 
looks. 
 
Mark: Popularity? 
 
Kamin: Popularity. Popularity with girls was there. I mean if you are on top of your food chain 
with anything you gonna get type of girls. Within the night clubs I think it is not 
particularly good environment. Nightclubs depth of it, looks glamorous and everyone’s 
happy, but there’s an edge to these guys and there’s a mystery to these guys, 
everybody’s talking about these guys (their crew)… Girls look for security, it’s a form 
of security, power, isn't it you know. It’s a false one, but yeah there was a lot of girls 
around me. I think genetic looks helps massively, but there was ugly guys, they was 
getting the same amount of girls. They were part of the crew, we were popular, it's a 
status. Yeah, I think you nailed it on the point, it is the status and the depth of it, the 
flip coin, I think it is status anxiety, that’s what’s driving you to do it more and more, 
because if it drops you have to top it up… 
 
Indeed, ‘perceptions of honour are strongest in those who see themselves through the eyes of 
others’ (Winlow 2001, p. 44). Moreover, Kamin was not the only actor of this type in the club 
scene, which ‘has long held an allure for ‘glamorous gangsters’ who seek to display their power 
and notoriety’ (Hobbs et al. 2003, p. 89). Because of this, he was continually getting into violent 
disputes to maintain his honour and social status. In regard to change itself, Kamin explains 
that in order to move forward, he needed to ‘kill his name’. Kamin had appropriated this idea 
from the Iconic Hollywood movie ‘Gladiator’, a favourite of his that he watched repeatedly. 
He had likened himself to the main character, Maximus, a freedom fighter who was hugely 
popular and a hero to the people. The Roman emperor Commodus had wished Maximus’s 
death but knew he would become a martyr if he did not discredit his reputation first: “You have 
a great name. He must kill your name before he kills you” (Gladiator 2000). Watching this 
Movie, Kamin realised that his reputation was a significant barrier to change. People were 
treating him in a certain way based on his reputation, and he was conforming to their 
expectation of him. Goffman makes this argument: 
 
“When an individual projects a definition of the situation and thereby makes an 
implicit or explicit claim to be a person of a particular kind, he automatically exerts 
a moral demand upon the others, obliging them to value and treat him in the manner 
that persons of his kind have a right to expect. He also implicitly forgoes all claims 
to be things he does not appear to be and hence forgoes the treatment that would 
be appropriate for such individuals” (Goffman 1956, p. 24). 
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Kamin wanted to transform his reputation but in order to do so he had to change the definition 
of the situation through the way he acted. This was difficult as he had become addicted to the 
lifestyle. He was addicted to the hedonism of the party, the attention of the women, and the 
respect and status he received from being the man he was. By identifying that he needed to 
change, there was a shift in his sense of self that no longer accepted his ways of being. This 
resulted in affirmative action and a reputational shift in his social networks, later down the line. 
However, as Campbell and Hansen (2012) found in their study of drug traffickers, desistance 
is not always enough in the long term. The community may define the person for their past 
actions and continue to treat them as such, which can pull them back into crime. Indeed, a 
number of people who have seen me with Kamin in the field commented on his capacity for 
violence, reflecting on things they had seen him do many years ago - “yeah that guy you were 
with, he doesn’t fuck around does he…”. Fortunately, Kamin has now completely reformed, 
but it took him many years in which he relapsed multiple times as he continued to frequent the 
club scene. Nightclubs are settings in which different criminal actors from within and outside 
of the city converge and collide (see chapter 6). Over time he began to change the way he acted 
when socialising or working in nightclubs, as well as going out drinking in them less 
frequently. A key factor in reforming his character was the help he received from a clinical 
psychologist at the behest of his brother. Indeed, it was his brother’s change of character that 
led to change within Kamin.   
 
 
Simon 
 
The following account was provided by Simon, a retail cocaine dealer and classmate of the 
lads from Summer Park School. Like the lads, Simon was introduced to drugs in his early 
school days and became a heavy user of cannabis. He eventually went on to retail powdered 
cocaine for his brother Derrick, who had been introduced to dealing by their father Josh. 
Intergenerational transmission among organised criminals is common (Spapens and Moors 
2019). Josh has recently been released from prison after serving a five-year sentence for 
conspiracy to supply Class A drugs. Derrick was the first of the two brothers to distribute 
cocaine, building up a substantial custom base, and was the ‘go to’ supplier for many users 
across Red City. Derrick took a step up from the retail side after he was hospitalised with severe 
head injuries following an altercation in a nightclub. He had gained enough money, contacts, 
and reputational trust, to purchase drugs at the wholesale level, which enabled him to increase 
his revenue whilst reducing the frequency of his sales. Higher earnings per criminal act are 
associated with lower rates of arrest (Ouellet and Bouchard 2017). Having built up a substantial 
custom base, he offered the retail job to his brother. He set Simon up with an active phone line, 
a consignment of product, and a set wage of around £2000 - £3000 per week for making the 
sales.  
 
At the time their father was arrested, Simon received a phone call from one of his crew 
informing him to get rid of the drugs as the police would be due any moment. When conducting 
raids on criminal groups, the police try to simultaneously coordinate their actions so that 
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information does not spread before other teams get to their targets (Bacon 2017). However, the 
deterrent effects of these raids on the drug market is limited (Sherman et al. 1995) and mainly 
symbolic (Coomber et al. 2017). Simon was lucky that there was a delay in the response. He 
had managed to stash the drugs but left seven thousand pounds worth of cash at his house that 
he could not account for. His dad lied to the police and told them it was his money and his son 
was only storing it for him. Simon got off with a fine and community service and closely 
avoided electronic monitoring and curfew. It was important for Simon to avoid being put on 
‘tag’ as he could not have continued running the phone line with it on. Simon is an attractive 
man and confident with women. He seduced his solicitor and began sleeping with her. It was 
his solicitor that managed to get his sentence lightened by pulling in favours at court. Whilst 
he was under investigation, the phone line was taken away from Simon as it was deemed too 
much of a risk. This was his first attempt at getting a job and going straight, although it did not 
last long: 
 
Mark: What were the main reasons for you leaving your jobs in the past? 
 
Simon: I think, lack of interest and seeing that I can get better money. Leaving for the 
opportunity of doing the phone again. You know I got arrested, my house got raided, 
not due to me but due to like the kind of ring where I was living. So, I had to stop doing 
the phone just in case. 
 
Mark: Yeah. 
 
Simon: I was being watched. I was under investigation. So, I stopped doing the phone and that 
really hit me, I was like, “I need the fucking money”. I was on like three grand a week 
to earning fuck all you know. Then I tried to get a job, then I was like “this ain’t 
working” so I begged and begged and begged to have the phone back. Then I got the 
phone back cus I really wanted it and I got the phone back to earning, going back to 
what I was earning before, earning nothing to then. 
 
Legitimate employment has been closely associated with desistance from crime (Van Roeyen 
et al. 2016). Events in the life course such as finding a job or getting married encourage 
desistance through structural routines that order the lives and activities of those who engage in 
them (Laub and Sampson 2003). It is difficult to be a full-time drug dealer if one is in full-time 
employment. Distributors will have to work around their jobs in order to do both. Research in 
this area often assumes that work is the catalyst to change; however, this is not necessarily the 
case. Employment can be the result of a commitment to change rather than the cause of it 
(Skardhamar and Savolainen 2014). Simon’s transition to the job market was not of his own 
volition, and it was for this reason that he did not succeed. If it had come about by choice, he 
may have been more committed to the role. An additional point is the fact that he was making 
significant amounts of money from selling drugs compared to working legitimately. This is 
another element that differentiates organised criminals from general offenders. Their activities 
can bring in substantial sums that are difficult, if not impossible, for them to replicate in the 
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legitimate workplace. Not to mention the lifestyle that dealing drugs brings with it (Adler and 
Adler 1983; Campbell and Hansen 2012; Douglas and Smith 2018).  
 
It is interesting to note that in an interview with Simon, which took place four years earlier 
when he was still dealing, he informed me that he was earning £2000 per week; however, in 
this later interview, the sum has risen to £3000. He may have exaggerated to give a more 
persuasive account of why he was involved in the businesses and kept returning to it. According 
to King (2013), desistance narratives often contain reference to a sense of powerless around 
past events that restrict individual autonomy. Whilst this may be true, this does not mean 
offenders will always construct narratives of their activities in a negative light. The positive 
aspects of crime provide further justification for the past. Indeed, offenders may employ a 
number of neutralisation techniques to come to terms with offending (Sykes and Matza 1957). 
 
Before Simon began selling cocaine, he had only tried the drug a couple of times and was not 
keen on it. He enjoyed his weed and a few beers from time to time but that was it for the most 
part. When he started dealing, this began to change due to the presence of the drug in his 
personal environment. It was not long until he was using cocaine on a regular basis and 
eventually became heavily addicted. Simon ran up a massive debt, and it was this life event 
that he believes was the primary reason in him going straight: 
 
Mark: So, tell me about how you got in debt? 
 
Simon: Yeah mate, I mean hanging around with people that did it all the time and I was like a 
fool for it as well, just had it all around me all the time. I think I just fell into a pattern 
of doing it all the time, I remember saying to Nick, I used to hang around with him a 
lot, even when I was hanging around with Ben and Danny and everyone else was happy 
to do it, but Nick was the main person, it was someone to have out with me. But I 
remember saying to him sat out in the garden “I can't remember the last time I hadn't 
done it”. 
 
Mark: Really? Woah. 
 
Simon: Yeah. 
 
Mark: Everyday? 
 
Simon: Yeah it was like that, it was like I could say “yeah a couple of years ago I wasn't doing 
it” just saying in general “I can't remember the last day that I hadn't done it”. It was 
getting to a point where I'd be out and I had to be out anyway cos I was selling it every 
day, there wasn't a day that I could have off, if I did he was breathing down my neck 
(Derrick), cos he was on my back constantly, our relationship was shit, it was just 
control… 
 
Mark: Drinking as well were you? 
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Simon: Yeah drinking all the time drinking, just sniffing flat out it was ridiculous, nights just 
being sat in my car on my own doing it. Horrible, horrible period of my life really and 
yeah just built up and built up. And the kiddy we were getting it from he used to just 
lay nines on (nine ounces) and it was like we'd have a nine and sell that and pay him 
the money and just do it like that, so it was always in advance and I built up a debt of 
this going on “can I have another one?”. 
 
Mark: Then you can pay it back? 
 
Simon: Yeah because I owed money into it and then it just spiralled and spiralled and got 
further and further and I owed more and more money then, I was going on with two, 
and then over a period of time I went to three and then one day it was four and he was 
like "oh", his runner was like "oh like gotta square up coming up to December" because 
he squares up every year, so I was like "yeah yeah sound” like thinking “fucking hell”, 
I owed fucking four nines. 
 
Mark: How much is four nines? 
 
Simon: Worked out sixteen grand.  
 
Mark: Fuck. 
 
Simon: Yeah I look back and say yeah I had fun, I didn't get my head kicked in, and like I said 
we met him that night he said "I get it off these guys up north” and I remember I was 
in the car park and he looked at me and said, “I've been seeing them for years but it's 
business and they don't fuck around, they will come down for their money" and he said 
"I'm not fronting it, I haven't got it, I haven't got sixteen grand. I might look like I've 
got a bit of money" and we all did we thought yeah he's fucking minted like cos he's 
the main guy but he said "I ain’t got it and they'll come down and when they do they're 
gonna take my door off, and I've got a daughter at home, so when that happens" and he 
looked at me and he leant towards me and said "I'm just letting you know, if that 
happens in my house, I will come and kill you". 
 
Simon had an arrangement with their main supplier’s drug runner. The runner had allowed 
Simon to get into debt without informing his distributor of how much he owed. Neither his 
brother Derrick nor their supplier knew the extent of the debt until that point. ‘The importance 
of trust and secrecy in criminal networks most clearly emerges when participants in such 
settings are confronted with the need to act’ (Morselli et al. 2007, p. 144). Indeed, mediated 
trust (Von Lampe and Johansen 2004b) is not only useful when new customers are introduced 
to suppliers (vouching), but also when assigning tasks to subordinates who work with trusted 
others (i.e. allowing runners to give credit). If it were not for the debt, it is unlikely that Simon 
would have needed to meet the main supplier, who then drew upon the reputation of his own 
suppliers to enforce debt recovery. It is possible that the main supplier wanted to maintain 
positive relations with Simon and Derrick for future business, which may have soured if he 
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said he would be the one conducting the violence. Alternatively, they may not have believed 
he was capable. We can see then, that the structure of criminal groups, and networks, change 
in the face of specific problems, where individuals in the ‘background’ become mobilised into 
action. Having assessed the seriousness of the situation, Derrick consoled the supplier and 
agreed that the debt would be paid within a week. To achieve this feat, the brothers approached 
their family, informed them of the problem and borrowed money. A significant amount of this 
was loaned by Derrick himself. To pay back the debt, Simon had to go back to work; he found 
a day job working for his cousin, which he juggled alongside working the phone line. His 
cousin was aware of his situation, so allowed him a little flexibility in his working hours. Simon 
paid off most of the debt within three months, but it took him eight months in total to clear it 
completely. Having cleared the debt, Simon quit his day job as the demand of working two 
jobs began to take its toll. It was not long before he slipped back into his old ways and he built 
up another debt totalling £8000. As before, the money was loaned, and the debt was paid.  
 
Addiction to any drug requires a significant amount of willpower and social support to break. 
Simon was not able to cut ties to his drug-using peers and had cocaine in his possession at all 
times. Early research on cocaine addiction demonstrates that users experience an ‘intense 
arousal and cocaine craving when they encounter ‘reminders’ of their previous cocaine use 
(Childress et al. 1988, p. 74). These ‘cue-induced cravings’ are the result of learned behaviour 
that alters neural processes, which assign a motivational value to an environmental stimulus 
(Bonson et al. 2002). It can take up to six months of abstinence for the brain to be reconditioned 
before the cravings subside (Goldstein 2018). Derrick was making a great deal of money from 
Simon running the phone line and did not have anyone else he could trust to take it on. 
Moreover, it is ‘important for criminal networks to work not only with trustworthy partners but 
also with capable partners: namely, people who can provide certain skills, contacts, and 
resources’ (Jaspers 2019, p. 4). Where these attributes cannot be found through strong ties, they 
may be found through weak ties instead. In these cases, actors may have to rely on trust 
substitutes, such as economic incentives, mutual dependencies or the threat of violence (ibid). 
Simon was highly trustworthy and capable; however, these qualities were being undermined 
by his drug addiction. Derrick pressured Simon to continue despite his issues with addiction.  
He suggested that he took greater control by rationing Simon with an ounce at a time which 
could be replaced the following day. An arrangement that was doomed to failure: 
 
Simon: It was just stupid like, yeah and I remember it happened like that, one night and he 
came round the next morning and he was like “where is it, where’s my stuff?”. 
 
Mark: Right. 
 
Simon: Yeah and he kicked right off, kicked off in my house throwing shit around. Like we've 
had stupid fights he would just come in my house and start trying to whack me and 
we're brothers. At that time I couldn't see it and he was just frustrated cos of what has 
been going on for so long, and yeah my missus phoned him up one day and said to him 
“look what you don't realise is that he's got a habit and you're not helping him and he 
needs to be away from it, and you're not helping because you just want to make him do 
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it yeah, and he's got and addiction and you're not helping". So then he said look "do 
you want to end it" even until then he was still asking "do you want do it then?". Cos 
he had no way and I was like "I can't, I have to stay away from it" so I did that and it 
just happened from there got a job. 
 
Criminal groups are not always willing to let their members go, especially when they are 
responsible for key roles and make money for them (Douglas and Smith 2018). In this instance, 
the group was a small family firm, so the bonds were even stronger. Indeed, strong family ties 
foster cohesion in criminal groups whilst ensuring impenetrability from law enforcement 
enquiries and surveillance (Luong 2019). In Italy, it is common for mafia groups to substitute 
familial trust through elaborate initiation ceremonies and strict codes of conduct. Such 
practices are rarely seen in the UK drug market, although it does happen (e.g. Varese 2017).  
 
Simon did not wish to completely cut ties with his brother, which made stopping dealing all 
the more difficult. Fortunately, Derrick saw sense and agreed to relieve him of his role. 
‘Ultimately, trust is a function of expectations, and has to do with building a reputation of 
trustworthiness. A shared past provides input for this reputation, and a shared future creates 
the need for it’ (Jaspers 2019, p. 4). Derrick realised that the shared future he envisioned for 
his family business was not realistic and would be best placed with someone else. Having quit 
dealing, Simon embarked on a life of legitimate employment. However, it took him many years 
before he could reduce his drug use to an unproblematic level. Simon had a family and children 
of his own, but this did not stop him from using and dealing. It was not until the birth of his 
most recent child that he finally changed his ways: 
 
Mark: How long has it been since you stopped selling it? 
 
Simon: It’s got to be nearly four years, three years, yeah been living where I am now two years 
lived in Saintsville for about a year, moved in with my partner’s parents because I was 
working for TV World, this was after Region Car Hire. I got a job for TV World doing 
door selling, give me a company car, but where I wasn't earning as much, me and the 
missus still trying to get on it (cocaine) and do stupid shit. We just couldn't afford to 
live in the house we were. I had a three bedroom house in Limewood and that is when 
the kids are still living with me, and it got to a point when my ex got out of the hospital 
(psychiatric care) she was living got a place of her own, she was recovering she wasn't 
mentally unstable, and it got to a point where it was like we are gonna have to move in 
with my (new) girlfriend’s mum just to save some money, and the kids gonna have to 
go back with my ex and that was a hard time. 
 
Mark: I bet. 
 
Simon: I was distraught, felt a failure to the kids like having them for two years and then having 
them having to go back with their mum because I can't sort myself out. It was shit mate. 
A lot of people are, live for the weekend as they say, and you end up in someone’s 
kitchen till five in the morning. It got to a point where it was slowing down, we were 
doing it now and again, yeah then she fell pregnant and it was like, bang. It’s come 
from to the extremes to really extreme to where we had to move out and the kids had 
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to move out, and I think it has taken to see what I have lost and also what I am gaining 
with the child with the baby, as soon as she fell pregnant it was like “sort everything 
out”. 
 
Mark: She had to stop drinking and everything? 
 
Simon: Yeah, she totally stopped everything, and we weren't heavy drinkers or smokers, it was 
just the weekend, I mean I don't smoke now, first drink I've had in like, well the other 
weekend, yeah it’s crazy mate. Soon as she fell pregnant everything stops and then it’s 
our first night out together tomorrow so (laughs) we will see what happens, going to a 
mate’s wedding party. Yeah, I'll end up messing around tomorrow (using cocaine) and 
it’s like we both said, we know, I know that it will never go back to that. One because 
I am not selling it like that do you know what I mean, but over that period of time I've 
still got bits and sold bits here and there and I've tried to make some money because I 
knew how with that and I needed the money. 
 
Mark: And you knew how to do it. 
 
Simon: Yeah, but even then doing that you still end up doing more than you think you will, 
just be like "oh yeah I'll just buy a half ounce and sell it off and I'll make this much" 
it’s all in your head and you work it all out and you think you'll make this much from 
it all to the precise fucking twenty pound and it doesn't happen like that. 
 
Cocaine is an expensive drug to consume and its effects are short-lived. The drug has a half-
life of around an hour, leaving the user needing regular hits as they chase the high. Cocaine is 
often consumed with alcohol, which when processed by the liver, is metabolised into 
cocaethylene. This by-product has a longer half-life, approximately double that of cocaine, but 
is more harmful to the body than consuming either substance alone (McCance-Katz et al. 1993; 
Nutt 2012). The longer half-life, however, does not stop the user craving more of the drug 
throughout the binge. Simon had cut his use down to weekends but was still living beyond his 
means, especially now that his income had reduced. As he had the knowledge and the 
experience of dealing, the prospect of making money pulled him back time and time again.  
 
Research on organised crime demonstrates that people turn to crime when negative life events 
reduce their income or ability to make money legitimately (Kleemans and de Poot 2008). The 
accumulation of criminal capital (McCarthy 2001) allows offenders to capitalise on 
opportunity structures that non-offenders may not be able to. Although Simon had a legitimate 
job, his addiction was leaving him without money to pay his bills. It was not until the birth of 
his last child that he really began to beat the habit. His girlfriend had stopped using drugs to 
protect the development of their unborn baby. Pregnancy has been shown to have a positive 
effect on mothers who abuse drugs, providing a strong motivation to quit (Kendler et al. 2017). 
Relationships, where both parties are addicted, can make getting clean difficult if either person 
is not willing (Briggs and Monge Gamero 2017). Fortunately, Simon was supportive and 
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stopped using as well. Since the baby has been born, he admits they may take the drug on 
occasion, but is confident he has put the past behind him.  
 
 
Rocco 
 
Rocco was introduced to the thesis in chapter 7 in which he discussed his experiences dealing 
with rival distributors in the local area, “the two mates who I was with grabbed what he had 
there and a bit of cash and the most important thing I wanted was his phone…”. Rocco sold 
heroin at the retail level before moving up to wholesale. He also has experience growing 
cannabis. Rocco is a skilled construction worker and is employed by his stepfather who owns 
a local business in the trade. The following account details his transition away from dealing 
heroin and crack cocaine to concentrating on cannabis cultivation.  
 
Rocco: The main thing of working (construction), and crops (cannabis), which was my main 
income and it was nice and easy. I got dragged away from that because everything else 
was so easy if that makes sense (dealing heroin), because the money was there like that, 
and it wasn't until I got back with my ex and she said “look you gotta calm yourself 
down, you're gonna get nicked in a minute, you're too hectic|” cos I was a bit highly 
strung and whatever, I'd do anything for anyone, wouldn't have my mates over (rip them 
off). I just wouldn’t take no shit, you had to be like that, you had to be very fronty 
(aggressive/authoritarian). So I left it all to my mate, “look you crack on”, I had two 
crops and went back just doing a little bit of work, but it was just like the odd day here 
and there, and I had a thief so I used to take the thief out in the day and he'd guarantee 
me £100 for the day. Take him out just for the day have a look round the shops, and I 
would walk in front of him, so if I say anything like that and I picked it up twice, 
anything twice, he would take it because that would be what I wanted, I would like 
come back home I had like £40 candles and then with that. 
 
Mark: You just pay him £100 a day to do that is that what you are saying? 
 
Rocco: No no, he could guarantee me £100 so if at the end of the day we would come back 
with this this and this he would sell it to whoever or say “do you want to buy it”, so 
what I would usually do was buy it off him for cheap as you like, so say it was like 
thirty grand’s worth of stuff it would work out about eleven hundred quid, so I would 
buy that off of him pay him through my mate obviously because he was a druggy. I 
would pay him in browns and whites (heroin and crack) for it and obviously cream off 
of that. So, I would get it a lot cheaper and sell it and give a bit to my mum, cos me and 
my mum fell out, not properly fell out but I wouldn't chat to her a lot, because she was 
always worried about me but had to let me do my own thing. Cos I was just a bit of a 
nightmare, so with that gradually I sort of stopped that going out and doing that because 
I got a bit of money behind myself, I started properly focusing, and then my old man 
passed away. So, I stopped selling browns and whatever, but I done it before that it just 
wasn't me I didn't like it.   
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Mark: Yeah yeah, it's a nasty game. 
 
Rocco: It's not a nice thing to do. I know like I'm, making money makes sense as such, it just 
wun’t me I don't like it, and I don't like…  
 
Mark: The damage it causes? 
 
Rocco: Yeah, I wouldn't say anything bad about people that do, it's just one of those things, but 
yeah so, I literally was just doing crops and earning money that way. 
 
Rocco and his friend had been selling heroin at the retail level when he decided to give it up. 
The role was impacting on his relationship with his girlfriend and mother as it required a great 
deal of time and attention to run the business efficiently. Due to the nature of the trade, drugs 
were often given out on loan, which would have to be chased up. Those who did not pay would 
need to be intimidated along with other dealers in the area who were stealing his trade. This 
meant having to maintain a particular front that was impacting on his relationship as it spilt 
over into his home life. Like Simon, Rocco was benefitting financially from dealing and the 
ease in which he was able to sell drugs was a significant motivator “I got dragged away from 
that because everything else was so easy if that makes sense, because the money was there like 
that”. Moreover, he was also exploiting a drug addict who would steal for him much like the 
relationship that Teeth has with his runner Hector (see chapter 5). Rocco’s moral compass was 
somewhat different from Teeth, however, as he did not like that harm that heroin and crack 
causes. It was something that played on his conscience. Nonetheless, the most significant factor 
that led to this turning point was his relationship with his girlfriend and his mother. They had 
a level of social control over Rocco that influenced his actions, but it did not last long: 
 
Rocco: What I started doing was working at my mum’s house for free, so I just go down there 
and chill, still spend a lot of money like, Nandos every day, whatever. I split up with 
my ex, and then because I wun’t with her, started selling smack again (heroin) and um, 
yeah, because, you sort of get so much trouble (people asking for drugs) sort of know 
so many people, when I deal it was like, I wun’t even trying and everyone was like 
chatting to me saying “yeah yeah I can sort it out for you, not a problem”. 
 
Mark: Yeah, it's easy because you have the network there. 
 
Rocco: And it just, I just went from like there, to doing two boxes (kilos) a week sort of thing, 
from half z's (half ounces) to like bars (nine ounces), to half boxes like that. 
 
Having a reputation for being a certain type of person is a persistent problem for criminals who 
want to go straight. Being known as a dealer increases the level of opportunity to make money 
from crime and acts as a constant reminder that money can be made in this way. If we think 
back to Simon’s struggle with addiction and the cue-induced cravings he was experiencing, we 
can see that this operates much in the same way. Seeking consumers act as cues that remind 
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and motivates actors to return to crime. Cutting social ties by moving to a new area may not be 
enough in a population that lives out their lives on social media. A complete break with all 
criminogenic social ties in both virtual and real-world locations would be necessary, but the 
prevalence of drug use makes this difficult; the Crime Survey for England and Wales 2017/18 
found that 9% of adults had tried illicit drugs in the last year (HM Government 2018b). As 
Rocco had split up with his girlfriend, the protective element of social control she had on him 
was also no longer present. It was the combination of these factors that influenced his decision 
to return to dealing heroin.  
 
Over time, Rocco moved up and away from the retail level, much like Simon’s brother Derrick. 
He was shifting kilos of the drug on a weekly basis and was making a great deal of money. At 
this level of the trade, there is less interaction with users on the street. This allows distributors 
to dissociate themselves from the harm that the drug causes, as they do not see its effects to the 
same extent. Indeed, when wars are conducted in other countries, the devastation may only 
register on the fringes of consciences in our society (Jones 1991). The same can be said of 
soldiers who pilot weaponised drones that kill whilst being operated from afar: killing from a 
distance is normatively easier (Boshuijzen-van Burken and van Bezooijen 2015). Distance 
affects the way people perceive moral issues. Rocco continued on this path for a couple of 
years before he met his new girlfriend, Sasha, and fell in love. Like his ex-girlfriend, Sasha did 
not approve of his actions and the effect it was having on their relationship, so pressured him 
to resign:  
 
Rocco: I remember we were out and I remember we were sat down in town, in the German 
market having a beer. Sat down there, I remember with our coats on, our woolly hats, 
and having a good time and I was like, “oh shit we gotta shoot, I gotta go grab some 
money”. 
 
Mark: Yeah? 
 
Rocco: And she was like “oh can't you grab it tomorrow”, I was like “nah”. I used to like be 
on point, if it was there grab it cos it might get spent or took, it just made sense. Always 
on the ball, and that's how you would earn money, cos people that were lazy, or used 
to sniff it, cos of course I've got that rule, I've never sniffed it in my life, just for that 
reason I don't, I don't see anything wrong with it, but that's just me. So, she said to me 
“oh, like when do you ever stop to enjoy it? Why do you do it? Why don't you ever stop 
to enjoy it?”. So I said “I enjoy it all the time, I'm out with you we're having a nice 
time”, but she was like “yeah but you gotta leave”, she said “when are you ever gonna 
stop and enjoy it?”, and wun’t to a couple of weeks later when you think about it, I'm 
always like a hundred miles an hour. I said to you about working? 
 
Mark: Yeah, yeah. 
 
Rocco: I think I've gotta be like that to keep my mind occupied it works too fast, but when she 
said that I thought “yeah” (agreed). Literally a couple of weeks later, went and saw one 
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of my mates who was like doing well, and something happened to his mate, but 
obviously like not put him in debt but took a lot of his savings away. Said to him “look, 
this is the score blah blah blah, I give you this, like X amount per week and sort yourself 
out. It's a piece of piss it's all set up for you, you don't have to touch it, just make a few 
phone calls sorted”. So I did and like now I've literally just got one crop on, making ten 
to fifteen grand every three months, and I work every day (day job). 
 
An effective dealer is one that is available to make sales and collections at all waking hours of 
the day. Research conducted on ‘on-call’ workers demonstrates that having to be available for 
work on a moment’s notice can be highly stressful and negatively impacts upon home life: 
 
“One inherent difference between on-call work and other forms of shift work is the 
unpredictability of when a call may occur. This unpredictability poses a unique 
work environment that is not faced by those working set shifts and has been 
identified as a factor that may inhibit workers’ ability to “switch off” and attain a 
cognitive distance from work when on-call from home. This has the potential to 
affect the lives of on-call workers by adversely impacting on their family time, 
social life, stress levels, and consequently, further disrupting their sleep.” (Hall et 
al. 2017, p. 4) 
 
For drug dealers, the negative effects of being on call are further compounded by the illegality 
of their operations. This put actors at constant risk and requires them to maintain particular 
fronts to be successful in their role. These pressures can make it difficult to sustain romantic 
relationships in the long term. This is why Rocco decided to specialise in cannabis cultivation 
whilst also working a legitimate job. With an automated set up that regulates temperature, 
water, lights and nutrients; cannabis plants do not need much maintenance. Video cameras can 
also be installed for added security, allowing the grower to monitor the crop from a distance. 
This reduces the risk of being caught by the police on site (Potter 2006, p. 191). Indeed, 
growing cannabis enabled Rocco to continue making money illegitimate without negatively 
impacting his ‘normal’ daily life.  
 
According to Kleemans and de Poot, specialisation in particular illicit activities occurs when 
they become more profitable than the alternatives (although, profitability is not always 
sufficient condition for crime). This, they argue, is the result of increases in scale (Kleemans 
and de Poot 2008). Rocco specialised in heroin distribution as a result of the higher profits and 
increased output. Yet, due to the negative impact it was having on his life and the risk of selling 
the drug, he switched over to cultivating cannabis. Specialisation is not always the result of 
increases in scale. That being said, I witnessed Rocco taking up the odd criminal opportunity 
by acting as a middleman sourcing Class A drugs for friends (social supply). He may not have 
mentioned this in the interview because he did not deem this as dealing when compared to his 
past activities. The construction of desistance narratives is thus dependent upon individual 
perceptions of what counts as crime, which may impact upon offending in the future. 
Nonetheless, occasional social supply is in activity that is less risky than ‘real’ dealing (Taylor 
and Potter 2013) and does not impact on life as much. Having a legitimate income gives 
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offenders more freedom to choose the criminal opportunities that are available, as they can 
maintain a basic standard of living (Ouellet and Bouchard 2017). Criminals who are financially 
desperate may take on more risky opportunities for immediate rewards. 
 
 
Andy and Sam Stone 
 
The final account in this chapter is provided by Andy, one of the lads I met at Summer Park 
School (see chapter 4). Andy and his brother Sam were long-term cannabis dealers, having 
sold the drug for around seven years total. The two have completely given up dealing and have 
been living relatively crime-free lives for the past ten years. Sam had a short spell where he 
was manufacturing anabolic steroids for personal use (see chapter 7) but has now quit 
bodybuilding entirely. There were a number of events that Andy believes led him and his 
brother to quit dealing cannabis. Primarily this was due to a police crackdown in the city that 
made sourcing the drug very difficult: 
 
Mark: So, can you tell me about the time you were selling cannabis and you were you having 
difficulties getting hold of it? 
 
Andy: Yeah well as you know I was in the business of selling cannabis with my brother we 
had been doing it for about seven years and it was quite easy to get hold of for a long 
time. Sometimes we would have problems but generally speaking we either had middle 
men we could go through, or we got a good direct contact ourselves a guy who lived a 
few miles away and we were buying cannabis off of him more, maybe about a year and 
a half, we got the contact from our cousin. The stuff was good you know we were able 
to get big quantities, make a decent profit from it. We got a few people complaining, 
which you always get in any kind of business, but generally it was good, and basically 
he went out of business. What happened is the police raided his friend’s house where it 
was getting grown, and that was the beginning of police crack downs. It wasn't just him 
it started happening to almost everybody we were getting it from. So, he basically went 
out of business because he didn't want to get caught. He had a kid, and it started to 
happen to a lot of other people, and over a process of probably about six or seven 
months it became increasingly more difficult to get it and when we did get it, it was 
expensive to the point where we were making maybe twenty quid off of an ounce. Just 
wasn't cost effective to do it anymore.  
 
Mark: Sure. 
 
Andy: And then what I learned was the police had been basically using new means of detecting 
cannabis grows using police helicopters heat detection, using people’s bills, if they had 
unusually high energy bills and stuff like that. And this was part of a larger police 
operation in the region, operation Trident which I think was an attempt to crack down 
on the distribution of all kinds of narcotics, but I think cannabis was one of the first 
things they really focused on, so yeah it made it very hard for us to sell. 
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Mark: Then when the prices went up did you change it or keep it the same? 
 
Andy: We tried keeping it the same and then we realised we were gonna have to drop it down, 
so we dropped it down to about one point three (grams), and we'd been selling them 
originally at one three when we first started selling cannabis but what had happen is 
everybody got used to one point four or one point five if we give someone a bump, like 
give them an extra spliff or something like that. And then all of a sudden the fact that 
these deals were getting smaller, people start complaining and stop buying off us as 
well, the consumer was out trying to look for different suppliers, so they generally 
weren't happy about the deals getting more squeezed but there wasn't much more I 
could do about it otherwise it became pretty pointless in selling it. There’s no point in 
hanging on to an ounce and shotting twenty deals and getting twenty quid out of it. 
Leaving the house twenty times and having the weed here. It also got reclassified to a 
Class B, so the penalty for selling weed coincided with this operation, this new 
approach to tackling cannabis, so when all of this started happening we started to 
consider not selling it anymore it wasn't really worthwhile. 
 
Operation Trident was a dedicated unit within the Metropolitan police 1998-2012 that was set 
up in to help tackle gun crime, although the majority of the cases were related to drugs 
(Guardian 2012). The crackdown on cannabis in Red City occurred in 2009 not long after the 
drug was reclassified. Cannabis cultivation uses a significant amount of electricity, which is 
further compounded by the illegality of the process; cultivators do not adhere to environmental 
standards (Arnold 2013). The atypical consumption of electricity and the additional heat 
produced can be indicators of a domestic cannabis operation  (McKee 2005; Morrison 2008). 
Since this time, growers in Red City have responded by installing additional heat shielding 
devices and reducing the size of their crops to reduce energy consumption. Indeed, there are a 
number of articles on the internet discussing ways in which to do this (Royal Queen Seeds 
2018). Nonetheless, the crackdown resulted in an increase in price that lasted for many years. 
In 2008 Andy was purchasing high-quality skunk (cannabis) for around £130 an ounce and was 
selling it at £10 per 1.4 grams making £70 profit per ounce. In 2104 participants reported that 
the cost of the drug had risen to up to £200 per ounce, which was selling at £10 per gram. It 
was not until around 2018 that the prices started to relax again.  
 
What this demonstrates is that although there was less of the drug available, suppliers 
compensated by raising prices to allow them to stay in business and retain profits. Andy and 
his brother were adversely affected by this change to the point that they quit dealing. Although 
policing cannot eradicate the market, it can lead to a decline in supply. Yet, there is a threshold 
in which over-policing results in diminishing returns (Caulkins 2014; Pollack and Reuter 
2014). The heightened penalty for dealing did indeed have some effect on the brothers, 
signalling that policy changes can impact dealers on the ground (although many of their peers 
continued to retail the drug). In this respect, it was the criminal opportunities within the settings 
they frequented that had changed. The brothers did not have to distance themselves from 
particular environments or social networks to exit the trade. The ban on new psychoactive 
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substances in 2016 also led Max to quit his business distributing nitrous oxide and temporarily 
invested his money in bitcoin. He reports that one of his competitors is still operating and has 
filled the gap that he had left. The market has become more violent as dealers have less 
protection from the authorities. Sam and Andy were fortunate in that they were able to get 
legitimate jobs after quitting; if it was not for this, they may have pursued other avenues: 
 
Mark: What were you doing for money instead?  
 
Andy: We got jobs and that was a more stable income and I was getting more money doing 
that to be honest with you, so there wasn't actually all that need, we were both in the 
process of doing that just around that time, so it all kind of coincided all of these 
different factors at the same time, and it therefore wasn't that big of an issue when we 
stopped but it was fortunate I guess we had other things that we could go into cos 
otherwise you kind of end up staying in the same thing… 
 
Mark: Would you ever consider starting it back up again? 
 
Andy: Only if I was especially desperate but I can't imagine I would ever be, I have improved 
my life tremendously since then. I've got my work not only in my industry, I've got 
other avenues, studying and stuff like that. I've got a career. I would say getting that is 
the biggest thing that stopped me or would stop me from going back, just getting 
yourself out of those financial needs and circumstances is probably the overriding factor 
as to why I wouldn't, and I think that is generally why people get involved in it in the 
first place really to be honest with you, it’s a lack of capacities or things that they can 
sell on the marketplace basically. They just go in at a low level, they just may as well 
sell drugs and I'm not in that position anymore. 
 
 
Discussion & Conclusion 
 
The primary aim of this chapter was to examine how and why organised criminals desist from 
crime. Following the accounts of five ex-offenders, it outlined the paths and mechanisms that 
lead to desistance within the life-course. This chapter demonstrated that desistance is often a 
slow process that involves drifts in and out of offending over time. There are some who desist 
without relapsing into crime, but this depends on the legitimate opportunities that are available 
them vs their embeddedness in criminal networks and settings. Networks and settings provide 
opportunities for crime. 
 
As offenders mature with age, they become less willing to engage in risky activities that impact 
negatively on their lives: whether it be through the threat of imprisonment or other negative 
consequences of engaging in illicit activity. For some, it is only after the negative consequences 
have been experienced that change begins to take place, whilst for others, the anticipation of 
the consequences is enough.  If offenders move into less risky and less harmful drug markets 
such as cannabis, this should be seen as a positive part of the process. It demonstrates a 
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cognitive shift to reduce the severity of their actions, to both the dealer and the community 
(even if it allows them to continue their criminal careers in the long term). If cannabis becomes 
legal, these opportunities may not be available. Nonetheless, participants such as Teeth (see 
chapter 5) and Simons brother Derrick, are able to continue their operations in high risk markets 
by positioning themselves within their networks so others take on the risks. This requires a 
level of social capital that can be built as part of the maturation process. Even with these 
mechanisms in place, dealing drugs can be demanding creating further pressures to desist as 
was the case with Rocco. Debts can be a significant hurdle for actors wanting to change, 
however. If a distributor is sourcing their drugs on credit, they will have to pay back what they 
owe before they can go straight. If the police confiscate the drugs, the debt may stay with them. 
This may mean having to borrow more drugs, increasing the level of indebtedness to the 
supplier.  
 
This chapter builds upon chapter 4 in demonstrating the role that settings have on the criminal 
career. Desistance can involve exiting criminogenic environments, acting differently within 
them, or the environments themselves may change. If criminal opportunities are removed from 
certain settings, this can lead to desistance from crime. If they are not and offenders still 
frequent them, desistance can be more difficult. Indeed, whilst the policing of drugs can never 
eradicate the market, it can shape it. Narrative construction plays an important part in 
desistance, in which justifications for past behaviour contain both disdain and admiration. The 
reworking of criminal to non-criminal identity requires explanation for previous involvement 
in crime, whilst also acknowledging its problems. If individuals within the current environment 
still identify actors by their past, however, this can create problems. 
 
Although none of the participants interviewed in this chapter were sent to prison, the threat of 
incarceration weighed heavily upon them. Nonetheless, there are a number of actors in this 
study who have spent time there, including Teeth and Derrick who still operate. For the most 
part, prison did little to stop the participants from offending and in some cases actively 
facilitated it. The only participant in this study who went completely clean after being sent to 
prison was Buster the drugs courier (see chapter 4). The difference in his case was that he had 
not been involved in this level of the trade for very long (around a year) and narrowly missed 
a life sentence. Buster did not have the issue of people soliciting him for drugs after he was 
released as he was never identified as a dealer as such. His role also required infrequent drops 
that did not affect his normal daily activities in ways that become habitual. He had no intention 
of becoming a drugs courier again, but these opportunities are also less readily available in the 
drug trade (international level). 
 
Prison creates additional criminal opportunities through the proliferation of new social ties and 
access to drug markets both inside and outside of prison. There were some who benefitted from 
prison by investing themselves in training programs, which led to jobs on the outside. Mat, for 
example, now works in construction after embarking on a Railtrack internship, whilst he was 
serving his sentence. He was fortunate in that he had a good family home living with his 
parents, where he returned to continue his internship when he was released. In prison, however, 
he became aware of how lucrative the synthetic cannabis market was and forged contacts with 
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suppliers. After being released, he started smuggling the drug into prison by post. He printed 
fake solicitors’ letters that had been dipped in the substance knowing that the prison staff were 
not allowed to open them. To compete with other vendors, he “double dipped” the letters to 
increase the potency and warned his drugs runner. One prisoner did not heed caution when 
taking the drug and died of an overdose.  
 
For actors working in a team, group dynamics can create significant pressures to offend or 
desist from it. These can be thought of as push and pull factors that attempt to hold the 
organisation together, break the organisation apart, and shift the organisation in and out of 
crime. The pressures exerted may differ, however, depending on what types of crime the 
organisation is involved in, the size of the organisation, and the value of the members within 
it. Simon, for example, was a member of a small family firm. This may have increased his 
value to the group because family ties are stronger than entrepreneurial ones where actors 
associate primarily to make money. Family members may be easier to trust than outsiders 
making them ideal business partners in crime. In larger criminal organisations such as ‘mafia’ 
groups, individual members may be less important due to their sheer size. Individuals may also 
be replaced fairly easily due to the number of recruits that are available. This may make them 
more susceptible to undercover police operatives.  
 
Overall, life events such as beginning a new relationship or having a child can put significant 
pressure on offenders to desist, but this can be difficult without a means to make a legitimate 
income that satisfies expectations and provides a reasonable means of subsistence. Many 
offenders continue to offend by refining their techniques to avoid arrest. Others may switch 
into less risky markets even if the financial gains are lower in the short term. Nonetheless, it is 
not always money that attracts offenders to crime; the social status incurred is a significant 
allure and may be difficult to replace elsewhere. 
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9) Conclusion 
 
This thesis aimed to address several gaps in the knowledge of ‘organised crime’ by 
investigating its most common manifestation: the illicit drug trade. It examined the criminal 
careers of serious offenders who operate in one of Britain’s large cities, to discover, in the 
broadest of terms, how and why people sell drugs. The project investigated the nature of the 
drug market, the crime risk management practices of drug dealers, and possible reasons for 
their involvement and patterns of activity. Having come to the end of the thesis, this chapter 
concludes with an overall summary of its main empirical findings. It then goes on to consider 
its significance for drug policy, policing and future research in the field. 
 
As set out in the introduction, drug policy has largely failed to visibly reduce the availability 
of drugs in the UK, and in some cases, has actually facilitated it. With demand increasing, the 
black market has continued to grow, creating financial opportunities for criminal actors. 
Popular conceptions of drug dealers continue to be plagued with stereotypes that demonise 
offenders and particular social groups. The organisation of the trade is also overplayed as being 
tightly managed and hierarchically structured, following age-old stereotypes of ‘kingpins’ and 
mafia groups. These stereotypes have been further reframed in the so-called phenomenon of 
‘county lines’ where predatory drug gangs spread from major cities to rural areas in search of 
market opportunities. The paucity of empirical research in this field has left experts and the 
public misinformed of recent developments on the ground. Indeed, there are few studies of 
organised crime in the UK and even fewer on active criminals themselves. Difficulties gaining 
access to serious offenders in the field, coupled with increasingly stringent ethical requirements 
by institutional review boards, have created significant barriers to entry for empirical research 
into drug crime. In search of answers, it is common for researchers to resort to official channels 
for access, whilst restricting their methods to desk-based techniques or interviews with known 
offenders. It is well known that data garnered through the criminal justice system is subject to 
bias. To generate a less biased insight, the thesis employed semi-covert ethnographic research 
of active criminals in the field, some of whom are unknown to the police. It followed the lives 
of a group of drug dealers described as ‘the lads’ and their criminal associates. The participants 
in this study distribute and manufacture a range of illicit substances, both offline and online. 
They distribute drugs on local, national and international levels (retail, wholesale, import and 
export); however, the thesis leans towards the retail end. To complement the fieldwork, 
interviews were conducted with official actors from the criminal justice system, the private 
sector and the third sector. Whilst the thesis was primarily orientated around the drug trade; it 
also considered actors who were involved in crime such as racketeering, professional theft and 
prostitution.  
 
Overall, the research makes significant contributions to research on illicit dealing, organised 
crime and the life-course of serious offenders. It demonstrates how actors become involved in 
crime as well as the techniques and strategies they employ to meet their goals. It contributes to 
previous research on organised crime which works to decouple popular conceptions of 
offenders, the structure of criminal groups and the manner in which they operate. In keeping 
with other studies in the UK, it finds that criminal groups are locally orientated, loosely 
organised, limited in size and scope, and ephemeral. The thesis builds upon this work by 
demonstrating how the structure and method of criminal groups differ in the drug market 
depending on the type of product sold, their place within the supply chain and the settings in 
which they operate. Illicit drug markets have been demonstrated to exist along a continuum 
between commercially and non-commercially ordered in which motives for selling drugs are 
financial or based around cultural norms of sharing. What these studies fail to demonstrate is 
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not only are drug markets culturally structured but also methodologically so, in terms of the 
techniques and strategies drug dealers employ to reduce the risk of their activities. Drug dealers 
operate within an ecology of risk that presents opportunities and contingencies in relation to 
the activities of state and non-state actors within the settings they operate; this also relates to 
relationships around trust. Previous ethnographic research on drugs has tended to focus on 
particular drug types or aspects of the market, which makes comparisons between markets 
difficult to achieve. This thesis examined the accounts of drugs dealers (and manufacturers) 
who distributed a range of different products, in a number of different settings (offline and 
online). In doing so, it demonstrates how drug dealers experience and respond to risks across 
illicit markets and settings, and how this, in turn, relates to the methods and structure of 
criminal groups and their reasons for involvement in crime. 
 
In the following section, I will first return to the four research questions of the thesis and outline 
its subsequent findings. I will then discuss the significance of this project for UK drug policy 
and contemporary policing practices. Lastly, I will outline the limitations of this project and 
make suggestions for future research in this field. It must be noted that the research questions 
and subsequent findings are not mutually exclusive. 
 
 
Research questions & findings 
 
1)  What influences the decision to establish oneself as a dealer, progress in terms of roles 
and amounts sold, and/or desist from it? 
 
Personal circumstances, life experiences, and the opportunities to sell drugs largely determine 
whether people will sell them. Motives to sell drugs are often economic but not necessarily or 
exclusively so. Drug dealing and other forms of organised crime can generate significant 
respect and social status within the community. Where money and respect are not easily 
established (or expected) in legitimate fields, people may turn to crime to fulfil those goals. 
This may make those facing financial hardship more likely to become involved in the trade, 
although not all offenders in this study come from impoverished backgrounds. Contact with 
the black market can precipitate involvement in crime. In this respect, it is the opportunity itself 
that can sometimes be the driving force behind offending. Offenders that are involved in crimes 
such as professional theft are also turning to selling, as well as consuming drugs, as their 
traditional activities become more difficult to carry out. Advances in technology have increased 
risks for traditional offenders whilst making the targets of crime harder to penetrate. The drug 
trade is now the ‘go to’ avenue for many serious offenders who have previously specialised 
elsewhere. The extent to which drug markets are policed does affect decisions to get involved 
in dealing, alongside public perceptions of particular products. Distributors typically view 
semi-legitimate drugs such as anabolic steroids and nitrous oxide as less of a risk, as well as 
those that are down the classification scheme, or are more socially acceptable, such as cannabis. 
Although the Home Office classification of drugs does have a relationship with police 
priorities, the local perceived harm and public anxiety that drugs cause  generally takes 
precedence. Media coverage also has a significant influence on this. If you are a known 
offender this also increases the likelihood you will be arrested again the future. Those with 
prior convictions for drugs receive significantly more police attention, which may lead 
offenders to alter their methods. 
 
With drugs being so highly available, popular and normalised in society, many offenders enter 
the market as users before establishing themselves as dealers later down the line. Others may 
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enter the trade as non-users through their social networks, which can be established through 
the family, through work or leisure activities. Social networks relate to entry points and the 
level in the trade that drug dealers become established. Certain environments within the city 
may favour particular types of drugs. The family home, the school, the street, the workplace, 
night clubs, pubs, gyms, prisons, websites, are all places where particular types of drugs may 
be prevalent. Those who frequent spaces of consumption (or distribution) are more likely to 
become exposed to the trade. These environments have particular features that may attract 
people at different stages through the life course. Night clubs, for example, are renowned for 
drug use but are typically out of bounds to children and early teenagers. This thesis adds to the 
knowledge base by demonstrating where, how, and at what age criminal contacts become 
established. Progression in the trade occurs over a number of years as offenders build a greater 
pool of contacts to buy from and sell to. As people consolidate their criminal identity and 
become trusted in the field, they may be approached by other actors soliciting their services or 
offering roles. As progression occurs, risks are reduced as dealers move away from retail 
distribution and the handling of drugs (more on this later). Progression can result in 
specialisation with particular markets and levels within the supply chain. Alternatively, 
offenders may change pathways as more lucrative, or otherwise appealing, opportunities 
become available to them. Maturation is related to increased criminal capability and resources 
for crime (social and material). 
 
As offenders mature with age, they become less willing to engage in risky activities that impact 
negatively on their lives. For some, it is only after the negative consequences have been 
experienced that change begins to take place, whilst for others, the anticipation of the 
consequences is enough. Those who have been embedded in the market for many years can 
find desistance difficult as legitimate opportunities are not forthcoming. People in the 
community may also identify these actors as criminals and continue to approach them for their 
services long after they have quit. Having established contacts with a wide network of 
offenders, it is all too easy for distributors to return to crime. Times of financial hardship and 
the opportunity to make quick cash can be enough to pull offenders back into the trade. 
Desistance can involve exiting criminogenic environments, acting differently within them, or 
the environments themselves may change. If criminal opportunities are removed from certain 
settings, this can lead to desistance from crime. If they are not and offenders still frequent them, 
desistance can be more difficult. How life experiences are constructed into narratives has 
important implications for involvement in and desistance from crime. If dealers are to construct 
non-criminal identities of the self, past activities need framing in ways that sympathetically  
explain involvement in crime, whilst also identifying its negative aspects. Neutralisation of 
past activities can provide offenders with a more positive of perception of who they are and 
who they could be. 
 
Addiction is a common problem for drug dealers and can constrain attempts to desist. 
Significant debts can also accumulate as drugs are given on credit, forcing suppliers to continue 
to operate to pay them back. Those who work within a group and are responsible for key tasks 
can find desistance difficult. Members can place significant pressure on their peers to 
contribute to the group on a long-term basis. Desistance of some members, however, can lead 
to a ripple effect, with other actors following suit as they pursue alternative interests. Indeed, 
developmental and life-course criminology typically focus on individual-level trajectories, but 
in doing so can miss insights that can be gained from examining the life-course of criminal 
groups and the dynamics within them. Some offenders do not desist but find positions in the 
trade that allow them to operate in a way that reduces risks. As criminals mature, they become 
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smarter, more sophisticated and less brazen in their crimes. This may result in a de-escalation 
of offending (rather than desistance) from other more prominent roles.  
 
Building upon criminal enterprise theory, the thesis demonstrates that not only do criminal 
groups operate in a similar manner to legitimate businesses; offenders also experience similar 
levels of stress and anxiety from working in related roles (coupled with the stress experienced 
from the illegality of their business). The thesis draws upon research on taxi drivers, delivery 
drivers and workers on call, to shed additional light upon the careers of offenders and 
organisation of the trade more generally. It demonstrates that retailing drugs on call is highly 
stressful and interrupts daily routines and family life. This may lead offenders to desist or prefer 
other levels of trade that require less work for higher rewards. The frequency of deliveries can 
pose significant problems for offenders.  
 
The thesis adds to the existing research base on criminal careers, both empirically and 
theoretically. It examines offender narratives around turning points and trajectories, as people 
respond to opportunities and contingencies within specific contexts at particular age ranges in 
their lives. The thesis draws on life-course criminology, social network analysis, organisational 
theory and market economics. It outlines the importance of grounded ethnography to illuminate 
how criminals respond to the practical troubles they experience in their everyday lives. The 
study demonstrates how policing and policy affects the criminal career in ways that can 
increase risks for drug dealers and in some cases, remove opportunities to offend. It examines 
how settings influence the manner in which products are sold and their relationship to the 
careers of offenders operating within them; something that other ethnographic studies have 
often failed to do. Overall, the study found that significant familial events such as having a 
child or starting positive romantic relationships are key explanations for desistance. 
 
 
2) How are relationships between suppliers and customers created and maintained within 
the drug market? 
 
Contacts in the black-market are created in two ways: environments and social networks. 
Environments are spaces in which offenders can come together and establish relationships. 
These can be physical or virtual and may require no previous introductions. Through a normal 
process of socialisation, offenders get to know each other and pass on their knowledge and 
resources. Different environments attract different types of offenders at different stages in their 
lives and maybe dominated by particular types of drugs (as alluded to earlier). The second way 
that contacts are formed is through an introduction from other peers. In this respect, there is a 
snowballing outward as new contacts are made, which lead to other new contacts and so on. 
This coincides with increases in resources and leverage, as offenders are better able to position 
themselves to maximise their profits whilst reducing the risk. Established offenders may be 
better known and reputable in the field, leading to greater opportunities than early starters.  
 
Distributors looking to employ others to take on specific roles can tap into their custom base 
for recruits. Drug addicts are particularly exploitable and may be more willing to take on more 
risky tasks than casual users; however, they are also more likely to become police informants. 
People in difficult economic circumstances may also be easy to enlist, making those from poor 
income communities more susceptible to the trade. Social supply is the most common form of 
exchange and often how ties are established. Once ties are formed, they can be maintained for 
many years. Sellers maintain ties with buyers by providing superior customer service and 
building personal relationships that foster trust (friendships). Familial ties are stronger than 
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those based solely around illicit enterprise; family firms are common in the trade. Distributors 
compete by providing drugs that are reasonably priced, of higher purity and easily accessible. 
Distributors gain customers through word of mouth or direct advertising. Advertising can be 
risky as it will raise the visibility of suppliers. The internet is the prime place to advertise drugs 
allowing distributors to reach a wide custom base.  
 
‘County lines’ currently dominates the policy and media discourse on drugs around concerns 
of violence and exploitation of vulnerable adults and children. In this respect drug dealers 
strategically look for people of specific characteristics to bring into their criminal networks. 
Contra to this, the thesis found that most supply relationships are formed voluntarily, as actors 
decide to work together to the benefit of both parties. Exploitation does exist but is restricted 
to certain aspects of the market, particularly at street level, in markets of highly addictive 
substances. In terms of geographical expansion, the study found that most drug dealers did not 
purposefully seek out new and previously unknown markets outside of the city. The only case 
in which this did happen was at certain events such as music festivals, where it was known that 
drugs would be in high demand. Dealers instead drew upon opportunities through their social 
networks, which were often locally based. A number of informants in this study began their 
dealing careers in rural areas before moving into the city to sell drugs in later life. As the market 
was so strong, it was more common for dealers to seek opportunities within the city rather than 
outside of it. Movement across the country was generally observed at higher levels of the trade 
and represented the normal pattern of distribution as drugs are transported from the 
manufacturer to the consumer. In this respect, the drug trade is orientated inwards through ‘city 
lines’ and outwards through ‘county lines’. In light of these findings, the thesis argues that 
county lines has been largely overplayed by the police, resulting in misrepresentations in the 
media, policy and also academia. Deceitfully or not (and there is no evidence either way), the 
drugs trade has been repackaged and reframed to suit policing agendas in ways that demonise 
particular actors and social groups. The thesis, therefore, builds upon existing research on 
offender stereotypes which continue to pervade common thinking around drugs and organised 
crime. 
 
 
3) How do drug dealers manage the risks of detection and reprimand from the state and 
other criminal actors in the drug market? 
 
Secrecy is paramount to the success of most criminal organisations. Maintaining control of 
flows of information can provide protection against the police and other criminal predators in 
the marketplace. Street-level operators are less able to do this as they will have to interact with 
a wider custom base than those who distribute at the wholesale level. This makes them 
relatively easy targets for arrest. Ultimately, suppliers protect themselves by creating layers of 
anonymity in the supply chain. This can be done by restricting roles to the coordination of 
supply rather than actual distribution. If the risky aspects of the trade can be passed onto others 
who are given limited information (such as the handling and distribution of drugs), then the 
police can have difficulties proving the involvement of key actors. Technology also has a 
significant role here (see below). Building upon previous research in this field, the thesis 
demonstrates how offenders manage their networks to mitigate risks; this includes controlling 
contact and association with actors that are known or wanted by the police. Maintaining a 
legitimate, law-abiding image is paramount in reducing risks. This can be achieved not only 
through a commitment to legitimate work, but through managing association with criminal 
peers in public places. Associating with known or wanted offenders, can raise the profile of 
drug dealers in police investigations. The stashing of drugs is also important at all levels of the 
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supply chain; drugs are transferred to the consumer in particular contexts that have the potential 
to be seized by the authorities or other criminal actors. The techniques that dealers employ for 
this depend on the type of drug sold, its physical size and the destination of sale. Retail level 
dealers may need easy access to their stash if they are making regular sales. This has the 
potential to increase risks for them.  
 
Trust is essential in drug markets. Buyers and sellers at any level in the supply chain need to 
be confident that their contacts will honour the exchange (ensure that the correct funds are 
given for the correct product) and maintain discretion and secrecy where required. The study 
demonstrates that relationships around trust vary depending on the type of product on sale, the 
mechanisms in place that increase safety and the extent to which drugs are policed. For 
example, distributors with websites, or those on the dark web, will sell openly to customers 
with no prior introductions (more on this later). The same can be said of those selling semi-
legitimate drugs, which are difficult to prosecute (more on this later). Furthermore, drug 
markets with cultural features that encourage altruism are deemed to be safer than others that 
do not, in this respect trust can be placed within the market itself. Violence (or its perceived 
threat) is useful as a tool to enforce debts and protect against other criminals. Offenders who 
have a reputation for violence and retribution make less appealing targets for robbery and have 
greater ability to uphold their positions and territories. Serious violence is relatively 
uncommon, however, as it increases risks of reprisals and draws unwanted attention from the 
police. Engaging in a few serious violent acts may be enough to establish a reputation and 
provide a narrative that can be drawn upon when needed. Violence is more common at the 
street level and in markets of highly addictive substances. Drug addicts can build significant 
debts that they cannot easily repay, leading those who supply them to respond aggressively. 
Where trust begins to break down, distributors can mobilise capable others (or the reputations 
of others) who may be hidden in the ‘background’. It is when issues emerge that these power 
structures reveal themselves. Drug dealers do not often engage in territorial disputes unless the 
market in their area becomes saturated or they cross paths with other dealers in particular 
settings. Nightclubs are settings in which different criminal actors from within and outside of 
the city converge and collide. The fact that multiple dealers are confined in these settings, rather 
than when they sell drugs on the street, makes conflict all the more likely. 
 
Expanding upon previous work in the night economy, the thesis demonstrates the role that 
door-supervisors have in controlling drug markets within their establishment (through the 
capacities of their role and monopoly on violence). It finds that, although increased regulation 
and securitisation has reduced the hold that criminal groups have in the sector, drugs remain 
prevalent and are widely accepted. There are some bouncers who sell drugs themselves, but 
this does not mean they will do it on the job, although this may relate to what level they are in 
the supply chain. Drug money is also laundered into clubs on a regular basis by a variety of 
actors (promoters and club owners). Fighters, hard men and those with violent reputations are 
still widely valued in the industry, making it particularly susceptible to criminal infiltration. 
However, there has been a shift towards a preference for less violent security staff who can 
give the club a better image. Territorial disputes between security companies are rare, so firms 
can get by with less physically capable door staff in some instances. Past reputations for 
violence have stayed with long-established companies and the older bouncers they employ. 
Such reputations provide a narrative of potential violence that can dissuade others from 
challenging them, although gang violence can still be an issue.  
 
Drug policy differentially constrains drug markets, allowing some vendors to operate more 
openly with particular nightclubs now distributing semi-legitimate drugs themselves. Markets 
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that are closest to legitimacy, in terms of their legal status and social acceptability of the 
product, are less heavily policed. To reduce risks, suppliers can switch into less risky markets 
to maintain their operations on a long-term basis. Indeed, the legitimacy of the drug affects the 
visibility of suppliers and their operational strategies. Those operating closets to legitimacy 
begin to resemble legitimate businesses.  
 
Overall this study adds to existing research in this field by demonstrating how criminal actors 
reduce the risks of their activities by controlling flows of information, positioning themselves 
within their networks, distributing certain products or maintaining particular fronts. It 
demonstrates the methods and strategies that criminal actors use to transport drugs to the 
consumer within various contexts that pose variable levels of risk. By operating in ways that 
blend into the normal flows of city life, offenders can maintain a relatively low profile. These 
actors place significant value in their ability to employ skilful tactics to outmanoeuvre the 
police; however, their efforts are not always successful. 
 
 
Technology 
 
4) What role does emergent technology have in facilitating drug sales? 
 
Previous ethnographic research into drugs has paid little attention to the impact of emergent 
technology in the trade. Its effects, however, are substantial. Technology works across a 
number of dimensions; it facilitates communication, production, and distribution. ICT has 
perhaps transformed the trade the most by allowing distributors to communicate over distance 
and, in some cases, anonymously. This has resulted from shifts between open, semi-open and 
closed markets over time. Semi-open and closed drug markets (supply between trusted actors) 
have remained dominant since the advent of the mobile phone; however, the internet is 
beginning to change this. Whether it is on the clear net or the darknet, suppliers can advertise 
openly with relative anonymity. Clear net suppliers follow alternative protocols such as hosting 
their sites under fictitious names in countries that are not easily accessed by the authorities in 
their local country of origin. This may require enablers who have the technical knowledge to 
make this possible. Clear net suppliers will also restrict themselves to selling semi-legitimate 
drugs to avoid legal action.  
 
Research into the online drug trade tends to miss the offline life worlds of the criminal actors 
who engage in them, largely due to their methodologies. Accessing active online distributors 
face to face is something of a rarity in criminology and is difficult to achieve. In doing so, this 
study is able to examine the relationship between online and offline distribution, as offenders 
employ a variety of technologies to meet their goals. The study found that smartphones provide 
the most significant development in ICT due to their ability to communicate through a variety 
of applications and internet platforms. A number of participants are still choosing to employ 
older generation mobile phones, however, as they generate less data and are easy to replace on 
a regular basis. Although, in most cases, street-level dealing is conducted in closed markets, 
there are a few suppliers who will distribute to anyone who has their mobile phone line number, 
using multiple runners to take on the risk. In this respect, customers place trust in the business 
line, rather than the individual, as it moves between runners at the retail level. This, however, 
is more of a rarity and significantly risky in comparison to dealing with trusted customers. 
Indeed, lines can become targets of dealers wishing to put their competitors out of business, 
they may be passed on to other suppliers in the form of trade or assigned to runners to handle 
that particular level of the supply chain.  
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Mobile phones generate significant data trails that can be used by the police to gather 
intelligence. Smartphone applications that use end-to-end encryption provide distributors with 
a level of safety but are not impervious to the authorities if they are able to gain access to 
unlocked devices. Encryption does not resolve issues such as cell-site monitoring. As criminals 
become increasingly aware of the data trails they procure, they can use them to their advantage 
by creating ‘digital alibis’, which falsify their movements. Surveillance can also be employed 
by offenders to monitor the police, their peers, and other criminals in the market. This may 
occur by accessing communication networks themselves or visually monitoring others through 
CCTV and emergent technologies such as drones. Drones can be used to make deliveries or 
monitor others and add an additional layer of anonymity in the supply chain. Visual monitoring 
can be used to gain information on targets or intimidate them. 
 
 
This thesis demonstrates how significant levels of trust can be garnered online. Offenders build 
digital representations of themselves that can lead to collaboration without having met other 
offenders in the offline world. Connected co-presence can be enough to establish trusting 
relations online, something that previous research has failed to recognise. The internet also 
provides alternative techniques for reprisal, such as scammers lists, which erode the 
reputational trust of actors by naming and shaming them, accurately or otherwise. Indeed, 
whilst trust may be demonstrated through actions, it is expressed through narratives, which 
then guides the actions of others (whether or not they are in written or spoken form). Online 
shaming may have more negative effects on the transgressors’ lives than actual physical 
violence. Indeed, the study demonstrates how internet suppliers respond to threats to their 
enterprise without having to engage in physical violence, that is more typical in traditional 
offline markets. The internet presents new ways to breach market territories for both offenders 
and the police. It also allows actors to establish contact over vast geographical distances in 
ways that were not previously possible. The thesis found that virtual environments act as a 
layer that do not replace traditional offline markets but extend them and their territories. 
Communication between actors online does have real-world implications and can exasperate 
feuds over physical geographical space. Online actors are grounded locally in the physical 
world and have to use the city’s infrastructure to distribute their products, which is important 
to recognise. Virtual reality is the next online development creating new environments for 
criminals to operate in. 
  
Domestic production of drugs is becoming more commonplace across markets, and this process 
will continue as manufacturing technologies become simplified for users and more 
sophisticated in their outputs. Manufacturing drugs locally can reduce risks, especially for more 
bulky products such as cannabis. Domestic production reduces the costs of transportation and 
enables suppliers to get their products to their consumers more directly. The internet provides 
the know-how of production (and other forms of crime) allowing production lines to be 
established more easily. 3D printers pose the next opportunity or threat in terms of production 
but will require the correct resources (precursors) to become operational. 3D printers may one 
day enable people to manufacture drugs in their own homes with very little technical 
competencies. Virtual reality (VR) technologies represent the next evolution in ICT and are 
becoming more readily available to average consumers. It is likely that offenders will begin to 
use virtual worlds (if they have not done so already) for illicit gain. Overall, this thesis adds to 
the existing knowledge base by examining the activities of suppliers employing a variety of 
digital technologies to meet their goals. Technologies provide opportunities and constraints in 
ways that reconfigure the method, movements and structures of criminal groups.  
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Policy & Policing 
 
The consumption of illicit drugs in the UK has been increasing consistently despite policy and 
policing. Illicit drugs are more available, of higher purity and more popular throughout society. 
The criminal justice system has contributed to this by creating the conditions for the black 
market to grow, whilst penalising users and distributors in ways that negatively disrupt their 
lives and their communities. Policing undoubtedly shapes illicit markets, has some deterrent 
effect, and can remove opportunities to offend. Indeed, the thesis demonstrated that policing 
can reduce the supply of drugs; however, the impact is often short-lived and can have negative 
side-effects. The crackdown in Red City on cannabis cultivation when the drug was reclassified 
upwards to Class-B was initially effective in many respects. Sourcing the drug at the wholesale 
level became increasingly difficult for street dealers, pushing some out of the market and into 
legitimate work. Those that took this path were only able to do so because they had already 
invested in their futures and had legitimate jobs to turn to (which were well paid relative to the 
street level cannabis market and more meaningful). Other participants were less fortunate and 
continued to distribute the drug (alongside other products) at a higher price per gram. Since 
this time, the potency of cannabis has continued to rise whilst the availability of the drug has 
rebounded. A more recent policy change was the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016, which 
similarly pushed dealers out of the trade but again had limited effects on availability. The thesis 
adds to economic research on drug markets by demonstrating how policing and policy impacts 
upon the price and availability of drugs and how, in turn, drug dealers respond these to changes 
on the ground. Economic analysis of drug markets is essential to our understanding of the trade; 
however, studies employing market data are typically only statistical and far removed from the 
lived realities of offenders who work within these markets. 
 
The thesis examined the activities of one of Red City’s largest retail suppliers of nitrous oxide 
(a semi-legitimate drug). After the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 was introduced, Max 
was concerned that he (and his staff) might be sent to prison for distributing the product. Max 
decided to shut down his business and closed his website. At the time of writing, there are no 
longer any delivery services in the city with websites that are accessible through the google 
search engine. 24-hour delivery of the drug is available, but the market has moved 
‘underground’, resulting in reports of increased violence in the trade. Max’s business represents 
what a legal drug market might look like in the UK. The entire operation was conducted in a 
legal manner; he logged his sales, paid his taxes and did not engage in any violence or 
exploitation. Due to his heightened level of visibility, it was imperative that he acted in keeping 
with the law or risk being prosecuted. He competed with other suppliers by providing superior 
service but did not undercut them by reducing his prices. To ensure profits were not 
compromised, suppliers-maintained prices across the city – thus they operated as a cartel on 
prices, but not on service. Sales were highest on evenings and weekends signalling that most 
people consume drugs outside of working hours in their leisure time and lead relatively 
productive lives (this trend was observed across all psychoactive drug types). 
 
The findings provide some insight and perhaps support towards the softening of drug policy 
and the legalisation of illicit drugs. When operating within the law, suppliers act in ways that 
can reduce the level of harm in the trade. The legalisation of ‘hard’ drugs remains a contested 
issue, although some academics have leant towards this. Unless all drugs are legalised, there 
will still be opportunities for criminals to sell them, and it is unlikely that policing will resolve 
the harms associated with the trade. With tight regulation that – unlike the oxycontin and opioid 
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scandals - restricts both sale and marketing, combined with pricing regimes that deter 
consumption, drugs can be legalised in ways that safely reduce the social and economic costs 
to society. If drugs can be taxed by the government, these funds can be reinvested into treatment 
programs that provide support for problematic users. Tackling drugs through policing and 
punishment is a failed agenda that cannot keep pace with developments in the trade. Illicit 
drugs can be harmful, so efforts to reform should move carefully so that commercial interests 
do not derail any positive outcomes. With greater emphasis placed on harm reduction rather 
than criminalisation, steps can be taken towards this aim. Lastly, drug policy itself is not the 
only solution; we must consider the political economy in which deepening poverty and income 
inequality lead people to crime. Removing the opportunity to sell drugs will not resolve these 
structural issues.   
 
 
Study Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research. 
 
There are a number of limitations to this research, some of which stem specifically from the 
methodology. Being a relatively small local study, there were some aspects of the drug market 
that were not directly accessible. I was not able to interview any foreign traffickers, although 
some of the participants had insights into the workings of the trade at this level. Buster, the 
drugs courier, introduced in chapter one, had knowledge of the processes of the trafficking 
operation he was involved in (from his time in court) but had remained in the UK and only met 
one member of the group from the country of origin (another courier). Charley had experience 
exporting anabolic steroids from the UK, but this was generally in small parcels sent in the post 
and incurred fewer risks than other drug types. In light of this, the study has less to say about 
the drug market at this level. Future research could solicit offenders involved in trafficking but 
could suffer in terms of gaining access. Researchers may need to go through official routes by 
interviewing offenders who are already known to authorities. This could be bolstered, where 
possible, with ethnographic research of unknown offenders (such as those in this study). A 
relaxation from ethics committees would help with this aim. The stringent requirements placed 
on researchers have had a suffocating effect on the research of this kind. 
 
The study did not consider in great detail how offenders managed the proceeds of crime in 
terms of the laundering of assets. Illicit drug dealing can be highly profitable and significant 
sums of money can be made. Funds may be difficult to spend or invest without drawing 
unwanted attention from the authorities. Questions remain as to how drug dealers launder their 
assets and how far they think ahead in terms of future investments. Do offenders intend to 
reinvest the proceeds of crime into illicit avenues to expand or diversify, or is it their goal to 
set up legitimate businesses in order to go straight and how is it that they do this? Furthermore, 
is it possible for offenders to launder their proceeds themselves or do they require assistance 
from professional enablers? There are few empirical studies of professional money laundering, 
requiring far more research in this area. If the police are to target criminal assets, then 
knowledge of how criminals channel funds are necessary.  
 
Modern cities are becoming increasingly dependent on digital technology to run their critical 
infrastructure and drive their economy. These technologies, however, have vulnerabilities in 
themselves and may be adopted for criminal means. Indeed, this thesis describes drug markets 
as socio-technical systems in that they are both socially and technically ordered. Technology 
allows old crimes to be committed in new ways and enables entirely new types of crime 
altogether; some of which are fully dependant on it. It can replace human actors as tasks are 
delegated to it, as well as providing new environments in which to offend. Such developments 
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may be anticipated and mitigated provided there is a research agenda in place that can keep 
pace with them. When it comes to policing, intelligence officers on the ground now work in 
tandem with desk-based analysists who develop intelligence products as part of police 
investigations. In a similar manner, computer scientists should collaborate with ethnographers 
to provide a more nuanced understanding of how technology is being adopted by criminal 
actors on the street. Yet, research into technology and crime is typically missing its 
ethnographic component. Moreover, research outputs can only feed into the policy discourse 
with greater communication between academics, the police and policymakers. Siloed labour 
breeds intellectual tunnel vision, which can undermine future interventions.  
 
Questions remain as to how emergent technology will change the operational strategies of 
criminal groups, and also how it will affect the life-course of offending. In what ways does 
technology facilitate entry into crime and how might it be used to prevent it or promote 
desistance? This thesis advocates a renewed focus in the Science and Technology Studies turn 
in criminology in which these questions may be answered with greater use of traditional 
ethnography. Criminal actors will continue to make use of technologies as they become 
available to them in their daily lives. Future research into drugs should consider the interaction 
between online and offline activity rather than focusing one of the two. Overall, the illicit drug 
market is composed of many different technological devices that impact upon manufacture, 
distribution and consumption. It is the interrelationships between these technologies and social 
life that will shape the organisation of the trade. By examining and exposing the weaknesses 
within socio-technical systems better efforts can be put in place to disrupt them, with harm 
reduction as a primary objective. One thing is for certain - drug markets are here to stay; the 
questions remain as to how we want to manage them and what management methods have 
which market and personal effects. 
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